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Abstract

Environmental controversies are by their nature difficult to
resolve satisfactorily dealing as they do with the potentially
divisive issues. At one extreme, these can be issues of land use
and planning, pollution, conservation and resource management.
Such issues are of immediate and personal concern to the
parties involved. At the other extreme, they can involve
conflicting and polarised ideologies, strong philosophical
differences and conflicting claims to represent the public
interest. In addition such controversies can involve political
considerations on a local or national level.

The use of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) methods have
been suggested in the literature as an effective mechanism for
the resolution of such controversies.

This study seeks to examine the effectiveness of these methods
to resolve environmental controveries. The research is based
upon two case studies of the use of ADR methods in resolving
environmental controversies of widely divergent types. In order
to facilitate the research a method of classifying environmental
controversies was developed.

The hypothesis of the research is that the effectiveness of ADR
methods would be confined to relatively simple matters
classified as environmental disputes in this research. Contrary
to expectation, the research suggests that ADR methods may
have a much wider application and may be a useful additional
mechanism in helping to resolve major environmental conflicts.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Controversies over environmental matters have become
increasingly prevalent and persistent in Australia over the past
20 years. Various political and legal means have been used to
attempt to resolve such controversies with varying degrees of
success. Broadly speaking such controversies are resolved by
adjudicative, consensual or administrative means. These three
broad categories are referred to as Environmental Dispute
Resolution mechanisms. The provision of satisfactory methods
to resolve environmental controversies remains a significant
issue for our legal and political systems. Experience in the
United States suggests that the use of a range of consensual
methods, usually termed Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)
methods, within the existing legal and political systems may
provide an effective solution.
The use of ADR methods in Environmental Dispute Resolution in
the Australian context has occurred in various guises since the
early 1980s, but no comprehensive studies of the effectiveness
of such methods have been reported. This represents a serious
gap in the knowledge required to detemnine the best means for
the efficient resolution of environmental controversies in our
society. This study seeks to contribute to the knowledge in this
area.

Outline
The aim of this study is to examine by way of case study some
of the uses now being made of ADR methods in the resolution of
environmental controversies in Australia and to investigate the
effectiveness of that use. The following is an outline of the
approach used to achieve this aim.

Chapter 1 provides an ouline of the research and introduces the
concepts of environment, dispute and resolution.

Chapter 2 examines the characteristics unique to
environmental controversies and uses such characteristics as a
method of classifying these controversies.

Chapter 3 reviews the various ADR methods to determine
which are used in the resolution of environmental controversies.

Chapters 4 and 5 review the current literature with respect to
the implementation of these methods in an environmental
context. This review involves a comparison of the experience in
the United States and Australia.

Chapter 6 details the research methods used to achieve the
aim of the study. This involved a distillation from the broad
areas of enquiry to more focussed and precise research
questions. A research approach based upon case studies was
selected as the means to address the questions posed.

Chapter 7 examines the existing mechanisms used for the
resolution of environmental controversies in New South Wales.
This review provides a basis for determining where ADR
methods are currently being used for the resolution of
environmental controversies and as a means for selecting
suitable case study examples.

Chapter 8 presents the results of the first case study
examining the use made of ADR methods in the Land and
Environment Court of NSW for the resolution of environmental
disputes.

Chapter 9 presents the results of the second case study
examining the use of ADR methods in the resolution of
environmental conflicts. The study focusses on the ADR methods
utilised by the NSW Resource and Conservation Council in its
preparation of an interim assessment strategy for forest use.

Chapter 10 discusses these results and draws conclusions
about how effectively ADR methods have been implemented in
the resolution of environmental controversies. The discussion
concludes with a series of recommendations as to how this use
could be made more effective.

Definition of Terms
Environmental

Dispute

Resolution.

What is the environment?

A broad definition of "Environment' is one tliat defines it in
terms of:
"the region, surroundings and circumstances in which any
organism exists. This environment includes the natural physical
aspects as well as the man-made surroundings with which the
organism

interacts.

This definition is broad in the sense that it is concerned with
the surroundings of "any organism" rather than a more
traditional approach which perceives environment in terms of
'the surroundings of man'.

The

anthropocentric

view

Much of Australian law applies a traditional, essentially
anthropocentric, view of the environment which accepts that:

'environment' includes all aspects of the surroundings of human
beings, whether affecting human beings as individuals or in
social groupings.2

International Union of Local Authorities, Glossary of Environmental Terms
(1991), lULA, Istanbul, 31.
^Environment Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act 1974 (Cth), section 3.

This was a definition with wide currency throughout the 1970s
and 1980S.3 It remains the definition used in the

Environmental

Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) (the EPA Act).^

The anthropocentric approach has been said to involve:

"the exaltation of human beings and their particular faculties
(eg reason) - the placing of the human being in a pre-eminent
position with respect to the rest of, not only terrestial
phenomena, but the universe at

large.

Even in relatively new and updated legislation an
anthropocentric definition continues to be used. The
Environmental Offences and Penalties Act 1989 (NSW) was
amended in 1990 to provide a more expansive definition, but one
that remains essentially anthropocentric:

"environment" includes all aspects of the surroundings of human
beings,

including:

(a) the physical factors of those surroundings, such as the land,
the waters and the atmosphere; and
(b) the biological factors of those surroundings, such as
animals, plants and other forms of life; and
(c) the aesthetic factors of those surroundings, such as their
appearance, sounds, smells, tastes and textures.^

3See for instance the Environment (Financial Assistance) Act 1977 (Cth).
^Section 4.
5A Dodson, Green Political Thought: An lntroduction{A990), London, 8.
^Section 4(1). (emphasis supplied).

What flows from a view which perceives human beings as the
central focus is inevitably a perspective which sees the
'environment' in terms of a benefit or commodity for the use of
humans. This perspective views any development
anthropocentrically and asks what will be the extent of the
development's effect on the amenity of human beings. This is
essentially the perspective of much planning legislation. It
helps to explain why such legislation is not primarily concerned
with ecologically sustainable outcomes but more concerned
with the facilitation of land development.

The mitigation of environmental impacts encouraged by the EPA
Act may well be insignificant in terms of sustainability or real
environmental concerns (such as climate change or maintainence
of diversity) since the effect on the amenity of man of these
outcomes is not perceived as immediate.^

While s90(1)(b)

speaks of "harm to the environment" it is used in the narrow
sense as an assessment of the effect on the benefit of that
'environment' to human beings not the effect on the environment
per se. This assessment focusses upon the effect the
development has on the amenities or interests of competing
human land users. Amenity value has a much narrower and more
limited focus than ecological value even though the latter will
have long-term impact upon human beings.

7K Sperling, 'Beyond Development Control: Creating a Planning Framework for
Sustainabinty'(1997) Australian Environmental Law News, no 3, 1997
September/October 26 at 26.

The ecocentric view

By the 1990s legislative definitions used in Australia were
displaying a wider ecocentric perspective. The ecocentric view
gives greater prominence to ecological values, placing mankind
in

his surroundings rather than at the centre. A good example of

this shift in perspective is the definition provided in the Local
Government (Planning and Environment) Act 1991 (Qld.):

"environment" includes:
(a) ecosystems and their constituent parts including people and
communities,
(b) all natural and physical resources,
(c) those qualities and characteristics of locations, places and
areas, however large or small, which contribute to their
biological diversity and integrity, intrinsic or attributed
scientific value or interest, amenity, harmony, and sense of
community, and
(d) the social, economic, aesthetic and cultural conditions which
affect the matters referred to in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) or
which are affected by those matters. ®

The wider ecocentric view has also received greater currency,
though not always acceptance, in the courts. The High Court of
Australia in D.R Murphy and Covehouse Australia v Queensland ^
reversed an eariier Queensland decision which had held that
'environment' in the eariier Queensland Act did not include living
^Section 1.4.
^Unreported 3 October 1990. FC90/039.

organisms (in this case turtles and their nesting areas) and so
the impact of a proposed development on such organisms did not
require

consideration.

Attempts have since been made to have courts adopt the wider
ecocentric definition. This has not always been successful. In a
case concerned with the effects of logging of south coast forest
areas on the environment, the Land and Environment Court of
New South Wales

was asked to expand the definition such that

'environment' would include:

"not only the physical environment but also include the social
effects (of a development) and their impact on the relations
between social groupings"^ °

While allowing that the social effects of a development could be
a relevant factor, Hemmings J stopped short of expanding 'social
effects' to mean :

"that an activity which is otherwise not likely to significantly
affect the environment could be seen to do so merely because it
excited opposition by a section of the public."
However even to have accepted such an expansion would have
been nonetheless an anthropocentric approach based upon the
effects on 'a section of the public'.

^^Jarasius v Forestry Commission of NSW & Ors (1988)71 LGRA 79 at 93.

Similar attempts to widen the scope of the definition of
environment are apparent on the international front. The Rio de
Janiero Earth Summit of June 1992 defined "environmental
protection" from an ecocentric perspective as the protection of
discrete and interacting ecosystems:

"The environment is threatened in all its biotic (living) and
abiotic (non-living) components: animals, plants, microbes and
ecosystems comprising biological diversity; water, soil and air,
which form the physical components of habitats and
ecosystems, and all the interactions between the components of
biodiversity and their sustaining habitats and ecosystems.^

The definition of the environment and dispute
resolution

The notion of competing human needs is the essence of an
anthropocentric view of the environment. However an ecocentric
definition of environment does not sit comfortably with the
notion of dispute resolution since implicit in dispute resolution
is the resolution of disputes between human beings.

This is not to say that inanimate objects could not be given
status as parties in any environmental controversy. United
States Supreme Court Judge W. O. Douglas in his dissenting

11 U N Conference on Environment & Development The Earth Summit
London, Agenda 21, Chapter 16, para. 16.22.

993)

judgement in Sierra Club v Rogers C. B. Morton gave an eariy
judicial expression of this view:

•Contemporary public concern for protecting nature's ecological
equilibrum should lead to the conferral of standing upon
environmental objects to sue for their own

preservation.2

This was not necessarily a novel idea given that other inanimate
objects such as ships or corporate entities were parties to
litigation. Similarly permitting a dispute resolution body to
appoint a representative of an inanimate object would not be
significantly different from customary judicial appointments of
guardian ad litem, executors or administrators.^^

Problems do arise given the competing claims of various
interest groups to represent the interests of the environment
generally, or inanimate objects specifically. Taking the
definition of the environment as far as proposed by Stone may
increase rather than diminish the intensity of the disputes
between human beings and further exacerbate the difficulties
inherent in resolving such controversies.

This makes it clear that the distinction between 'environment'
from an anthropocentric approach or an ecocentric approach is
largely an artificial one. Strictly speaking an environmental
controversy is never between the needs of human beings and the
"•^Supreme Court of United States No. 70-34, April 19, 1972 reproduced in C
D Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Towards Legal Rights for Natural Objects
(1974) W Kaufman, Los Altos, CA, appendix.
I3|d., 81.

needs of the environment, it is always between competing
human beings even when the focus is ecocentric. This is so
because only human beings can Value' the environment by
attaching meaning or value to particular interests, needs or
goals in relation to it.

For some, the focus is upon preservation of an ecosystem, while
for others it is upon employment opportunities or economic
development. But either way the perspective is anthropocentric,
since it involves attaching value to potentially conflicting uses
of the surroundings of human beings. Given this, the two
different approaches to the environment.do not provide any real
assistance in classifying environmental controversies. For all
practical purposes environmental controversies are
anthropocentric disputes, even if one of the parties to the
controversy perceives the environment from an ecocentric
perspective. It is necessary to look elsewhere for a method of
classification.

What is a dispute?
'Dispute' in a generic sense

According to its ordinary English meaning the term 'dispute' is
simply a disagreement or difference of opinion. This is
essentially synonymous with the wider but related term
'conflict' which means a clash of opposing principles. Boulle
concedes this similarity but makes a distinction in terms of
intensity. So while:
11
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"a dispute involves an overt and contested claim between two or
more parties over competing interests, principles or process"
A conflict refers to:
•an ongoing series of disputes of severe intensity which have
occurred over a extended period of time.'^^
Disputes in this general sense embrace both a dispute per se (a
single contested claim) and a conflict (a series of contested
claims).
But in the field of dispute resolution the term 'dispute' has a
distinct technical meaning which has a much narrower scope
than a contested claim. So for the sake of clarity and
consistency of expression, a dispute in the generic sense has
been labelled as a 'controversy' and covers both disputes per se
and conflicts.

'Dispute' in a special sense
Tillett^s points out that in the field of dispute resolution terms
such as 'dispute' and 'conflict' are used in ways that do not
necessarily correlate with their ordinary English meaning.
"•^L Boulle, Mediation: Principles, Process, Practice (1996) Butterworths,
Sydney, 12.
"^^G Tillett, Resolving Conflict A Practical Approach (1991) Sydney
University Press, Sydney, 4.

Definitions of 'dispute' in this technical sense include:

"a dispute arises when two (or more) people (or groups) perceive
that their interests, needs or goals are incompatible, and seek
to maximise fulfilment of their own interests, or needs, or
achievement of their own goals (often at the expense of
others)."! 6

Burton adapts this definition and describes these "interests,
needs or goals" as "negotiable issues". He makes the assumption
that the perception of incompatibility and the desire to
maximise fulfilment over such interests is not fixed in the
minds of the parties but open to some potential form of
compromise.

It is this possibility of compromise or negotiability implicit in
Burton's interpretation of Tillett's definition that is the
distinguishing feature of a dispute in this more limited
technical sense. In a dispute in this sense the maximising of
goals may be achieved through bargaining or negotiating
because, even though the goals may seem incompatible, "to
obtain that which is more important, one party may yield to the
other on that which is less important".i® These disputes are
open to settlement, either by a mutually agreed settlement or a

'l^ld., (emphasis supplied).
"•^J Burton, Conflict Resolution as a
University, Fairfax, 11.
I^G Tiiiett, op cit., note 15 above, 4.

Political System(^9QQ) George Mason

settlement imposed in adjudicative proceedings or
administratively.

Conflict

It is this negotiability feature of a dispute that puts it in sharp
contrast to Tillett's definition of a conflict:

"Conflicts exist when one or more parties perceive that their

values or needs

are incompatible. Values are incompatible if

each contradicts or opposes the other. One need would be seen as
incompatible with another if meeting that need is thought to
prevent, obstruct, interfere with or in some way make meeting
the other need less likely or effective."^^

In the case of a dispute, the incompatibility was to do with
"interests, needs or goals." But as Burton pointed out, in spite of
the appearance of incompatibility, a compromise was possible.
In contrast, there is some different quality of the "values or
needs" involved in a conflict that make the scope for
compromise so much narrower.

So it must be assumed that the values and needs perceived as
incompatible in the case of a conflict are different in some
significant way from the "interests, needs or goals" associated
with disputes. Burton distinguishes the former as "relating to

"•^id., 7 (emphasis supplied).

ontological human needs that cannot be

compromised."20

'Values'

in this sense are those beliefs which have significance for an
individual, and he offers religious or political beliefs as
examples. 'Needs' on the other hand involve both physical or
psychological wants. In the case of conflict, Burton asserts the
needs at issue relate to essentially psychological wants of a
fundamental character not seen as amenable to compromise and
he includes in these both the need for self esteem and the need
for a sense of identity.

Such conflicting values and needs are seen as opposites, either
objectively so or at least in the minds of the Individuals
involved. As Burton emphasises, these real or perceived
differences are seen as non-negotiable:

"Conflict is a relationship in which each party perceives the
other's goals, values, interests or behaviour as antithetical to
its own."21
Controversies over these values or needs are perceived as
incapable of resolution.

The other distinguishing feature of conflict is that the
perceived incompatibility may often be underlying rather than
overt. It may manifest itself in a superficial way in the form of
a dispute over a particular issue, but the vehemence with which
this incipient dispute escalates may be reflective of a depth of

2 0 j Burton, "Conflict Resolution as a Political Philosophy"(1991)
3(1) Interdisciplinary Peace Research, May/June, 62 at 63.
2lBurton(1988), op cit., note 17 above, 11.

conflict not previously manifested by the parties. It is the
pervasive nature of this incompatibility which leads Burton to
conclude:

•When we come to conflicts, however, it is not sufficient to
deal with particular cases and institutionalize means of dealing
with them."

This is said by way of distinguishing conflicts from disputes:

•Disputes that are over negotiable interests will always exist,
as will problems of management amongst persons who have
common goals and values. But both can be dealt with by applying
consensus norms, and by management techniques."22
The assumption Burton clearly makes is that application of
consensual norms or management techniques are not effective
for the pervasive nature of conflicts.

A further point is made in the literature about both the concepts
of dispute and conflict. Gregorczuk, discussing international
environmental disputes, places 'dispute' in a legal context:

"as a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal
views or interests between two parties, in which a claim or
assertion of one party is met with refusal, counter-claim or
denial by another."23
22Burton(1991), op cit., note 20 above, 71.
23H Gregorczuk, "The appropriateness of mediation in international
environmental disputes"(1996) Australian Dispute Resolution Journal,
February 1996, 4 7 at 50.

There is however, nothing implicitly legal in any controversy be
it a dispute or a conflict. Legal controversies are "ordinary
disputes which are either governed by legal rules or followed by
legal consequences".24 in the case of environmental
controversies, the nature of the matters at issue are just as
likely to be political as legal, either on a local, regional or
national level. There is nothing to say that disputes or conflicts
must necessarily be subject to legal norms.

The categorisation of controversies as either 'disputes' or
'conflicts' is neither clear cut nor distinct. It was considered
that the concept of a continuum, with its sense of an unbroken
sequence of incremental changes, could be used to trace the
subtle shifts in perspective between a dispute and a conflict.
This was an important step in the development of this study,
because once utilised for this purpose, the device of a
continuum allowed a system of classification of environmental
controversies to be proposed as a basis for analysis.
Controversies could be placed at some point along a continuum
using the extent to which they exhibit interests, needs or goals
seen as negotiable (disputes) or goals and needs seen as
incompatible

(conflicts).

24D Easton, Introducing the Law {^9B2) CCH Australia Ltd, Sydney, 94.

What is

resolution?

Resolution in a generic sense

Similar definitional problems arise concerning the concept of
'resolution'. Controversies, or contested claims, by definition
can be the subject of some form of resolution. The distinction
between a dispute and a conflict may be reflected in the manner
in which these are resolved. Burton has referred to the
negotiated or arbitrated outcome of a dispute as a "settlemenf;
while the process of dealing with a conflict in a way that
satisfies the inherent needs of all parties (while not perhaps
solving the conflict) has been referred to as a "resolution'.^s For
the sake of clarity and consistency of expression resolution in
the generic sense needs a separate label and has been termed a
'solution'. Solution covers both a settlement and a resolution in
the special senses discussed.

Settlement

When the literature on dispute resolution speaks of settlement
it is generally referring to the use of a mechanism to settle or
manage the actual controversy manifested. The controversy is
settled if a solution is imposed by an external body, that is
adjudicatively, or if it is one provided consensually by
negotiation or mediation between the parties.

25j Burton(1991) op cit, note 20 above, 62.

Resolution

When speaking of resolving conflicts, there is an implict
understanding that the conflict involves a larger degree of
incompatibility between the parties. It is in order to address
this degree of incompatibility that the mechanisms for
resolving conflict must identify or deal with the underlying
issues rather than merely settling its superficial manifestation.
Conflict resolution digs deeper in an attempt to resolve the
source of the conflict, often by addressing real or perceived
incompatibility of

values.2 6

The essence of the distinction that marks out resolution from
settlement is the attempt made to resolve underlying conflict:

"Conflict Resolution means terminating conflict by methods that
are analytical and get to the root of the problem. Conflict
Resolution, as opposed to mere management or 'settlement',
points to an outcome that, in the view of the parties involved, is
a permanent solution to the

problem.''27

Tillett's view is that conflict resolution in this sense of
complete solution may be impossible in many situations.^s To
expect resolution of a conflict in the fullest sense suggested by
Burton may exclude from the definition of resolution most

26g Tillett, op cit., note 15 above, 45.
J Burton, op cit., note 17 above, 2.
28g Tillett, op cit., note 15 above, 10.

practical examples of conflict resolution. A less strict
interpretation may allow for successful 'resolution' where the
mechanism for resolving the conflict at least identifies the
underlying issues (such as value conflict), even if it does not
then overcome their incompatibility.

A resolution in this less exacting sense may produce a solution
to the underlying conflict (such as an agreement to disagree)
with which I h e parties agree they can live with once they leave
the neutral ground of the problem-solving forum.'29 In this
study, resolution in this less than complete sense is accepted as
equating to 'conflict resolution.'

Distinguishing

settlement

and

resolution

There are gradations in the manner in which a dispute or
conflict can be solved. On the one extreme, a permanent solution
where the real matters at issue are identified and addressed is
a resolution in the fullest sense. At the other extreme, a
temporary truce over a single issue between parties with
fundamental differences in values is little more than a
settlement.

'Settlement' can be seen as the reaching of a binding agreement,
either mutually agreed or imposed, to which the parties adhere.

29p. Adler, "Mediating public disputes" (1990) in R J Fowler (ed)
Proceedings of the Intemationai Conference on EnvironmentaJ Law,
Sydney,14-18 July 1989, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 103.

'Resolution' can be seen as the identification and addressing of
overt and underlying conflict with a view to producing a
permanent solution to the problem in issue within the
framework of continuing competing needs or values even if no
final solution is reached.
It can be seen that the aim of both settlement and resolution are
essentially similar, namely achieving a permanent
understanding between the parties involved in the dispute or the
conflict. The distinction is that settlement of a dispute
provides a solution to the problem manifested; in the case of a
conflict, the settlement achieved may need to co-exist with the
incompatibility of values underlying the conflict.
But it does not follow from this that disputes are always
settled and conflicts are always resolved. This can be made
clear if the distinctions between settlement and resolution
were also plotted along a continuum, since they need not (and in
many instances will not) overlap with the dispute/conflict
continuum. A solution of a conflict may not be a resolution,
indeed it might be more likely to be a settlement of a single
issue, leaving the fundamental conflict of values unresolved.
Conversely, a solution of a dispute may achieve a full closure of
the controversy, because the values in dispute are not
fundamental, such that it is possible to describe the solution
reached as a resolution. But to then merge the two continuua
would create a number of inconsistencies, since it would not be
correct, for instance, to label one end of the merged continuum
'dispute settlement' and the other 'conflict resolution'

The Mechanisms of Dispute Resoiution

Preston classifies dispute resolution mechanisms into three
kinds:
-managerial direction or administrative,
-adjudicative or
-consensual mechanisms-^®

Each of these three mechanisms manage environmental
controversies in a manner which produces solutions, ranging in
various degrees from settlement to resolution.

In the case of administrative means of dispute resolution, these
mechanisms encompass environmental controversies solved by
both administrative and executive decision. The decision-maker
is vested with authority, usually by statute, to apply the
relevant criteria and to exercise the authority in accordance
with administrative law p r i n c i p l e s . I f such decision is subject
to review on its merits to a court or tribunal the review is
nonetheless an administrative decision or a managerial
direction. A merit appeal remains a re-exercise of an
administrative or executive power and in this way is
fundamentally different from the judicial function of a court in
reviewing a

decision.32

For the purpose of this study, solution by

30B J Preston, 'Limits of Environmental Dispute Resolution
Mechamsms'(1995) 13 Australian Bar Review 148 at 149.
31M A Eisenberg, "Participation, Responsiveness and the Consultative Process:
An Essay for Lon Fuller"(1978) 92 ¡harvard Law Review 410 at 425.
32B J Preston, op cit., note 30 above, 150.

either administrative or executive decision making processes
are labelled as 'administrative mechanisms'.
Adjudicative mechanisms usually involve a judicial or quasijudicial body making a judgement in relation to an issue before
that body.33 The decision is binding upon the parties to it and in
the case of judicial decisions establishes a precedent which
may be binding upon others. An example of an issue solved by
way of an adjudicative mechanism is where the decisions of
government ministers or officals are judicially reviewed. The
grounds of such a review must involve alleged errors of law in
the manner in which the minister or official has exercised his
or her powers.
Consensual mechanisms are essentially the ADR methods which
are the subject of this research. These mechanisms rely on the
consensus or agreement of the parties to the controversy to
solve it, either alone (negotiation) or with the assistance of a
third party (mediation).
It Is considered that each of these mechanisms can potentially
produce a solution which could comfortably sit at either
extreme of the spectrum. No one mechanism has a monopoly on
producing either settlements or full resolutions.

33B J Preston, op cit., note 30 above, 150.

The Concept of a Continuum

As outlined above, the complexities associated with these
definitional questions can be addressed using the concept of a
continuum. Each of the three elements of environmental dispute
resolution: environment, dispute and resolution can be dealt
with in these terms.

The concept of a continuum between environmental disputes and
environmental conflicts develops into a central theme or
structure in this study. For clarity it can be illustrated by a
simple diagram:

The continuum of environmental
dispute resolution

Controversy
^
dispute

conflict

Environmental disputes in a wide generic sense are labelled as
'environmental controversies'. The continuum ranges from the
one extreme of an 'environmental dispute' in the sense of a
disagreement over interests, needs or goals dealing with the
environment, seen as incompatible but in fact amenable to
solution. At the other extreme is 'an environmental conflict'
where the needs or values over environmental issues appear
essentially

incompatible.

Conclusion
The method of nomenclature adopted is designed to systemise
the reporting and structuring of this research. The model of a
continuum provides the flexible method necessary because it
takes account of the fluidity of the concept of dispute and
conflict. Arriving at some method of placing environmental
controversies on some point along the continuum is the next
focus of this research. This is considered an important focus as
it provides a structure from which the hypotheses of this study
can be effectively examined.

CHAPTER TWO
CLASSIFICATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROVERIES

Introduction
This chapter outlines the mechanisms for resolving
environmental controveries and indicates that different
mechanisms may be appropriate depending upon where a
controversy lies on the continuum between an environmental
dispute and an environmental conflict. A method of placing
environmental controversies along the continuum is needed.

To achieve this purpose the nature of the characteristics of
disputes and conflicts relating to the environment are examined
in detail to provide one possible means of classification.
Specific examples are then examined to show how the
classification system might be applied.

The mechanisms of resolving environmental
controversies
The distinction between dispute and conflict is important in
determining the form of dispute resolution mechanisms which
may be effective in environmental matters. Environmental
disputes or environmental conflicts as defined may be suited to
different mechanisms. So a dispute between neighbours as to

one neighbour's building extension plans can be placed at some
point on the controversy continuum. It involves a perceived
incompatibility between the parties' respective interests, needs
or goals rather than their inherent values, and so can be placed
in the 'dispute' half of the controversy continuum. The issues in
contention may be negotiable between the parties on the basis,
for instance, that the extensions are modified to satisfy the
neighbour's concerns about privacy or loss of amenity.
Alternatively, if the parties cannot find a solution, one may be
imposed adjudicatively. In this research this is classified as an
environmental

dispute.

In comparison, a controversy involving an environmental
organisation, government entities and a natural resource
developer over commercial logging in native forests would be
placed at a different point along the controversy continuum. It
involves a perceived incompatibility of fundamental values,
with the strong probability of actual incompatibility. The issues
in contention appear non-negotiable: a compromise based upon
agreed restrictions of tonnage or areas logged is not necessarily
likely to be accepted by the parties. Some conservationists may
indeed not agree to any logging of native forests. The scope of
the difference in fundamental values is reflected in conflicting
attitudes to forest usage:

•You cant just save half the forest. You cani save half an
ecosystem, anymore than you can save half a human life or half
a sacred slte."^

These value differences would place It in the 'conflict' half of
the controversy continuum. In this research, this is classified
as an environmental conflict

This distinction has ramifications for the appropriateness of
the mechanisms of resolving environmental controveries. The
purpose of this study is to determine whether one category of
these mechanisms, namely ADR methods, is appropriate and
effective in solving controversies lying along all or part of the
continuum

'Environmental dispute resolution' Is taken to mean collectively
the range of procedures used to resolve environmental
controversies. As discussed in Chapter One, Preston's^
classification of such methods is used here:

consensual mechanisms - those mechanisms which depend upon
the consensus or agreement of the parties to the dispute. For
example, negotiation, mediation, neutral intervention and the
like.

^K Jurd, Director, Wildemess Society quoted in H Wootterv, 'Environmental
Dispute Resolution'(1993) 15 Adelaide Law Review 33 at 49.
2b J Preston, 'Limits of Environmental Dispute Resolution Mechanisms'
(t995) 13 Australian Bar Review 149 at 149

adjudicative mechanisms - those mechanisms where the dispute
Is resolved by the determination of a judicial or quasi-judicial
Institution. For example, litigation or arbitration before a court
or tribunal.

administrative mechanisms - those mechanisms where the
dispute Is determined by the direction of a decision-maker
vested with managerial authority. Preston describes these as
managerial direction but the simpler term 'administrative' is
used here. Examples of administrative mechanisms are decisions
made by a Minister, a government bureaucrat or a local council
and also merit reviews by a court or tribunal.
These procedures are not mutually exclusive and can be used In
combination. So, for Instance, consensual mechanisms may be
used as an adjunct to adjudicative or administrative
mechanisms. Similarly, adjudicative methods such as public
inquiries may be used as adjuncts to the administrative
mechanism.

Distinguishing environmental disputes and
environmental conflicts
As well as identifying the controversy as one Involving Issues
relating to the environment, some method of determining
whether the controversy Is an environmental dispute or an
environmental conflict needs to be found. This is essential
before any assessment can be made as to whether consensual

mechanisms are suited to resolve environmental controversies
along all or part of the continuum.

Disputes and conflicts relating to the environment have a
number of special characteristics and these characteristics
have been most comprehensively reviewed by Atherton &
Atherton3. This review is examined in detail with a view to
using these characteristics as a means of classifying
controversies, into either environmental disputes or
environmental

conflicts.

The extent to which a controversy displays these
characteristics will be used to place it on the continuum
between a dispute and a conflict. In general terms the more of
these characteristics which are shown, the closer that
controversy is towards the environmental conflict end of the
continuum.

However certain of these characteristics, it will be argued,
carry greater weight in discriminating between an
environmental dispute and an environmental conflict. Therefore
an attempt will be made to identify those characteristics which
can be used as key discriminators between environmental
disputes.and environmental conflicts.

3T Atherton & T Atherton,"Mediating Disputes over Tourism in Sensitive Areas,
Part 1"(1994 ) Alternative Dispute Resolution Journal, February 1994 , 7
at 11-17.

The characteristics of

environmental

controversies
Many of the characteristics reviewed here are neither unique nor
peculiar to environmental controversies. They are evident in
many non-environmental controversies. Additionally, a number
of the characteristics are not mutually exclusive, that is to say
there is a considerable degree of interrelatedness between
them. However it is considered useful to distinguish each
separate

characteristic.

Government is a party

A popular misconception is that environmental controversy
concern only developers and environmentalists. However
research in the United States dispels this view, suggesting that
government in its various fonns is a parly to four out of every
five environmental controversies. This research was the result
of a study commissioned by the US Conservation Foundation in
1986 to examine the effectiveness of environmental mediation
and as such is confined only to controversies subject to
mediation, which was still in the embryonic stage at that time.^
The research reviewed 161 environmental controversies
referred to mediation in the period 1974-84. These
controversies were classified into two groups for analysis:
site-specific and policy-level

matters.

^G Bingham, Resolving Environmental Disputes: a decade of experience (1986)
The Conservation Foundation, Washington.

The study analysed the parties involved in the 115 controversies
identified as site-specific. While environmental groups and
developers were each only involved in about a third of these
controversies,'federal and state agencies and units of local
government were involved in 82% of these matters."®

The research also disclosed that the single largest category of
these site-specific matters, 19 out of 115 cases or 16.5%, were
controversies between govemment agencies, that is to say no
parties other than public agencies were involved.® For example,
in one controversy involving a regional port development, the
parties consisted solely of 12 public agencies.

These results are readily embraced by other writers as
reflecting the norm for all environmental controversies, though
the research related only to conflicts resolved by mediated
means. This generalisation may not necessarily follow if it is
assumed govemment bodies involved in conflicts would be more
likely to mediate. Atherton & Atherton however accept that such
high levels of government involvement are also typically a
characteristic of environmental controversy in Australia, given
that these controversies directly involve the public interest and
govemment agencies are assumed to have responsibility to
represent that interest.^ Fowler also adopts this view:
•experience suggests that four out of every five environmental
disputes will involve govemment at local, state and/or Federal

5|d., 45.
6|d.. 46.
7T Atherton & T Atherton, op cit, note 3 above, 12.

levels."®

This is the view accepted here, that by their nature

most environmental controversy involves some level of
government involvement.

Multiple

Issues

Environmental controversy typically involve a large range of
issues. A large conflict may involve issues of land use, natural
resource management and questions of air or water quality. That
is not to say that a smaller dispute over a specific planning
matter will not involve multiple issues. A consent authority in
determining a development application is required under Pt 4
and Pt 5 of the EPAA Act to take account of a large range of
issues including:

(i) the landscape or scenic quality of the locality,
(ii) any wilderness areas,
(iii)any

critical

habitats,

(iv) the amount of traffic likely to be generated,
(v) the likelihood of soil erosion,
(vi) the amenity of the neighbourhood.^
But these need only be considered "so far as they are relevant",
and most will not be considered as relevant in essentially
planning disputes.

J Fowler,"Environmental Dispute Resolution Techniques- What Role in
Australia?" (1992) 9 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 122 at 128.
^See sections 90 & 111.

In the case of environmental conflicts the issues may also be
interconnected and interdependent, such that a decision on one
issue may influence all other environmental issues involved in
the controversy. This phenomenon is described as a 'polycentric'
problem:
"Polycentric problems involve a complex network of
relationships, with interacting points of influence. Each
decision made communicates itself to other centres of decision,
changing the conditions, so that a new basis must be found for
the next decision."
The difficulty with problems of this fomn is that they cannot be
resolved by identifying each issue at the start and then solving
them in turn, since the solution of one issue will have
repercussions for the others. The solution of one issue may
change the nature and scope of the others. ^^
So, for example, in a conflict over logging a particular native
forest compartment, a decision to permit or refuse logging in
that area will have implications for a potentially wide list of
issues. Logging will affect both fauna sanctuaries and flora
diversity. The management or curtailment of logging quotas will
have implications for the economic and social well being of the
local community. A decision to permit logging may also have
implications for these same issues in interconnected forest

"•Oj Jowell, 'The Legal Control of Administrative Discretion" (1973)

Law 178 at 213.
I^ld., 167.

Public

areas. The conflict cannot be considered without proper regard
for these and related issues.

Multiple

Parties

As discussed, in the vast majority of environmental
controversies government in some guise or other will be a party.
In addition, there may be other parties, including prívate
developers, environmental groups, local community groups,
residents, unions and other affected or interested individuals.
In many complex controversies the disputants are rarely confined
to 'the main parties'. At a local level, a controversy ostensibly
between a private developer and a local authority may attract the
attention of one or more community groups. A controversy on a
regional or national level may involve several government
agencies, private development interests, local community groups
and environmental groups with an international focus.
While each of these interested parties or stakeholders has
legitimate interests they differ markedly in degrees and style of
organisation and have wide disparities in power and resources.^^
Additionally such controversies may also be protean, that is to
say new and significant stakeholders may emerge as the dispute
process takes place and escalates.

I^Atherton & Atherton, op. cit., note 3 above, 12.

So, for instance, a controversy involving the establishment of a
copper and gold mine at Parkes in New South Wales involved
community groups represented by the Environmental Defenders'
Office, local graziers, the mining company, local shire
representatives and State government authorities J ^ Similarly, in
environmental controversies which are referred for review to
Commissioners of Inquiry under section 18 of the Environment
Planning and Assessment Act (NSW) 1979 (EPAA Act) "it is not
unusual for party numbers to be between 30 and 60 and in one
case have been as high as 400."14

Scientific

Uncertainity

Environmental controversies frequently raise questions of a
scientific or technical nature which extend over a number of
scientific disciplines. This creates the difficulty that no single
discipline can provide a complete or precise answer to the
scientific issues in disputed ^ In addition, even within each
discipline there is seldom unanimous agreement as to the
scientific implications of various decisions or developments.

The nature of this uncertainity is far reaching. Preston isolates
four possible sources:

I^The Adovale Mine Dispute, mediated in the Land and Environment Court in
1991, see NSW Parliament, Legislative Assembly Debates (1991) 11
December 1991 at 6480-1.
^ ^Office of the Commissioner of Inquiry for Environment and Planning, Annual
Report 1993-94, 4.
l^T Atherton & T Atherton, op cit, note 3 above, 13.

(1) uncertainity as to the environment: for example, does the
area to be developed contain habitat of an endangered species of
wildlife?
(2) uncertainity as to development: for example, what will be
the volume and quality of pollutants emitted?
(3) uncertainity as to impacts of a development: for example,
will a pollutant have a material impact on the local, regional or
global environment?
(4) uncertainity as to the effectiveness of proposed mitigation
measures: for example, how effective will habitat rehabilitation
be in restoring damaged or disturbed ecosystems?^^

This uncertainity can arise either because of imperfect
knowledge about the consequences of environmental action and
disagreement among scientists about the interpretation of the
data that is available; or because of the scientific biases of
various experts in the manner and methods of data collection, or
in many cases simply by the lack of useful research J ^

So, in the case of a relatively straightforward case involving
the siting of a mushroom composting plant in a rural community,
questions about the existence and location of water courses and
about the estimation of effluent levels produced widely
divergent views among the scientific experts involved J® With
respect to one submission as to what constituted a
"•^B Preston, op cit, note 2 above, 161.
^^L Horn, "The role of mediation in international environmental lav/(1993)
4(1) Australian Dispute Resolution Journal 16 at 28.
^^Narrambulla Action Group Inc. v Mulwaree Council & Ors.( 1996),
Unreported Bannon J, Land and Environment Court No 40165/95, 15
November 1996.

'watercourse', Bannon J said in his judgment 'a number of
erudite gentlemen, geomorpliologists and hydrologists were
called as witnesses and gave widely differing evidence on
affidavit as to that issue.'^^

The uncertainity is exacerbated because the scientific
information or opinion that is available is seldom value free.^^
For these reasons it is simply impossible to say that
environmental controversies are scientific disputes for which it
is possible to obtain a 'right decision'. There is no assurance
that a 'right decision' can be achieved. The disagreement among
scientists as to the implications of various effects concerning
the environment and the inherent difficulty in separating
scientific evidence and opinion from value judgements simply
prevents this occurring in contexts of scientific uncertainity.

This problem of scientific uncertainity and the related question
of irreversibility has given rise, in environmental law and
policy, to a protective approach to the environment, termed the
precautionary principle.21 As Stein J has pointed out, the
development of the principle 'is directed towards the prevention
of serious or irreversible harm to the environment in situations
of scientific uncertainity'.22

12.
Susskind & A Weinstein, 'Towards a Theory of Environmental Dispute
Resolution' (1980) 4 Land Use and Environmental Law Review 433 at 441.
21 Preston, op cit., note 2 above, 161.
22|n Leatch v National Parks and Wildlife Service & Shoalhaven City Ck)uncil
(1993) 81 LGERA 270 at 282.

The principle had its origins in Genmany in the 1970s and
received expression in international environmental instruments
such as the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, Principle 15. The principle has been incorporated
in the Commonwealth Strategies on Endangered Species and
Biological Diversity and in the 1992 Intergovernmental
Agreement on the Environment, as well as in State legislation
such as the Protection of the Environment Administration Act
1991 (NSW). The statement of the principle in the following
terms has now been cross-referenced in a number of other State
legislative

provisions:

'Where there are threats of serious or irreversible
environmental damage, lack of full scientific certainity should
not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent
environmental degradation."23

The formulation in the 1992 Intergovernmental Agreement on
the Environment has in addition the following provisos:

"In the application of the precautionary principle public and
private decisions should be guided by:
(i) careful evaluation to avoid, wherever practicable, serious or
irreversible damage to the environment; and
(ii) an assessment of the risk-weighed consequences of various
options."24

23 Section 6(2)(a) & see for example the Environmental Planning and
Assessment Regulation 1994 (NSW), Schedule 2, para.8(a).
24CI. 3.5.1.

Prior to its statutory incorporation in most New Soutli Wales
legislation by cross-referencing, the principle itself was
considered as a general proposition in Leatch v National Parks
and Wildlife Service and Shoalhaven City Council.^^ Stein J
considered the basis of the principle, namely "the potential for
serious hami to any endangered species and the adoption of a
cautious approach in the protection of endangered species" as
largely commonsense and clearly consistent with the scope of
the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 (NSW).26

The principle was applied to an application to take and kill
endangered fauna in the context of the construction of a link
road through North Nowra to the Pacific Highway on the south
coast of New South Wales. Two species of endangered wildlife
were affected, the Giant Burrowing Frog and the Yellow-bellied
Glider.

Stein J said in his judgement:

"while there is no express provision requiring consideration ot
the 'precautionary principle', consideration of the state of
knowledge or uncertainity regarding a species, the potential for
serious or irreversible harm to endangered fauna and the
adoption of a cautious approach in protection of endangered

25(1993) 81 LGERA 270.
26|d., 282-283.

fauna is clearly consistent with the subject matter, scope and
purpose of the [National Parks and Wildlife] Act.'27

It was accepted that the precautionary principle was most apt
in the case of the Giant Burrowing Frog because it was a new
addition to the endangered species schedule and therefore
warranted the cautious approach suggested where there is
scientific uncertainity. As regards the Yellow-bellied Glider it
had been listed as either of special concern or as endangered
since 1974. Though the licence was also refused for the Yellowbellied Glider, the court considered the precautionary principle
was not the crucial factor as the lack of scientific uncertainity
was considerably less.^^ The principle was thus a crucial factor
in the court's view that a licence should not be granted in the
case of one of the two endangered species.29

The principle has not, however, been universally applied. Talbot
J in Nicholls V Director of National Paries and Wildlife Service &
Forestry Commission of NSW^^ said in refusing to allow an
appeal against a licence to take or kill protected fauna in
relation to forestry operations near Wingham in northern New
South Wales:

'while it might be framed appropriately for the purpose of a
political aspiration, its implementation as a legal standard

27|d.
28|d.. 286.
Segal, "The Precautionary Principle- Should it be Embraced?', paper
presented to the NELA Conference Coolum, 8-12 May 1996.
30(1994) 84 LGERA 397

could have the potential to create interminable forensic
argument. Taken literally in practice it might prove to be
unworkable. Even the applicant concedes that scientific
certainity is essentially impossible".^^

In Greenpeace Australia Limited v Redbani< Power Company Pty
Limited & Singleton Council 32 Pearlman CJ in the NSW Land and
Environment Court dealt with an appeal against the granting of
development consent for a new power station. Greenpeace
opposed the power station on the basis that it would
unacceptably exacerbate the greenhouse effect through the
cumulative effect of carbon dioxide emissions. The Court was
asked to apply the precautionary principle and refuse
development consent. The Court held that the application of the
precautionary principle dictated that a cautious approach should
be adopted but it did not require that the greenhouse issue
should outweigh all other issues.^^

At present the use of the Precautionary Principle in Australia
appears to be essentially a public policy directive rather than an
operational t o o l . S o , for instance, in the case of the
preparation of Environmental Impact Statements (EISs)

in New

South Wales, the EIS is required to contain reasons justifying a
proposed development having regard to "the principles of
31 id., 429.
32 (1994) 86 LGERA 143.
33|d., 153 and see comments of T F M Naughton, Land and Environment Court
Law and Practice (1993) LBC, Sydney, 2.663.
34D Farrier & L Fisher, "Reconstituting Decision-Making Process and
Structures in Light of the Precautionary Principle'(1993), paper delivered to
UNSW Institute of Environmental Studies on The Precautionary Principle'
20-21 September 1993.

ecologically sustainable development", which principles include
the precautionary principle. But the EIS does not need to show
that the development positively satisfies ESD principles.^^

The precautionary principle developed to deal with the
scientific uncertainity often associated with environmental
controversies.
If uncertainity exists a cautious approach is warranted. If there
is uncertainity as to environmental outcomes from a
development,
this uncertainity extends to doubts as to whether these
outcomes will be irreversible or not. The extent of current
scientific knowledge does not provide an adequate basis for
making such a prediction.

The clearing of certain forest compartments and thus causing
habit destruction may result in fauna species destruction which
is irreversible. The precautionary principle counsels that in the
face of such uncertainity caution should be exercised.

It is considered that the presence of questions such as this
dealing with scientific uncertainity mark out an environmental
conflict from an environmental dispute. It would be reasonable
to expect scientific and technical questions to arise in
environmental disputes but in such a way that reasonable
certainity would exist as to the environmental outcomes of the
development. In the case of environmental conflicts however
^^Environmental Planning and Assessment Regulations 1994 (NSW), Schedule
2, para. 5&8.

scientific uncertainity may well exist. The presence of such
uncertainity is considered to be the first critical factor in
distinguishing environmental disputes and environmental
conflicts.

Value

Conflicts

Environmental controversies are at least as much disputes about
values as about science.^^ The value disputes can relate both to
the divergence of values parties themselves bring to the dispute
and to the value judgements scientists make in assessing
ecological data. The problems associated with scientific
judgements can be addressed to a large extent by a clear
recognition that such judgements are seldom value-free.^^

The value conflicts which separate parties however may be
more fundamental:

•For example, a conflict will often occur on the basis of values
about the relative rights of human beings and other species, or
the merits of exploiting natural resources or conserving them,
or what constitutes an acceptable quality of life for people in a
particular

community."3®

Susskind & A Weinstein, op cit., note 20 above, 446.
^^See for example, S Beder, "Activism versus negotiation: Strategies for the
Environment Movement" (1991) 10 Social Alternatives 53.
38g Tillett, Resolving Conflict: A Practical Approach (1991) Sydney
University Press, Sydney, 138.

This is not to say tiiat these differences in underlying values
will always surface but their existence should not be ignored.
The divergence of values held by the parties may well influence
the methods open to resolve the controversy. Environmentalists
may, for instance, assert that in some circumstances
environmental issues are simply not susceptible to compromise,
for example, where they allege biological diversity is
threatened or wildemess values are involved.^Q
It is the range of values at issue that is fundamental. If it is
considered that all environmental controversies involve value
issues but that the values at issue range from non-fundamental
to fundamental, it is possible to use this characteristic as a
further discriminator between environmental disputes and
environmental conflicts.
So in the case of an environmental dispute where there are
issues to do with amenity such as noise or view, a conflict over
what the respective parties hold valuable may arise. Similarly
in the case of an environmental conflict value conflicts over
questions of sustainability may arise. But the two value
conflicts are objectively speaking not of the same dimension,
only the question of sustainability gives rise to fundamental
value conflicts.
This is best illustrated by retuming to our discussion of the
two approaches to the concept of the 'environment'. These

J Fowler, op cit., note 8 above, 126.

approaches essentially show two differing ways of valuing the
environment. The anthropocentric approach clearly views the
environment in terms of its relationship to human beings and so
conflicts arise as to the respective uses proposed for the
'surroundings of human beings'. This may, for instance, be the
extent to which such proposals reflect or depart from principles
of sustainable development. But the ecocentric approach also
values the environment in terms of its relationship with human
beings. It is just that from this approach it is valued differently
since it is valued in temns of its value to human beings as an
entity in itself to be simply admired and appreciated or to be
sympathetically developed.

But while both approaches value the environment in tenns of its
relationship to human beings there is a wide divergence in the
values that attach to the environment. At one extreme, the
environment is a resource to be used and exploited for the
benefit of human beings, at the other extreme the environment
is a resource to be left unexploited for the benefit of present
and future human beings. In the middle, these extremes are
subject to a fine balance based upon the principles of
sustainable development.

The extreme views mark out the fundamental value conflicts
that are a key to the existence of environmental conflict. Some
environmental disputes involve value conflicts but they are not
of the same fundamental nature. For this reason the
characteristics of value conflicts will also be one of the crucial
distinguishing factors between environmental disputes and

environmental conflicts. The existence of fundamental value
conflict mark the controversy out as an environmental conflict.
Difficulties

with

identifying

and

invoiving

participants

In an environmental dispute the parties will usually identify and
involve themselves simply by participation in the process. So,
for instance, the parties to a dispute involving a development
application to operate a funeral parlour in a residential area
may include the applicant, the local council and affected local
residents, either individually or as a group. The geographic
scope of the dispute is that of the local community and a
reasonable expectation would be that any affected party would
be easily identified and involved in the dispute resolution
process.
The position can be markedly different in the case of an
environmental conflict, with the potential of a much larger
scope of influence or effect. An example of such a conflict
would be a proposal to grant logging licences in disputed
wilderness areas. In such a situation there may be difficulties
as regards numbers of participants and in balancing
representation to ensure that all stakeholders participate in any
resolution process. There needs to be a mechanism for
identifying potential stakeholders such as representatives of
communities affected socially and economically, conservation
and development interests, government departments and other
interested groups or individuals, such as recreational users.

One relevant consideration is tlie need to attempt to ensure as
far as possible participatory equity between the competing
interests of government, conservation and development.^^ A
further consideration is whether funding of participants
perceived as having an equity disadvantage is necessary and
appropriate to ensure the full involvement of such groups in the
dispute resolution process.
As well as these considerations, there are certain specific
restrictions with respect to environmental conflicts subject to
adjudication or administrative resolution that warrant
comment. Where a conflict is to be dealt with by way of
adjudication or administrative resolution, participation for a
particular party will depend not only upon whether the party has
a right or interest affected by the conflict but also whether this
right or interest is recognised by the law as being sufficient to
warrant participation. In areas of public law such as
environmental law this concept of locus standi, or standing to
sue, may restrict the participation of some otherwise affected
parties. The requirement that affected parties must not only
profess an interest but that this interest be recognised at law
may present problems in involving all interested parties in the
conflict resolution process.

So, for instance, the interest of the Australian Conservation
Foundation in the preservation of the environment generally and
^^B Boer et al., The use of Mediation in the Resource Assessment Commission
Process (1991) AGPS, Canberra, 52.
41 Id., 70.

in upholding an environmental right or principle in a case
concerning wetlands protection was classified by the court as
an "emotional or intellectual interest" not sufficient to warrant
standing in IQSO.'^^

By 1989 however, in a case conceming a licence to export
woodchips from logging in the South East Forests in New South
Wales, it was accepted that the ACF had a special interest in
the subject matter of the application. While not giving
environmental groups

carte blanche as

regards standing, Davies

J said:

"While the Australian Conservation Foundation does not have
standing to challenge any decision which might affect the
environment, the evidence thus establishes that the Australian
Conservation has a special interest in relation to the South East
Forests and certainly in those areas of the South East Forests
that are National Estate. The Australian Conservation Foundation
is not just a busybody in this area."^^

North Coast Environment Council
Incorporated v Minister for Resources accepted that the North

Similariy Sackville J in

Coast Environment Council had a special interest such as to give
standing to sue against a grant of a licence to export
woodchips.^^

^^Australian Conservation Foundation Inc v The Commonwealth (1980)
146 CLR 493.
^^ACF V Minister for Natural Resources (1989) 76 LGRA 200 at 205-6.
44(1994) 55 FOR 492..

He followed this principle in granting standing to the Tasmanian
Conservation Trust with respect to the judicial review of a
similar decision to grant a licence to export woodchips.^^
Standing rules in the Land and Environment Court of NSW are on
the face of it open. Section 123 of the EPAA Act speaks of "any
person" bringing proceedings to remedy or restrain a breach of
the Act and section 25 of the

Penalties Act

Environmental Offences and

1989 (NSW) allows (with leave of the court^®)

"any person" to take such proceedings where the breach is likely
to cause harm to the environment.
However in the case of adjudicative and administrative
proceedings, the permitting of participation through open
standing rules raises questions over the financing of that
participation. This is particularly so in the case of community
groups or groups representing environmental interests. Not only
are their own legal costs a consideration, the insecurities
associated with costs orders and cost indemnities remain an
ever present constraint.

These concerns received recent

emphasis as a result of the anxiety engendered by the NSW Court
of Appeal decision in

Richmond River Council v Oshlack ^^

recently overtumed in the High Court. The Court of Appeal had
departed from the line of authority that held that the public
^^ Tasmanian Conservation

Trust v Minister for Resources & Gunns Limited

(1995) [Gunns No.1] 127 ALR 580.

^^Brown v Environment Protection Authority & Anor (1992) 75 LGRA 397.
^^See T Bonyhady, Places Worth Keeping (1993) Allen & Unwin, Sydney.88 as

to the pro bono representation provided to conservationists.
^SUnreported CA 40120/94, 19 June 1996 and Oshlack v Richmond River
Council (1998) HCA 11, 25 February 1998.

nature of environmental proceedings was a relevant
consideration in the exercise of judicial discretion to refuse an
award of costs to a successful party.
The problems discussed in the identification and involvement of
participants to environmental disputes need to be addressed to
ensure that any resolution reached will not subsequently be
jeopardised by parties not being included in the process at the
outset.

Nature of issues may involve the pubiic interest
One characteristic consistently attributed to environmental
controversies is that they involve the public interest. However
the concept of the public interest' presents a number of
theoretical and practical difficulties itself. The primary
difficulty Is in defining the concept of the public interest' and
In making provision for the competing claims of various parties
to represent such interest. The extent of this difficulty is
apparent from Tillett's comments:
'Two or more participants may each claim to represent public
interest, community interest, national interest, or nature itself.
Within a community, several groups or individuals (including
elected officals and community groups) may each argue that
they represent the interests, and the opinions, of the
community.'^®

^^G Tillett, op cit., note 38 above, 137.

An examination of the developing jurisprudence witli respect to
the concept of 'public interest litigation' is useful, though it has
developed essentially to address questions relating to cost
orders and indemnities.so

In Rundle v Tweed Shire Council, a case concerned with a cost
order following upon an unsuccessful appeal to restrain
herbicide spraying, consideration was given as to what might
properly be characterised as involving the public interest. The
applicant's counsel (B J Preston) submitted the following
features were relevant to categorising the litigation as 'public
interest

litigation":®!

•(i) the fact of the Attorney-General's intervention in the
proceedings;
(ii) the considerable local interest in the issues raised by the
proceedings;
(iii) the applicant's proceeding represented the common concern
of a number of local persons;
(iv) the long history of the controversy concerning the second
respondent's use of 2,4-D in its noxious plant eradication
programmes;
(v) the public interest served by the respondents ascertaining,
by judicial decree, the extent of any relevant obligation under Pt
V of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act; and

^^The 'public interest* arises in these cases on the principle that in public
interest litigation the usual rule about costs following the result does not apply.
5169 LGRA 21 at 27.

(vi) the public interest in protecting local flora and fauna.'

Similar factors are considered when seeking to identify what
constitutes 'public interest environmental matters' in the Legal
Aid policies of the Legal Aid Commission of NSW when
determining the merits of applications for legal aid.52. The
criteria provide:

"Legal Aid is available for public interest environment matters
where the activity or proposed undertaking raises a matter of
substantial public concern about the environment. In deciding
whether there is substantial public concem, regard will be had
to at least the following:
* whether or not the activity, or proposed undertaking is likely
to have a significant impact on the environment in NSW or to
substantially affect public use, or enjoyment of that
environment.
* the scarcity of the particular attribute(s) of that environment.
* the value of that environment to the community of New South
Wales.
* community interests that may be affected including the
impact on the social and cultural needs of the community.'
The Legal Aid guidelines equate 'public interest' with
'substantial public concern' about developments likely to have
significant effects on the environment.

^^Legal Aid Commission of NSW. Legal Aid Policies (June 1995), 5.

Atherton and Atherton take a different view in referring to
market theory to answer the question: what is the 'public
i n t e r e s t ' . M a r k e t theory attempts to quantify the relative
values of competing interests:

"The mechanism for this is usually cost benefit analysis and a
proposal is deemed to be in the public interest if the benefits
are found to outweigh the

costs."54

While cost-benefit analysis has adapted methods for valuing
'unpriced social benefits'^s (such as the recreational value of a
beach or a national park), such that the public interest can be
equated to development which produces the largest net public
benefit, these methods remain an essentially artifical device
for showing what should be in the public interest rather than
what actually is.

This brief overview shows that the concept of the public
interest has proven a difficult concept to express or define.
There is some merit in the often voiced proposition that the
public interest is 'what interests the public'. This reflects the
approach of the Legal Aid guidelines in equating the public
interest with 'substantial public concern'. This is a useful
shorthand approach to use in determining whether the existence
of the public interest in a controversy is a discriminating factor

53t Atherton & T Atherton, op cit., note 3 above, 15.
54|d..
55see P W Abelson, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Environmental Problems
(1979) Saxon House, New York.

between an environmental dispute and an environmental
conflict.

Because a layer of government has been shown to be involved in
virtually all environmental controversy- be it local, state or
national- it can be assumed that a potential public interest is
involved since government is presumed to represent the public
interest. The question is whether the public interest has been
aroused in a particular environmental controversy, that is to say
'has the public become interested?' If it has not, the public
interest can be said to be dormant; if it has, then there is an
active public interest involved. It is considered that this
characteristic of an activated public interest marks out an
environmental conflict from an environmental dispute. In the
case of an environmental dispute, a public interest factor exists
but it has not been activated. In the case of an environmental
conflict, it has been activated.

The difficulty remains that it is not possible to isolate a single
public interest, dormant or active. There are instead a range of
public interests, subject to the participants' perceptions,®® and
such 'publics' include "environmental objects'^^ (inanimate
objects, wildlife) and future generations.

The extent of this range of 'publics' led US Justice Douglas in
Sierra Club v Morton to say:

J Preston, op cit., note 2 above, 166.
57l Susskind & A Weinstein, op cit, note 20 above, 457.

"'public interest' has so many different shades of meaning as to
be quite meaningless on the environmental front/^s

For the purposes of this study it is not necessary to pursue this
issue of the nature of the 'public interest' in an environmental
dispute or an environmental conflict. All that is necessary is to
find evidence that the public interest has been activated in a
particular matter. If the public interest has been activated the
matter is likely to be an environmental conflict. In the case of
an environmental dispute, the interests that are activated are
private ones, the public interest exists (hence the govemment
involvement as the arbiter of planning standards) but it is not
activated. Stereotypical environmental disputes involve
competing private interests over amenity.

Environmental conflicts on the other hand involve competing
public interests, for instance between the economic benefit of a
development and the environmental protection benefit. Such
competing public interests lead to conflicting claims by various
parties to represent such interests:

"advocates of one position or another claim that they represent
not just their own concerns but the public interest as well."®®

There is no real solution to these conflicting claims other than
to concede that there is no single public interest activated in an
SQSierra Club v Morton, 405 US 727 (1972) at 745 cited in C D Stone,
Should Trees Have Standing? Towards Legal rights for Natural Objects (1974),
William Kaufmann, Los Altos, 76.
S^L Susskind & A Weinstein, op cit., note 20 above, 455.

environmental conflict. If this concession is made then there
may be legitimacy in a number of parties claiming to represent
"the interests of various p u b l i c s . S u c h competing claims will
usually arise only in environmental conflicts, environmental
disputes will be characterised by competing private interests,
though such interests may be just as firmly held and
championed.

The activation of competing public interests is thus the third
key discriminating factor between environmental disputes and
environmental

conflicts.

Implementation

Difficulties

The implementation of agreements for resolution of
environmental controversies may pose special problems. Firstly,
previously unidentified problems may arise after a project is
completed or well advanced which make the agreement reached
or the decision imposed no longer acceptable to all the parties.

Implementation difficulties may also arise because the
proposed resolution of the conflict is frustrated by individuals
or bodies which were not part of the resolution process. This
can arise in two ways. Firstly interest groups not party to the
resolution process may attempt to block its implementation if
their interests have not been accommodated.®^ Secondly, if a
govemment agency charged with the authority to implement a
60|d.. 456-7.
S^T Atherton & T Atherton, op cit., note 3 above, 15.

decision has not been a party to tlie process, implementation of
tlie decision at ail or in its agreed form may be dependent upon
its endorsement.®^

Absence of a Prior Relationship among Parties

Another specific characteristic of environmental controversy is
that the parties often have no relationship prior to the conflict
arising. The controversy itself may bring the parties together
for the first and perhaps only time.®^ This needs to be seen in
the context that in the majority of controversies a government
agency or authority is one of the parties involved. This means
that there is in fact a pre-existing relationship between the
government authority and the other parties at least in the sense
of elected representatives and their constituencies.

In the case of an environmental dispute the parties are likely to
have been in a pre-existing relationship such as neighbours or
community members. That proximity may affect their
willingness to participate in various dispute resolution
processes. In the case of an environmental conflict there may
either be no prior relationship between the parties or there may
be an ongoing relationship of an entrenched bitter nature not
conductive to eariy dispute resolution.

®2T Atherton & T Atherton, op cit, note 3 above, 15.
®3see Id., 16 and G Bingham & L V Haywood, 'Environmental Dispute
Resolution: The First Ten Years (1986) 41 Arbitration Journal 3 at 4.

Inter-organisational

Environmental controversies are usually inter-organisational
rather than interpersonal.^^ This produces potential problems
associated with the size of the organisations and of the actual
and ostensible authority of the executive to represent the
interests of a broad constituency. This is particularly so in the
case of environmental groups, which often purport to represent,
and are perceived as representing, a far broader class of
individuals than their own members.®^ Preston raises the issue
as to whether advocates of such groups can legitimately be said
to represent the public or even their own constituency.®® It is
reasonable to anticipate that an advocate will tend to represent
at best the interests of a few active members of the
organisation's constituency rather than the whole constituency.

Geographical

Uncertainlties

The complexities of ecological systems mean that it may not
always be possible to deal with a dispute in isolation from its
surroundings on the assumption that its effects can be
localised. The approach of Agenda 21 to environmental
protection reflects the interdependent nature of ecosystems by
emphasising the need to protect both discreet and interacting
ecosystems.
Atherton & T Atherton, op cit., note 3 above, 16.
®5R Stewart, "The Reformation of American Administrative Law"(1975) 88
Harvard Law Review 1667 at 1767.
®®R J Preston, op cit., note 2, 166.
67UN Conference on Environment and Development, The Earth Summit {^993)
London, Agenda 21, Ch 16, para.16.22.

Because of this interconnectedness, development in one
ecosystem may have repercussions for other systems,
repercussions which may not be predictable with any degree of
certainity. For instance, the impacts may be irreversible,
involving habitat destruction or species extinction's, which
effects were not immediatedly apparent nor contemplated.

The effect of these complexities is that it is not always
possible to set realistic geographical boundaries to a conflict.
Susskind and Weinstein are of the opinion that: "There are no
correct geographical boundaries for a particular environmental
dispute".'^ Such boundaries need to be estimated as accurately
as possible in order to determine jurisdiction and to include or
exclude potential stakeholders.^^ But the effects and boundaries
of environmental controversies are often difficult to estimate
accurately in advance.^i

Classification of
controversies72

environmental

As discussed, the term 'environmental controversy' covers a
wide range of controversies dealing with the competing
interests, needs and goals relating to environmental matters.
®®T Atherton & T Atherton, op cit., note 3 above, 14.
S^L Susskind & A Weinstein, op cit., note 20 above, 451.
^^T Atherton & T Atherton, op cit, note 3 above, 16.
G Tillett, op cit., note 38 above, 137.
^^The classification system adopted here owes much to that developed by B J
Preston, op cit., note 2 above, and this debt is warmly acknowledged here.

These controversies range across a continuum between disputes
over essentially negotiable interests, needs or goals, to
conflicts involving essentially non-negotiable interests, needs
and goals.

For the purpose of analysis it is necessary to have some method
of placing an environmental controversy at some point along
this continuum. The method selected essentially follows the
classification system suggested by Preston:

'Environmental disputes can be classified by the extent to which
they exhibit certain characteristics.
The more characteristics a particular environmental dispute
exhibits the more readily it can be classed as a conflict.
The fewer characteristics a particular environmental dispute
exhibits the more readily it can be classified as a dispute.'^^

So, for this study, the exhibition of the majority of these
characteristics mark a controversy as an environmental
conflict, distinguishing it from an environmental dispute which
exhibits at most a small number of these characteristics.

In addition an attempt has been made to isolate a small number
of key characteristics which are considered the essence of the
distinction between an environmental dispute and an
environmental conflict. Three characteristics capture the

73|d.. 175.

essential of conflict, that is, irreconcilable disagreement over
values or goals. These are the characteristics designated as:

1. Value Conflicts,
2. Scientific Uncertainity, and
3. Public Interest Concerns.

An environmental controversy displaying a majority of the
characteristics but in particular these three key characteristics
will be placed in the environmental conflict half of the
continuum. An environmental conflict classified in this way is
defined as:

•An environmental controversy dealing with competing
interests, needs and goals over environmental issues, in
particular the apparently non-negotiable issues of value
conflict, scientific uncertainity and public interest concerns."

Conversely an environmental controversy which displays only a
monority of these characteristics and in particular does not
display the three key characteristics will be placed towards the
environmental dispute end of the continuum. An environmental
dispute classified in this way is defined as:

"An environmental controversy dealing with competing
interests, needs and goals over environmental issues, but which
issues deal with essentially competing amenities questions.'

Distinguishing environmental disputes and environmental
conflicts in this way and emphasising three of the
characteristics may appear to exclude the importance of other
characteristics which intuitively suggest large scale conflict.
This is particularly so with the characteristics of 'multiparties' and 'multi-issues', where the magnitude and breadth of
the controversy suggest that the public interest has been
activated over conflicting values or questions of scientific
uncertainity. But these two characteristics while important are
not considered to be as effective in discriminating between
environmental disputes and environmental conflicts. This is
best illustrated by an example.
Two recent large scale controversies are the Lake Cowal Gold
Mine proposal in central New South Wales and the Bengalla Coal
Mine proposal in the Hunter Valley. Both of these controversies
involved multi-parties and multi-issues and precipitated a
ministerial referral to a Commissioner of Inquiry pursuant to
si 19 of the EPAA Act. On the basis of these characteristics it
would be expected that both controversies would be placed in
the environmental conflict half of the continuum. But it will be
contended that they lean towards different ends of the
continuum.

The Bengalla Coal Mine Controversy

The Bengalla Mining Co Pty Limited lodged a development
application with Muswellbrook Council in 1993 to establish and
operate an open cut coal mine In the Upper Hunter Valley north
of Sydney. The area proposed for the mine was adjacent to local
residents and they together with community groups opposed the
development. Particularly strong opposition came from local
land users, Rosemount Estates Winery and the Dalama Horse
Stud.

A Commission of Inquiry was ordered in January 1994 and
reported to the Minister in August of that year.^^ The report
recommended that the Minister grant consent to the
development subject to a number of conditions. Before
ministerial consideration, the report was subject to an
application to the Land and Environment Court of NSW seeking
judicial review of the recommendations on the basis that the
Commission of Inquiry had incorrectly assumed the relevant
Local Environment Plan (LEP) permitted the mine. That
application was upheld in the judgement of Waddell, AJ on 24
January 1995 and as such the recommendation could not be
acted upon by the Minister.^s As a result of this judgement, the

^^Office of the Commissioners of Inquiry for Environment and Planning,
Establishment and Operation, Bengalla Open Cut Coal Mine Muswellbrook
(1995) Commission, Sydney.
"^^Rosemount Estates Pty Limited v Cleland & Ors, Land and Environment Court
of NSW No. 40144/94.

Inquiry reconvened and a supplementary report of May 1995
confirmed the original recommendation of consent.^®

Nevertheless the government gazetted SEPP 45 on 4 August
1995 and the Minister then granted consent to the mine on 7
August 1995. This consent was subject to a further appeal in
the Land and Environment Court of NSW. The basis of the appeal
was that the process of making the SEPP was manifestly
unreasonable as insufficient opportunity for public participation
had been given due to the Minister's decision not to publically
advertise the SEPP. The court granted the appeal and declared
SEPP 45 and the development consent void. This decision was
the subject of a successful appeal to the NSW Court of Appeal.^^

Before the appeal was heard the NSW Govemment had passed
legislation specifically designed to approve the project.^^
This was passed in June 1996 and construction of the mine
commenced in 1997.

Mather, "SEPP No.45 (permissibility of mining) declared ¡nvalid'(1996)
34(5) Law Society Journal 30.
Minister for Urban Affairs & Planning v Rosemount Estates Pty Ltd & Ors,
NSW Court of Appeal 40127/96, 14 August 1996.
State Environmental Planning (Permissible) Mining Act NSW (1996).

The nature of this controversy was examined in terms of the
characteristics discussed above. The results of this examination
are tabulated as follows:

Table One
Bengalla Coal Mine Project
Display of the Cli aracteristics of Enviror mental Controversy
Characteristic
Extent Displayed
Evident
government is a
11 government
yes
party
agencies
multiple issues
noise, air quality,
yes
salinity, effect on
viticulture, visual
amenity
multiple parties 76 submissions
yes
scientific
Complex scientific
no
uncertainity
issues re noise,
effect on viticulture,
no clear issues of
uncertainity re effect
on flora & fauna
value conflicts
Conflicts as to the
yes
value of the project
in economic terms as
opposed to ecological
effects
nature of dispute Essentially private
no
involves the
interests were at
public interest
stake; public interest
not activated
no
difficulty
none
identifying
parties
implementation
no
adequate conditions
difficulties
were possible
yes
absence of prior yes, though previous
relationship
co-existence
interorganisation no
no
no
no, geographically
geographical
defined
uncertainities
Number of characteristics clearly
five
evident

Lake Cowal Gold Mine Controversy

North Limited proposed in 1995 to develop a gold mine at Cowal
West, West Wyalong in Central New South Wales. The proposed
extraction area included part of the bed of Lake Cowal, a
wetland waterbird habitat. While relevant government
departments expressed concern about the potential ecological
impacts, the majority of local residents supported the
development. However both regional and national conservation
groups opposed the development. The main environmental issues
in dispute were the conservation of the ecological values of
Lake Cowal and the effect of cyanide concentrations in the
tailings discharging after ore processing.

A Commission of Inquiry was ordered in October 1995 and
reported in March 1996 recommending that conservation and
environmental considerations did not preclude the Minister
granting consent to the proposed development.^^ However in
April 1996 the Minister did not adopt this recommendation and
rejected the development on environmental grounds. The
Minister was of the view that there could be no guarantee that
"cyanide use will not damage this fragile ecosystem."so

^^Offlce of the Commissioners of Inquiry for Environment and Planning, Lake
Cowal Gold Project, Bland Shire-Forbes Shire (1996), The Commissioners,
Sydney.
Sydney Morning Herald, 12 April 1996, 7.

Subsequent negotiations have tal<en place between North
Limited, environmental groups and the NSW government
involving attempts to have an amended development proposal
approved. A compromise plan was brokered by the NSW Labor
Council involving, inter alia, the establishment of a trust fund
for environmental improvements, included North Limited
purchasing the whole lake area and turning it into a nature
reserve.®^ It now seems likely that the mine may proceed, either
by Ministerial approval or a further Commission of Inquiry.

Id.. 13 June 1998, 17.

The nature of this controversy was also examined In terms of
the characteristics of discussed above. The results of this
examination are tabulated as follows:
Table Two
Lake Cowal Gold Mine Project
Display of the Characteristics of Environmental Controversy
Characteristic
Extent Displayed
Evident
government is a 11 government
yes
party
agencies
multiple Issues Effectof cyanide
yes
levels on flora &
fauna, water quality,
noise,aboriginal sitei '1
visual amenity
multiple parties 118 submissions
yes
scientific
As to effects of
yes
tailings leakage on
uncertainity
wildlife breeding
grounds
value conflicts As to ecologically
yes
& judgements
sensitive areas v.
local social &
economic impacts
yes
nature of dispute Competing public
interests activated,
involves the
public interest community,
environmental
industrial and groups
no
none
difficulty
identifying
parties
yes
implementation controls required
difficulties
constant monitoring
absence of prior no prior relationship yes
relationship
interorganisatlor no
no
no
geographical
no, geographically
uncertalnities
defined
eight
Number of characteristics clearly
evident

Both of these environmental controversies are multi-party and
multi-issue. On the face of it they would be expected to lie
close to one another on the continuum. But in terms of the total
number of characteristics each of these environmental
controversies displays, there is some significant difference.
The Lake Cowal project displayed eight clear characteristics,
the Bengalla Mine project only displayed five.

Confining the comparison to the three key characteristics, the
differences are even more significant. In the Lake Cowal
controversy, the public interest is activated; in the case of the
Bengalla Mine project it is not activated to any significant
degree. In the case of the Lake Cowal controversy, there is
scientific uncertainity as to the effect of tailings leakage on
native fauna in terms of waterbird breeding grounds. There is no
strong evidence of such uncertainity in the case of the Bengalla
Mine project. In both environmental controversies howver there
are conflicting values over the uses to which the environment
should reasonably be subject.

This comparison provides a useful illustration that the size of a
controversy (in terms of number of parties or issues) does not
necessarily satisfactorily discriminate between an
environmental dispute and an environmental conflict. Both of the
inquiry processes provoked a very large number of submissions
and involved a large number of direct participants, yet the
controversies are at different halves of the continuum. The
presence or absence of these three characteristics moves a

controversy closer to either the environmental dispute or
environmental conflict end of the continuum.

Conclusion
This discussion has provided a framework for the reporting of
this research. Key terms have been defined. A method of
classifying environmental controversies has been proposed
based upon the extent to which they exhibit the characteristics
of environmental controversies. This method of classification
reinforces the existence of a continuum ranging between
environmental disputes and environmental conflicts.
This is the first preliminary task of this research. The next
preliminary stage requires a review of the mechanisms for
resolving environmental controversies. The third preliminary
stage is an examination of those ADR methods currently used in
the consensual mechanisms .
Having completed these preliminary stages a detailed study of
the use of consensual mechanisms to resolve environmental
controversies can be detailed.

CHAPTER THREE
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION METHODS
Introduction
In Chapter Two the distinguishing features of environmental
controversies were examined. While not implying that those
features indicated that such controversies were more amenable
to resolution by either adjudicative, consensual or
administrative means, it was suggested that environmental
controversies displayed levels of complexity which may call for
innovative approaches to their resolution.
The aim of this chapter is to examine one such group of
innovative approaches, namely Alternative Dispute Resolution
(ADR) methods. The examination confines itself to those
methods used significantly in environmental controversies.
The concept of Alternative Dispute Resolution is critically
examined to determine which methods of dispute resolution fall
within this description. Secondly, those methods commonly used
in environmental controversies are detailed and examined.

Alternative

Dispute

Resolution

This discussion considers the different ways in which the
concept of ADR can be said to be 'alternative'. These senses
include:

(1) as an alternative to adjudication
(2) as an alternative to externally imposed solutions
(3) as an alternative or addition to existing dispute resolution
structures
(4) as a bundle of dispute resolution methods alternative to
existing methods.

The term ADR begs the question as in what sense these methods
are said to be 'alternative'. If the term is used in the sense of an
alternative to litigation then the term may still embrace other
adjudicative dispute resolution methods, such as arbitration. As
Gibey says, "arbitration has a long and successful history as an
alternative to litigation".^ But Boulle points out it can be
misleading to portray ADR as an alternative to litigation, simply
because "litigation itself is such a rare method of managing
disputes."2

If ADR methods are seen also as consensual mechanisms of
dispute resolution (where the solution of the dispute is not

l M Gibney, "Alternative Dispute Resolution-Arbitration' (1994) paper
delivered to the Australian Mining & Petroleum Law Association 18th Annual
Conference, Perth, 10-12 August 1994, 20.
2 l Boulle, Mediation: Principles, Process, Practice (1996) Butterworths,
Sydney, 5.

imposed upon the parties but is dependent on achieving
agreement between them) then they cannot include arbitration,
since it is an imposed solution. In addition the dispute
resolution approach of negotiation cannot strictly be said to be
an 'alternative' (other than to adjudication) it having been a
method long in existence.

This provides some potential problems of expression. For the
sake of clarity, the four senses of 'altemative' can be grouped
together and examined in two categories: 'altemative to
adjudication and altemative to externally imposed solutions'
and 'alternative to existing dispute resolution structures or
methods'.

Alternative to adjudication & to externally imposed
solutions

These two senses of 'alternative' have much in common. In the
first sense they are confined to "dispute resolution procedures
which are an altemative, not just to litigation, but also to
arbitration",3 that is to say as alternative

to

adjudicative

methods. In the second sense they are taken to mean alternative
to imposed solutions, that is to say they are consensual
mechanisms which have as a common feature a solution which is
agreed between the parties rather than imposed.'^
3|d.. 1.
^A Rogers, 'Alternative Dispute Resolution-Mediation' (1994) paper
delivered to the Australian Mining & Petroleum Law Association 18th Annual
Conference, Perth, 10-12 August 1994, 1.

Viewed in these senses, ADR methods can be defined as:

•Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) refers to a variety of
methods, short of litigation, by which disputants may reach
(their own) agreement to resolve their

differences.

In shorthand form these methods are consensual mechanisms
and in this research ADR methods in this sense and consensual
mechanisms are used synonymously.

The breadth of these methods is apparent from the scope of a
number of other definitions in common usage. Bingham and
Haygood define "environmental dispute resolution" as referring:

"collectively to a variety of approaches that allow the parties
to meet face to face to reach a mutually acceptable resolution
of the issues in a dispute or potentially controversial situation.
Although there are differences among the approaches, all are
voluntary processes that involve some form of consensus
building, joint problem solving, or negotiation."s

This definition incorporates the extension suggested by, inter
alia, Clark:

5G Tillett, Resolving Conflict - a practical approach (1991) Sydney, LBC,
146.
^G Bingham & L V Haygood, 'Environmental Dispute Resolution: the first ten
years' (1986) 41(4) Arbitration Journal 3 at 4 (emphasis supplied).

"In addition to the established mechanisms, ADR also includes
any technique which helps the parties to reach a compromise.' ^

Paratz uses the convenient summary term of 'managed
negotiation processes' for these processes to encompass the
essense of ADR procedures which "allow for parties to come to
consensual resolutions of their disputes in an efficient and
effective manner'.®

Alternative to existing dispute resolution structures or
existing

methods

To use the terms 'ADR methods' or 'consensual mechanisms' in
the senses of 'alternative to adjudication' and 'altemative to
imposed solutions' does not categorise their use as either
supplementary to the institutionalised methods of adjudication
and administrative procedures or as completely autonomous
alternatives. So when 'alternative' is used in these first two
senses it is possible, as some proponents prefer, to describe
ADR as "Additional Dispute Resolution".®

^E Clark, 'The role of non-litigious dispute resolution methods in
environmental disputes"(1995) 2(2) The Australasian Journal of Natural Law
and Policy 4 (emphasis supplied).
®D Paratz "Options for environmental dispute resolution', paper presented at
9th NELA Conference, Gold Coast, Queensland, 26-28 August 1990, 274.
^L Street, 'Environmental Mediation and Other Means of Alternative Dispute
Resolution in Environmental Matters in the Pacific Region' (!991) in R J
Fowler (ed.) Proceedings of the International Conference on Environmental
Law, 14-18 July 1989, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 129-135 at 134.

To describe ADR methods excludes 'alternative in the third and
fourth senses of 'alternative to existing dispute resolution
structures or methods.' To do this diminishes their differences
and this description is not used here.

Some critics contend that ADR methods should in fact remain
alternative to existing dispute resolution structures in the
sense of a separate and self contained system of dispute
resolution existing alongside the traditional adjudicative and
administrative forms. The general consensus though has been
that many of "the techniques are used not so much
independently, but are incorporated into traditional judicial or
administrative

processes".""o

For this reason 'alternative' is not used in the third strict sense
as alternative to existing dispute resolution mechanisms or
structures. When 'altemative' is used in this research in the
third and fourth senses it is confined to the sense of a
particular set of techniques for dispute resolution and not in the
stricter sense of a separate and distinct consensual system of
dispute resolution.

It is suggested that using ADR methods in the sense of
'alternative to existing dispute resolution methods' allows for a
discussion of their use to overcome the inadequacies in
traditional adjudicative mechanisms. For instance, ADR methods

"•OR J Fowler, "Environmental Dispute Resolution techniques: what role in
Australia? (1992) 9(2) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 122 at
123.

can be used long before the dispute has reached an impasse. The
methods can be, and often are, used for dispute prevention in the
sense of mediating compromise and thus avoiding escalation of
the controversy. The question of the timing of the intervention
is important because it allows the scope of what can
legitimately be described as ADR to be expanded significantly.

Seen in these terms ADR methods may extend to any situation of
managed negotiation with the aim of preventing, circumventing
or resolving an actual or potential controversy. So, for instance,
participation on an advisory body setting environmental policy
may fall within this expanded definition if the participation
helps to manage the inherent conflict between the stakeholders
over such policy.

To summarise, the sense of 'alternative' which remains from
this discussion is that ADR methods are alternative to
adjudication and to externally imposed solutions and alternative
or additional to existing methods of dispute resolution.

ADR methods used in environmental
controversies
In addition to defining ADR methods in the senses set out above
they can also be classified into a simple division of 'assisted'
and 'unassisted' negotiation. Assisted negotiations are
characterised as involving an additional person in the process

who is not an immediate party to tlie controversy. ^^ Mediation
is tiie main fomn of assisted negotiation and will be used here
to describe the process of mediation itself and as a convenient
summary expression to describe all forms of assisted
negotiation. The other assisted negotiation forms essentially
involve the use of mediation in wider contexts and these include
facilitation, neutral evaluation or case appraisal, scoping and
mini-trials.

Unassisted negotiation is sometimes referred to as a 'primary'
dispute resolution process. Boulle indicates this is so, both
because negotiation is an element in most other dispute
resolution processes and because negotiation of itself is the
most immediate way of dealing with a

controversy.^

2 Unassisted

negotiation is also a flexible process used in a wide range of
contexts and forms but unassisted by a neutral non-party. The
term negotiation is used here to describe all forms of
unassisted negotiation.

Mediation and other forms of assisted
negotiation
The definition of mediation

To Wade, mediation is a "slippery concept" having multiple
meanings essentially dependent upon the context in which it is
Boulle, op cit.,note 2 above, 66.
12|d. 65.

used and the userJ^ Wade says that at a broad level mediation
can best be described as assisted negotiation or assisted
decision making.

To define mediation with as much precision as possible, the
best starting point is the classic definition of mediation of
Folberg and Taylor:

"The process by which participants, together with the
assistance of a neutral third person or persons systematically
isolate dispute issues, in order to develop options, consider
alternatives and reach a consensual settlement that will
accommodate their needs."^^

Boulle is critical of this definition, primarily because of the
departures it makes from actual practice. He says, for instance,
there are many instances where mediation does not
systematically isolate issues nor consider options but rather
involves incremental bargaining towards a compromise
solution.

As well as the elements contained in Folberg and Taylor's
definition, there is the additional important element of
voluntariness. Cormick's definition is the classic statement of
this approach:

H Wade, "Mediation-The Terminological Debate" (1994) 5(3) Australian
Dispute Resolution Journal August 1994 204 at 207-209.
"•^J Folberg & A Taylor, Mediation: A Comprehensive Guide to Resolving
Conflict Without Litigation (1984) Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 4.
"•^L Boulle, op cit., note 2 above, 5.

"Mediation is a voluntary process in wliich those involved in a
dispute jointly explore and reconcile their differences. The
mediator has no authority to impose a settlement. His or her
strength lies in the ability to assist the parties in resolving
their own differences. The mediated dispute is settled when the
parties themselves reach what they consider to be a workable
solution.

But the prerequisite of this element of voluntariness is not
without its critics. Certainly mediation is not always voluntary
since parties are sometimes coerced into the process. Modem
litigation and administrative case management systems for
instance require or compel parties to enter into the process.
This is either by the imposition of cost sanctions or on the
basis of fear that intransigence to participate will adversely
affect any subsequent adjudicative or administrative decision.

Similarly as regards participation in the process itself the
element of voluntariness implies that mediated decisions
reflect the preferences of the parties and not that of a
mediator. But it is not always possible to draw a clear line
between consensual and imposed decisions since consensuality
can be a question of degree. There are examples of mediations
where the process creates its own momentum and pressures to
settle and where the mediator induces parties to settle where

16G w Cormick, 'Mediating Environmental Controversies: Perspectives &
First Experience" (1976) 2 Earth Law Review 215 at 215.

they might not otherwise have done soJ^ Merely because of their
authority, mediators may perform a quasi-adjudicative
function^® However consensuality should be taken in the narrow
sense that the parties have the autonomy to accept or reject
particular outcomes and to refuse to settle. Then voluntariness
in the sense of 'consensuality of outcomes' can be regarded as a
defining characteristic of mediation.

Given these considerations mediation is still no easier to define
after several decades of application, 'since it does not provide a
single analytical model which can be neatly described and
distinguished from other decision-making processes'.

Nevertheless, allowing for this difficulty Boulle provides a
definition and this definition is preferred for the purpose of
this study:

'Mediation is a decision-making process in which the parties are
assisted by a third party, the mediator; the mediator attempts
to improve the process of decision-making and to assist the
parties to reach an outcome to which each of them assent.'2 o

Definitional questions were also addressed in the context of
legislation requiring adoption of ADR methods. One common
example of such legislative initatives is the New South Wales
"•^C Moore, The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for resolving Conflict
(1986) Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 277.
"•öR Ingley, 'Court Sponsored Mediation: The Case Against Mandatory
Participation' (1993) 56 Modem Law Review 441 at 443.
L Boulle, op cit, note 2 above, 3.
20|d.

enabling legislation, the Courts Legislation (Mediation and
Evaluation) Amendment Act 1994 (NSW) which came into force
on 14 November 1994. This Act inserted new provisions headed
'Mediation and Neutral Evaluation' into, inter alia, the Land and
Environment Court Act 1979 (NSW) (the LEG Act) being Part 5A,
sections 61A-61L. This amending legislation indicated that its
purpose was to:

"enable the Court to refer matters for mediation or neutral
evaluation if the parties to the proceedings concerned have
agreed to that course of action.''2i.

The amendments added by the Act provide a definition of
mediation:
"'Mediation' means a structured negotiation process in which the
mediator, as a neutral and independent party, assists the parties
to a dispute to achieve their own resolution of the dispute." 22

This definition does not mention the essential element of
voluntariness, but s 61D (1) (b) of the LEG Act provides for it in
making the consent of the parties a condition precedent to the
Gourt referring a matter to mediation.

The other condition precedent to the Gourt referring proceedings
for mediation or neutral evaluation is that the Gourt consider

2lsection 61A(1)
22section 61B(1).

the circumstances appropriate and there is agreement by the
parties as to who is to be the mediator or neutral

evaluator.23

Section 61E of the LEG Act reiterates the essential element of
voluntariness by providing that attendance at and participation
in mediation or neutral evaluation sessions are voluntary and
that a party may withdraw from the sessions at any time.

The process of mediation

Once definitional problems are addressed the next aspect to
consider is the process of mediation itself. The process of a
particular mediation depends amongst other things upon the
nature of the controversy and the resources of the parties.
Boulle isolates what can be referred to as a standard

mediation

process. He denotes three sequential phases which involve the
following stages:

(1) preparatory matters: initiating the mediation, screening the
dispute's suitability, determining the scope of the dispute and
identifying relevant stakeholders;
(2) the mediation meeting: mediator's opening, parties'
presentations, defining and ordering the issues, negotiating,
separate meetings, decision-making and its recording;
(3) post-mediation: ratification, official endorsement by a
consent authority if required and supervising

23section 61D(1)(a)&(c).
2 4 l Boulle, op cit., note 2 above, 91-112.

implementation.^^

These stages are relevant for a consideration of mediation both
as a stand alone method of dispute resolution and as a
component In other forms of assisted negotiation.

Commentators distinguish between four models of mediation,
namely: the settlement, facilitative, therapeutic and evaluative
models.2^ The point should be made that a single mediation may
display the characteristics of a number of models, for instance
it may begin in the facilitative mode then move into an
evaluative mode. Allowing for this it is easiest to distinguish
the models on the basis of the main objective they seek to
achieve.

Settlement mediation seeks to encourage incremental
bargaining towards a compromise between the parties'
positional demands. Whereas facilitative mediation seeks to
negotiate in tenns of the parties' underiying needs rather than
In terms of their overt positional expectations. Therapeutic
mediation is similar in that it focuses upon the underiying
causes of the parties' problems with a view to improving their
relationship as the basis of resolution. Evaluative mediation has
a narrower focus in that it essentially deals with a dispute
according to the parties' entitlements and the anticipated
adjudicative outcomes.26 in terms of the application to
environmental controversies, the preferred model is the

25see Id.. 28; H Brown & A Marriott, ADR Principles and Practice (1993),
Sweet and Maxwell, London, 115 and S Bordow & J Gibson, Evaluation of the
Family Court Mediation Service (1994) Family Court of Australia, Research
and Evaluation Unit, Research Report No. 12, Canberra.
26L Boulle, op cfL, note 2 above, 29.

facilitative one since resolution of the controversy requires an
examination of underlying needs and interests especially in
dealing with environmental conflicts.

The purposes of mediation

The last aspect to consider in this review of mediation practice
is the various uses to which mediation is put. A number of these
uses are evident in environmental mediation. The first use to
which mediation is put is for the sole purpose of defining the
issues in dispute and referring the dispute to other forms of
dispute resolution. Some writers refer to this as scoping
mediation but the preference here is to deal with scoping as a
distinct form of assisted negotiation.

The second use to which mediation is put is referred to as
dispute settlement mediation. This is where the process is used
in an attempt to settle the controversy between the parties
through joint decision-making.

Contrasted with this is the use of mediation to manage conflict
in the sense of an ongoing series of controversies, while
acknowledging that the conflict itself will continue. An example
of this usage is the mediated regulation of relationships
between the parties involved in an environmental controversy.
Boulle identifies the use of mediation in this way to formulate
policy, or standards and

procedures in government made rules

and regulations. This reflects the use of mediation in the United

States where it is institutionalised in a form of mediation
known as 'policy dialogue'. This process operates where:

"a third party convenor assists the various (and usually
adversarial) interests groups to formulate consensually arrived
at legislative or regulatory recommendations which are
forwarded to decision-makers."27

This process has been given legislative effect in the United
States referred to as regulatory-negotiation or "reg-neg".28 The
use of mediation in this policy-making fashion was recognised
as a process:
"where parlies, who lack power to resolve a dispute by their
agreement, reach agreement by mediation on a common position
to put to a decision maker."29

Conciliation

Conciliation is another form of assisted negotiation in which
the conciliator intervenes in various ways with the object of
faciliating a settlement between the parties.^o There is.

27p Adier, "Mediating Public Disputes' (1990) in R J Fowler (ed.)
Proceedings of the International Conference on Environmental Law, 14-18
June 1989, Sydney, University of Adelaide, Adelaide,
28d Pritzker, "Regulation by Consensus: Negotiated Rulemaking In the United
States' (1994-95) 1 Commercial Dispute Resolution Journal 217.
Wootten,'The Merits of Negotiation and Mediation in Resource Management
Disputes' (1991) 15 Adelaide Law Review 33 at 41.
30L Boulle, op ciL, note 2 above, 67.

however, a wide divergence of views about the definition of
conciliation and its relationship to the mediation process.^i

One of the essential differences considered is that conciliation
is routinely provided by public agencies and is therefore
institutionalised and not alternative in the strict sense of
'alternative to existing dispute resolution structures.' But as
discussed above this sense of 'alternative' is not favoured here.
In addition conciliation operates 'under the shadow of the law'
and as such there are limitations on the kind of settlements
possible. Bryson reflects this view by defining conciliation as
"mediation within a legal framework" with the conciliator
acting as an advocate for the law.32

These differences reflect the origins of conciliation as a
statute-based system of dispute resolution, particularly in the
area of industrial relations, but there is little real difference
between mediation and conciliation in practice. For instance.
Street says:

"In recent times, mediation or conciliation (the words are
synonymous) has been increasingly accepted in Australia and in
comparable jurisdictions as an adjunct to the adjudication of
claims at law. Although we have a preference for the word
mediation, we shall use in this report the word conciliation.."33

31 Wade, op cit., note 13 above, 204.
32d Bryson, "Mediator and Advocate: Conciliating Human Rights" (1990)
1 Alternative Dispute Resolution Journal 136.
33l. Street, Report on a Model of Conciliation for the NSW Workcover Scheme
(1996) L. Street, Sydney, 8.

Because the resolution of environmental controversies also
operates by necessity 'under the shadow of the law' the process
of resolution by mediation in environmental matters could
equally be described as resolution by conciliation. But it is
considered that no useful purpose is served by making an
essentially artificial distinction between mediation and
conciliation. Mediation as used here encompasses this form of
assisted negotiation.

Scoping

Scoping is a normal part of a mediation process but it can also
be used as a distinct part of other dispute resolution
mechanisms. Its aim is to detemnine the 'scope' of the issues to
be addressed and to identify the significance or ranking of such
issues.

The formal origin of the scoping process' is the United States
National Environmental Policy Act 1969 (NEPA) regulations
which developed in reaction to the preparation of lengthy
environmental impact statements (EISs), criticised as costly
and non-evaluative.34

The NEPA provided instead for the

mandatory use of scoping to involve interested parties such as
government agencies, proponents, affected parties and others in
determining matters of relevance to be addressed in the EIS at
34b Boer et al, The Use of Mediation in the Resource Assessment Commission
Process (1991) AGPS, Canberra, 7.

the initial stage of its preparation with a view to realistically
limiting their scope. The matters scoped included determination
of the significant matters in issue, allocation of responsibility
for conducting the necessary studies, arrangements for
conducting consultation and methods for determining
compliance with related legislation.^^

More recently the suggested use of scoping has been widened to
include an initial period of scoping preceding public inquiries.
This was one of the recommendations made in the consultants'
report to the Resource Assessment Commission.^^. It has also
been recommended as the "proper role for negotiation/mediation
in terms of environment dispute resolution" by the
Environmental Assessment Board of Ontario.37 The general view
is that scoping will be most effectively conducted with the
involvement of a neutral third party.

Scoping is a modification of mediation since its use is confined
to an initial tool only with the resolution of the actual
controversy left to other dispute resolution methods. The
benefit of scoping is that it can overcome the constraints of the
public inquiry process where the emphasis is upon sequential
and non-interactive consultation.3® Scoping potentially permits
for a much more interactive process. This is the use suggested
35|d., 62.
36|d., xlv.
37m I Jeffery, "Accommodating negotiation in the environmental impact
assessment and project approval processes" (1987) 4(4) Environmental and
Planning Law Journal 244 at 250.
38h ROSS, "Environmental Impact Assessment: How to Understand and Resolve
the Substantive Issues in a Dispute" (1991) paper presented at EDR
conference Sydney, 14-15 May 1991, 5.

for the inquiry process of the Commissioners of Inquiry for
Planning and Environment in NSW.^Q

Scoping can also be used to settle the process for dealing with
smaller individual impact assessments and planning reviews at
a local level, rather than leaving the scope of such reviews to
the staff of local authorities.^o

One important difference between scoping and mediation is that
the scoping process does not necessarily require
confidentiality, a usual prerequisite of ADR processes. The
significance of this distinction is an important issue in this
research.

Facilitation

Facilitation overlaps considerably with mediation. The main
point of difference is that facilitation has the capacity to be
more flexible and open-ended than mediation in terms of its
procedures and potential uses.-^^ The definition of facilitation
reflects this

difference:

390ffice of the Commissioners of Inquiry for Environment and Planning,
Annual Report 1994-95 (1995) Office of the Commissioners, Sydney, 5.
^^R Sandford, 'The Merits of Negotiation and Mediation in Resource
Management Disputes''(1991) paper presented to Environmental Dispute
Resolution Conference, Sydney, 14-15 May 1991, 9.
L Bouile, op cit., note 2 above, 74.

•Facilitation Is the bringing together of disputing parties with a
view to clarifying Issues, reducing adversity, establishing
facts, confining issues and creative problem-solving."

The wider scope of facilitation is evident from the range of
matters facilitators assist the parties with, Including
Information gathering, fact finding, round table conferencing,
public meetings and consultancy referrals. Facilitation is said
to be particularly useful In dealing with problems involving
multiple issues and multiple parties, characteristics typical of
some environmental controversies. Facilitation most
appropriately constitutes a preliminary step before the dispute
resolution process Itself commences.

Similar to scoping, facilitation is not a process that necessarily
demands

confidentiality.

Neutral Evaluation / Case Appraisal

The terms 'neutral evaluation' and 'case appraisal' are used
synonymously for the process in which a controversy is referred
to an independent third party who provides a view on Its merits.
The Courts Legislation (Mediation and Evaluation) Amendment
Act 1994 (NSW) which Introduced mediation and neutral
evaluation into the procedures of six court systems in New
South Wales provides a definition of neutral evaluation which
reflects its differences from mediation:

'Neutral evaluation means a process of evaluation of a dispute
in which the evaluator seeks to identify and reduce issues of
fact and law that are in dispute. The evaluator's role includes
assessing the relative strengths and weaknesses of each party's
case and offering an opinion as to the likely outcome of the
proceedings.

The equivalent Queensland legislation, which introduced ADR
processes at the discretion of the court into the Queensland
court system, uses the synonymous term 'case appraisal'. The
definition however indicates that case appraisal has
similarities with adjudicative mechanisms. Case appraisal is a:

"process under the Rules under which a case appraiser
provisionally decides a dispute.'^^

As Clark^3a points out this is really a variation of arbitration,
except that the parties are free to decide in advance whether
the determination will be binding. Given this saving clause the
differences between the New South Wales and Queensland
provisions are in fact slight. In NSW, the evaluator's role
includes offering an opinion on a likely outcome whereas the
Queensland appraiser makes a provisional determination. The
use of this ADR option is usually in a controversy requiring a
decision on a specific technical or scientific issue which can be
detemiined by a neutral expert, either in an advisory or binding
^^Court Legislation (Mediation and Evaluation) Amendment Act 1994 (NSW),
Sch 1.
^^Courts Legislation Amendment Act 1995 (Old), section 6 (emphasis added).
43a E Clark, op cit., note 7 above, 7.

capacity. Usually it is non-binding and is intended to "constitute
the

voice of experience wliich will influence the parties in

negotiating".44

The difference in roles between the evaluator / expert and a
mediator is that:

"unlike a mediator, an expert is expected to provide an answer
to a particular matter submitted by the parties and it is
generally expected that an expert will reach a decision upon the
basis of her or his personal opinion or expertise rather than on
the parties' submissions or on law."^^
In this sense the expert is using his or her expertise and
influence to potentially affect the outcome of a controversy.

Mini-Trial

'Mini-trial' is a dispute resolution process which combines
aspects of case presentation with mediation. It involves firstly
a 'best case' presentation by both parties, usually to a neutral
third party. The second stage is then intended to evolve into a
consideration of settlement options with the third party
assisting in such process.

^^L Boulle, op cit, note 2 above, 72.
Astor & C Chinkin, Dispute Resolution In Australia (1992) Butterworths,
Sydney, 114.

A mini-trial in this sense is not really a trial at all in the
traditional sense but rather a structured presentation utilising
a trial-like setting. Its use is mostly confined to disputes
involving large corporations, with consequent limited use to
date in environmental controversies.^®

Forms of Unassisted

Negotiation

Negotiation

Definition

Negotiation refers to unassisted or direct negotiation between
the parties to a controversy. There is no third party neutral'
present. Negotiation is a traditional approach to dispute
resolution but the principled or 'win-win' approach to
negotiation which is said to characterise ADR methods has
produced "an enormous change in the way we think about
negotiation.•47

The core elements of negotiation irrespective of the approach
taken have been isolated as:

(a) a verbal interactive process
(b) involving two or more parties

Clark, op cit., note 7 above, 29.
47H Wootten, op cit., note 30 above, 42.

(c) who are seeking to reach agreement
(d) over a problem or conflict of interest between them
(e) in which they seek as far as possible to preserve their
interests, but to adjust their views and positions in the joint
effort to achieve an agreement

All models of negotiation display these core elements but are
substantially different in the approaches they take. The three
models examined here are positional bargaining, problemsolving negotiation and interest-based bargaining.

Models
Positional

of

negotiation
Bargaining

In positional bargaining the parties adopt extreme opening
positions, and thereafter make incremental concessions bringing
them closer together until they reach agreement. This is the
most commonly used approach to negotiation because it is form
most often familar to litigants and their advisers.^s

The advantages of this approach essentially flow from its
familarity and its relative ease of application, but it has a
number of shortcomings. One serious shortcoming is that it may
overlook some of the parties' needs or interests which have not
Anstey, Negotiating Conflict (1991) Juta & Co., Kenwyn, South Africa,
91-92.
49c Mendel-Meadow, "Lawyer Negotiations: Theories and Realities-What We
Learn From Mediation" (1993) Modem Law Review May 1993, 361 at 361.

been clearly articulated in the claim and and thereby reduce the
negotiation to a single issue.^^ A number of difficulties may
flow if the negotiations become reduced to a single issue. Where
the other potential issues in dispute are ignored it may
sometimes be difficult to close the final gap between the
parties since there is nothing left to bargain. The negotiations
may break down without a settlement. Similarly where the
controversy involves parties in a continuing business or other
relationship the tactics often employed in positional bargaining
may sour the relationship and adversely affect any future
negotiations.

Problem-solving

Negotiation

Approaches such as problem-solving negotiation attempt to
promote techniques in negotiation which go beyond mere
compromise. One of the salient features of such negotiation
which Boulle recognises is the preparedness to probe beneath
the positional claims of the parties to uncover "their real needs
and interests".5i By placing on the negotiation table all such
matters, the scope for effective negotiations is said to be
therefore enhanced.

Boulle, op cit, note 2 above, 48.
51 Id.. 49.

Interest-based

Negotiation

One of the most influential of the recent problem-solving
approaches to negotiation is that of interest-based negotiation.
The main example of this approach is the principled negotiation
model associated with the Harvard Negotiation Project,
generally accessible through the writings of Fisher and Ury.52
Fisher and Ury's model is the basis for most descriptions of the
interest- based negotiation process. The model relies upon four
underlying principles summarised as:

(1) Separate the feelings of the people from the substance of
the problem;
(2) Focus on interests, not positions;
(3) Invent options for mutual gain;
(4)

Insist on objective

criteria.5 3

The first of these defining features emphasises the need to
develop a working relationship between the parties based upon
mutual acceptance and reliability without conceding on the
substantive issues. The emphasis in such negotiations is upon
separating the personal and emotional aspects of the
controversy and focussing upon the substantive problem.

Secondly, parties in negotiations are encouraged not to focus
upon their positions but upon the needs and interests which

52r Fisher and W Ury, Getting to Yes (1981) 2nd ed., Business Books Limited,
London.

53|d. 11-12.

underlie those positions. The reason for this emphasis is that
the underlying interest may be easier to negotiate and achieve
in a number of ways different from that represented by the
initial

position.

Fisher and Ury's model encourages inventive and innovative
solutions to the problem at hand. The atmosphere encouraged by
once novel techniques such as brainstorming allows the
development of settlement options which may not otherwise be
considered nor recognised by the parties.

The fourth feature of the model emphasises the need for
objective criteria about what outcomes are realistically
possible or preferable. Insistence on objective criteria can
avoid stalemates and breakdowns in negotiations. A difference
of opinion as to options can be resolved by reference to an
agreed standard and thus not become a protracted area of
dispute.

Boulle's view is that despite the apparent simplicity of these
principles, "they are deeply profound".®^ They help to achieve the
desired outcome of an agreement that meets the interests of the
parties. Fisher and Ury describe such an outcome as a "wise
agreement":
"An agreement that meets the legitimate interests of each side
to the extent possible, resolves conflicting interests fairly, is
durable, and takes community interests into
Boulle, op cit., note 2 above, 51
55|d., 4.

account.

A model having these features remains the basis for the conduct
of interest-based negotiations. But the model has been subject
to criticism as an inadequate description of the process,
particularly with reference to multi-issue and multi-issue
n e g o t i a t i o n s . i t remains to be seen whether the model can
make adequate allowance for situations involving conflicting
values, public interest concerns or scientific uncertainity which
we have suggested distinguish environmental conflicts.

In these cases either interest-based negotiation is
inappropriate and should be avoided or different criteria will
need to be applied. Some critics argue that if negotiations do
take place the parties return to the "ultimate hard bargaining"
strategies.57 The process is then characterised by strategies
"pushing for a compromise outcome" which essentially equate to
positional bargaining.^s

It is important to remember for this reason there can be no
certainity that the style of negotiation being employed in ADR
processes reflects the Fisher and Ury ideal. The parties may
equally be negotiating positionally as from an interest-based
position and the negotiations will need to take account of the
inherent

differences.

56see B Wolski, "The role and the limitations of Fisher and Ury's model of
interest-based negotiation in mediation" (1994) Australian Dispute Resolution
Journal, August 1994, 210.
J White, "The Pros and Cons of 'Getting to Yes' & Comments by R Fisher"
(1984) 34 Journal of Legal Education 115 at 116.
58b Wolski, op cit, note 56 above, 218.

Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a framework for
discussing the use of ADR methods in the resolution of
environmental controversies. 'ADR methods' and 'consensual
mechanisms' are used synonymously to describe those dispute
resolution methods 'alternative to adjudication, to externally
imposed solutions and to existing dispute resolution methods'.
'Mediation' is used as a shorthand description for all forms of
assisted negotiation. 'Negotiation' is similarly used as a
shorthand description for those ADR methods where the parties
seek to reach a consensual resolution without the assistance of
a neutral third party.
Using this nomenclature the research explores the use of these
methods in resolving environmental controversies along the
length of the continuum between environmental disputes and
environmental

conflicts.

CHAPTER FOUR
THE UNITED STATES EXPERIENCE
Introduction
The previous chapters have detailed the characteristics of
environmental controversies and the ADR methods which may be
utilised to resolve them. This chapter reviews the current
United States literature on the use made of ADR methods in the
resolution of environmental controversies and the extent of that
usage.

In reviewing an effective 25 year history of the development
and use of ADR methods to resolve environmental controversies
a number of topics arise for discussion. This review seeks to
address these recurrent topics.

In two classic articles in the 1970s Fuller discussed the limits
and forms of two dispute resolution mechanisms, referring to
mediation (or consensus mechanisms generally)^ and
adjudication.2.

He was concerned with controversies in general

rather than environmental controversies specifically. His
discussion of the limits of these two dispute resolution
mechanisms involved a consideration of the characteristics of

"•L Fuller, 'Mediation-Its Forms and Functions' (1971) 44 Southern
California Law 325.
^L Fullerp 'The Forms and Limits of Adjudication' (1978) 92 Harvard Law
Review 353.

each mechanism and its capacity to resolve certain types of
controversies.
Another aspect of Fuller's discussion was the form of the
dispute resolution mechanism, that is the way to organise
adjudication or mediation in order to be most effective. His
discussion is the first clear expression of the notion that
different kinds of controversies may be better resolved by
different dispute resolution mechanisms. This is particularly
important in the light of our earlier argument that the kind of
environmental controversies requiring resolution range along a
continuum between planning disputes and environmental
conflicts.
Fuller provides the theoretical background for the discussion
suggesting that mediation (or ADR methods generally)
constitute a separate and distinct system of dispute resolution.
He draws a clear distinction between mediation and
adjudication as separate dispute resolution mechanisms. This is
important because the growth of ADR methods is often seen as a
reaction to the inadequacies of adjudication.
For the sake of clarity our discussion reviews the United States
experience with ADR methods in three separate stages:
implementation & experimentation, consolidation and current
practice.

stage

One: Implementation

Reaction

against

&

Experimentation

adjudication

It is customary to think of adjudication as 'a means of settling
disputes or controversies." But more fundamentally adjudication
can be viewed as a fomn of social ordering, "as a way In which
the relations of men to one another are governed or regulated.'^
Seen In this light, adjudication can be compared with other
forms of social ordering those involving for instance,
negotiation or those requiring a managerial or political solution.

Fuller considers the essential distinguishing characteristics of
adjudication. Firstly, adjudication Is a device that gives formal
expression to the influence of reasoned argument. Secondly, the
disputant must make a 'claim of right' based upon some legal
principle.^

The judge or arbitrator can certainly step out of this strict role
of adjudicator and assume another role and therefore not be
subject to these constraints. But this does not negate the fact
that there are some forms of controversy which are inherently
unsuited to adjudication. Fuller categorises these as
'polycentric disputes', controversies involving both a
multiplicity of parties and an issue which is not sharply
defined, in Fuller's words, where there is 'a somewhat fluid

3|d., 357.
4 Id. 366.

State of affairs".^ His view is tliat if such controversies are not
suited to resolution by means of adjudication, other mechanisms
such as negotiation or "administrative direction" may be more
suitable.

Fuller still places adjudication in the role of the primary
mechanism of dispute resolution saying that these other
mechanisms may be more suitable for certain types of
controversies.

Other writers are sharper in their criticism of the inadequacies
of adjudicative mechanisms. One common criticism was that the
inefficiency of adjudicative bodies was due to a 'litigation
explosion' with which the court system had simply been unable
to cope. This rise in court use was seen as a legacy of the 1960s
when many legal newcomers (consumers etc.) started utilising
the court system. But on reviewing the empirical research,
Parmentier concludes that "this diagnosis is severely
questioned and [should be] ultimately discarded."® His view was
that the reaction against the adjudicative system was not
primarily due to its perceived inefficiencies stemming from
overioad.

In the case of environmental controversies the perceived
inefficiency of the court system is seen more as an inability to
deal with the growth of environmental legislation and the added
5|d.. 397.
Parmentier, "Alternative Dispute Resolution in the United States: No roses
without thorns" (1991) in S Nagal & M Mills(ed.) Systematic Analysis in
Dispute Resolution, Quorum Books, New York, 223-241 at 227.

interpretative role this places on courts and other tribunals. But
as Wald points out the role of adjudication in environmental
controversies is limited. The primary responsibility to
formulate and apply 'pertinent legal rules' is granted to
executive officals and independent agencies^ The court's role is
in the exercise of review over such decisions.

If the perception of 'a legal and regulatory malaise' which was
said to have characterised the view of the American legal
system by the late 1970s was not primarily due to the inability
of the courts to deal with a quantitative leap in 'court dockets',
what was the source of the perception?® It seems in part to be
due to a realisation of the inherent restrictions of adjudication
in handling controversies. Fletcher identifies the major
restriction:

'Our courts are reactive bodies - like spiders, we judges wait
and watch to see what controversies may fly into our webs...our
obligation is to resolve the dispute presented and on as narrow
grounds as possible."^

These restrictions are particularly pertinent in the case of
environmental controversies where the ramifications of a
decision may well extend beyond the specific controversy or
parties involved. But the inherent restrictions of adjudication
M Wald, "Negotiation of Environmental Disputes: a new role for the
courts?'(1985) 10 Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 1.
8|d., 3.
^B B Fletcher, 'The Judicial Approach to Environmental Litigation'(1990) in
R J Fowler (ed.) Proceedings of the Intemationai Conference on Environmental
Law, 14-18 July 1989, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 60.

do not allow courts to fill the role of reconciling essentially
competing political interests. This is a role for:
"the agency to which congress has delegated policymaking
responsibilities...rely[ing] upon the incumbent administration's
view of wise policy to inform its judgments.

On this view the reaction against adjudication is more in
response to its perceived ineffectiveness in resolving complex
public interest controversies than any perception of its
inefficiency in dealing with a hugely increased levels of
litigation. This realisation prompted a number of early writers
to speculate as to whether ADR methods could effectively fill
this void. A closer examination of the features of the small
scale societies in which mediation in particular was said to be
most effective (such as their social cohesion, the fact that the
mediator was often a highly ranked member of the community
representing the common values of the group and exerting
pressure on the parties) convinced some critics that adequate
regard needed to be made for the substantial differences
between these societies and the United States.^^

I0(js Supreme Court's view expressed in Chevron, USA v Natural Resources
Defence Council - US 104 SCt 2778 (1984) quoted in Wald, op cit., note 8
above, 6.
11 Parmentier, op cit., note 6 above, 227.

ADR as a separate and distinct dispute resolution
mechanism

Fuller says that 'under a system of state-made law, the
standard Instrument of dispute settlement should be
adjudication and not mediation'J^ Within this context he then
explores the features of mediation. The essential quality of
mediation which distinguishes it from adjudication is:

•its capacity to reorient the parties towards each other, not by
imposing rules on them, but by helping them achieve a new and
shared perception of their relationship.'^ ^

This distinguishing quality allows mediation to be a more
appropriate dispute resolution mechanism in some
circumstances. In Fuller's view the adjudicative process is only
one way of bringing human relations into a workable and
productive order. The difficulty is In detennining what is the
'proper domain of mediation".^ ^

Fuller proposes two tests to determine this, the first of which
indicates when mediation should not be used and the second
indicates when it cannot be used. The first test is applied by
asking 'Is the underiying relationship best organised by
'impersonal act-oriented rules', that is, rules properiy flowing

Fuller, op cit, note 1 above, 328.
I3|d., 325.
330.

from an external authority? If it is, mediation is unsuitable as
it may undermine the protection afforded by that authority.

The second test is applied by asking 'Is the problem presented
amenable to solution through mediation processes?' To Fuller
there are two intrinsic limitations to mediation. He considers
that it cannot generally be employed when more than two
parties are involved. Additionally, it presupposes an
intermeshing of interests of an intensity to make the parties
willing to collaborate. Fuller calls this "a felt sense of
interdependence" exerting pressure to reach agreement.^^ if this
sense of interdependence is missing mediation cannot work.

But this is not to say whether mediation is or should be a
separate and distinct dispute resolution mechanism. Cormick's
view is that it is not. He sees the mediation process as
complementary to existing social structures, not separate.^^ In
this way ADR processes exist within the framework of existing
administrative, regulatory and judicial processes. On this view
the processes and methods of mediation and negotiation do not
require a separate mechanism to operate effectively. This view
receives support from critics who assert that "informal
institutions" such as mediation, should be planned as additive
supplements to, and not as substitutes, for the existing legal

15|d..
16g w Cormlck, 'Mediating Environmental Controversies: Perspectives and
First Experience"(1976) 2 Earth Law Journal 215 at 223.

systemJ7

j h e consensus appears to be that ADR methods will

work best within these existing mechanisms J®

Should ADR be the preferred dispute resolution
mechanism?

The view that ADR methods constituted another form of social
ordering was seen by some as debasing the functions of
adjudication by comparison. Certainly Fuller's view was that
adjudication should be the standard instrument of dispute
resolution and that controversies requiring the imposition of
external rules were not suitable for mediation. But to see
mediation on an equal footing with adjudication was regarded as
a trivalisation of the remedial dimensions of adjudication and a
reduction of its functions to one of resolving private disputes
only.i^ To see adjudication in this light does not make allowance
for the public purpose of adjudication. This purpose is to
articulate and interpret the rights, principles and rules that
help to protect individuals and groups in society.^^

Fiss' view is that if adjudication is seen only as a process of
resolving controversies then the settlement that comes from
mediation or negotiation achieves exactly the same purpose as

Abel, "The Contradiction of Informal Justice" in R. Abel (ed.) The Politics
of Informal Justice, Vol. 1 (1982), Academic Press, New York, at 273.
l^A Painter, 'The future of environmental dispute resolution"(1988) 28
Natural Resources Journal No.1 Winter, 145 at 167.
I^O Fiss, 'Against Settlement'(1984) 93 Yale Law Journal 1080 at 1085.
20c Ellison, Dispute Resolution and Democratic Theory"(1991) in Nagel &
Mills, op cit., note 6 above, 243-268 at 248.

judgment. But he considers this is not so because it ignores the
broader purpose of adjudication, a purpose which mediation does
not have. To Fiss this is:

"not to maximise the ends of private parties; nor simply
to secure the peace, but to explicate and give force to the values
embodied in authorative texts such as the Constitution and
statutes."21

If ADR is the preferred dispute resolution mechanism, the duty
embodied in this purpose may not be discharged when the
parties settle, for the parties will be free to settle while
leaving justice

undone.22

Similar criticisms are made based upon the inherent
characteristics of ADR methods themselves. Abel traces the
development of "informal legal institutions" from the growth of
neighbourhood justice centres in the 1970s to an expanded role
in dealing with larger social issues. His criticisms are that
these informal legal institutions deal with the controversy by
depicting it as only a failure of communication: once lines of
communication are reopened the controversy will resolve itself.
Further the controversy is neutralised by individualising
complaints and inhibiting the perception of common
grievances.23

The effect of these two factors is that the

disputants are actively encouraged to settle their separate

2 I 0 Fiss, op cit., note 20 above. 1085.
22|d.
23R Abel, op cit., note 17 above, 284-289.

disputes as either party is robbed of any "strong normative
basis for his

posltion."24

To make ADR the preferred dispute resolution mechanism
nullifies important protections afforded by not only the
adjudicative mechanism but also by the administrative
mechanism. The legal system allows class and collective
actions that can result in precedent setting. The political arena
is the better place to handle controversies about societal
problems, such as environmental safety standards where
matters of public Interest are best dealt with transparently.2 s
This is not to say that both the legal and political systems are
without limitations. But the point Abel and others are making is
that at least the potential for abuses In these mechanisms can
be limited by requiring the safeguards of due process and as
such they should remain the preferred dispute resolution
mechanisms.26

These criticisms have considerable relevance in the case of
environmental controversies. For instance, the series of judicial
decisions that played a part in developing the protective role of
the precautionary principle would never have occurred If these
disputes had been mediated.^^

24|d., 293.
25s Parmentier, op cit., note 6 above, 236.
26r Abel, op cit, note 17 above, 307.
27see for instance in the NSW jurisdiction: Leatch v National Parks and
Wildlife Services & Anor. (1993) 81 LGERA 270 and Greenpeace Australia
Limited V Redbank Power Station & Anon (1994) 86 LGERA 143 (see eartier
discussion on pp. 40-42 above).

Should environmental controversies be mediated?

The argument about whether environmental controversies should
be dealt with by mediation or other forms of ADR methods
follows essentially the same pattern as did the argument over
the use of these methods to resolve controversies generally.
Firstly, there is a perception that traditional methods have
failed. The federal agencies given a major role through
environmental protection legislation to resolve environmental
controversies administratively are seen to be unable to cope
adequately with that role. The effectiveness of the 'command
and control' model of government regulation as a useful
approach to environmental protection was being tested.^s There
was also doubt that the role of the Federal Courts in exercising
judicial review of agency decisions provided an effective
safeguard. The courts were seen to exclude many interested
parties, to leave unaddressed larger issues involved in the
environmental controversy and to leave unresolved the
underlying conflict.2 9

Susskind and Weinstein reported a general mood of
dissatisfaction with both administrative and adjudicative
means of dispute resolution such that:

Susskind & A Weinstein, "Towards a theory of environmental dispute
resolution"(1980)4 Land Use and Environmental Law Review 433 at 440.
29|d., 441.

'many environmental conflicts exceed the decision-making
capacity of our existing institutions and will require new
institutional arrangements for

resolution."^o

They suggest that ADR methods may be the answer, but other
commentators remain unconvinced. Amy, while conceding a role
for mediation in controversies of a type similar to those
referred to as environmental disputes in this study, raises
questions about the suitability of mediation for environmental
c o n f l i c t s . H e poses a number of important questions which
will be applied to the environmental conflict case study
examined in this research:

Is the mediation process politically biased in favour of the
interests of developers?
Can the public interest be protected in mediation agreements?^^

He says that questions such as these are 'politically charged'.
By politics, he means 'the issues of power, equality and
democracy that are necessarily involved in any policymaking
process.'33

Amy then sets out to examine mediation from the politics of
environmental mediation and sees a number of disturbing
aspects. He sees an imbalance of power between different
30|d.,

443.

Amy, The Politics of Environmental Mediation (1987) Columbia
University Press, New York, 6.
32d Amy,"The Politics of Environmental Mediation'(1983), 7
Ecology
Law Quarterly 1 at 2.

33|d.

stakeholders with an unequal access to the mediation table by
interested parties in that only powerful stakeholder groups are
parties to the process. In addition he sees an imbalance of
expertise amongst the parties involved, in that some interests
are better resourced than others. The politics of the process
itself are characterised by an illusion of voluntariness, meaning
that there are subtle pressures on the parties to participate and
to produce an outcome. Amy argues that there is also the
illusion of power in the participants. He says public and private
stakeholders use mediation to give the illusion of significant
and widespread participation, while retaining essential policymaking power. There is also a coercive element rising from the
process to achieve a 'reasonable compromise' where in some
environmental conflicts, for instance a compromise may involve
an unwanted and unsuitable development continuing in a
modified form.^^

Amy says that when mediation is seen from this perspective its
inherent unsuitability as a mechanism to resolve 'public policy
conflicts' is apparent. The same criticisms could not be equally
made of the resolution of environmental conflicts by
administrative mechanisms. His comments that consensual or
administrative mechanisms rest on a false understanding of
what politics is applies to both contexts:

"Politics is not simply about communication, it is also about
power struggles. It is not only about common interests, but

34|d., 6-15.

about conflicting interests as well. And it not only involves
horse-trading, but competition between conflicting values and
different moral visions.'^s

Amy's argument is that there is a need amongst participants,
particularily less powerful ones to face this political realism.
The conclusion to be drawn from this is that environmental
controversies in the nature of environmental conflicts are
better resolved administratively. If they are to be dealt with by
ADR methods there should at least be a clearer understanding
that the mediation itself is a political process.

This is a view essentially endorsed by other commentators.
Macdonnell is concemed with whether ADR methods are best
suited to resolving environmental controversies involving
'natural resource conflicts.Macdonnell's view is that these
conflicts involve questions of values, for example the quality of
air, water and land are such a fundamental part of human
existence that their use is a matter of special concern. These
value-centred conflicts are especially difficult to resolve and
as such are best addressed through the political process, that
is, through administrative means.37 While conceding that Amy's
criticisms of environmental politics apply equally to
administrative mechanisms as to mediation, administrative
mechanisms are at least transparently political and not
mistakenly portrayed as consensual.
^^ D Amy , op cit., note 31 above, 228.
J MacDonnell, 'Natural Resources dispute resolution: an overview" (1988)
28 Natural Resources 5 at 7.
37|d., 8.

This is not to idealise the administrative mechanisms
unnecessarily. Meyers in discussing a dispute over logging oldgrowth forests in the Pacific North West of the United States
and its impact on protected species paints a different picture of
the administrative process. He says the administrative
mechanism involves "political posturing in Congress, foot
dragging by the executive branch..(which) will not resolve public
resource conflicts."3®

The theme that there are particular critical concerns about the
use of ADR methods to resolve environmental controversies is
picked up by Ellison in his review of the use of policy dialogues
and negotiation in the Federal Government agencies' rulemaking
p r o c e s s . T h e rulemaking process is the manner in which US
government agencies create rules, a process usually
characterised by public participation in the drafting stage. So,
for example, the process was used to set penalties for vehicle
manufacturers failing to meet Clean Air Act standards. Ellison
is critical of this "negotiation-based approach to policy
formation." He repeats Amy's criticism that environmentalists
rarely examine ADR as a political phenomenon nor consider
whether the "flight from politics" in the formal sense is
justified or appropriate.'^o Ellison's argument is that the

A Meyers, "Old-growth forests, the Owl and Yew: Environmental Ethics
versus Traditional Dispute Resolution"(1991) 18 Boston College
Environmental Affairs Law Review 623 at 667.
Ellison, "Dispute Resolution and Democratic Theory"(1991) in S Nagal &
M Mills(ed.) Systematic Analysis in Dispute Resolution, Quorum Books, New
York, 243-268.
40|d. 246.

administrative mechanism is the preferred mechanism for
dealing with environmental conflicts involving the setting of
public policy. Nor is adjudication an appropriate public policy
tool. Its strength lies in the resolution of controversies where
there is a need to 'articulate and interpret the rights,
principles, and rules that help to protect individuals and
groups.'^^ The role of consensual mechanisms on tiie other hand
is ancillary to each of these processes.
Ellison's view is that this process of formulating and
implementing public policy is the province of politics. Politics
is a process of resolving distributional disputes requiring
consensus and incremental adjustments between parties. The
political process performs this function well by administrative
means, and in some cases the administration will override
resolutions reached elsewhere.^^ Environmental conflicts
invariably involve such distributional issues. To attempt to
substitute ADR methods for this process in Ellison's view
'generally serves bureaucratic purposes and only rarely the
needs of

d e m o c r a c y . j ^ e

problem with this rationale is that

the concept of 'stakeholder as constituency is flawed as it
potentially excludes less organised or less powerful groups
which nonetheless are effected by the outcome. To equate the
public interest with the interests of those participating is

^Md. 248.
^2see. for example. State Environmental Planning Policy No. 47 Moore Park
Showground, the effect of which excluded public participation in the
development of particular land.
43c Ellison, op ciL, note 39 aba^e, 250.

flawed. In this sense the administrative mechanism may not in
fact 'resolve' the conflict in the sense used here.

The other concern expressed by critics is with the manner in
which negotiated settlements are conducted. For Ellison this is
likely to occur in temporary fora protected from the pressures
of dealing directly with constituencies and so regulating
controversies "to these private spaces in public life."'^'^ ADR
methods are seen as privatising what should be a public policy
controversy by limiting the participants, the issues and the
audience. The controversy then becomes inappropriately
depoliticised. When the matter involves an environmental
controversy it should be dealt with by the administrative
mechanism, involving publically elected officials or their
delegates. For Ellison, negotiated approaches tend to weaken the
authority and public interest committment of such officials,
making them 'bargain like any other stakeholder " often at the
expense of previously articulated public values.^^

The growth of ADR methods in environmental
controversies

The first recorded example of the use of ADR methods to resolve
an environmental controversy was in 1973. Two mediators, G W
Cormick and J E McCarthy from the Mediation Centre in
Washington, were appointed to attempt to resolve a long running
44 Id. 253.
45|d., 261.

controversy over a proposed flood control dam on the
Snoqualmie River in Seattle, Washington. In fact the controversy
had gone unresolved for over 14 years.^^ After defining the
parties and selecting representatives, the mediators held a
number of mediation sessions. From these sessions the parties
made joint recommendations to government, essentially
proposing a smaller dam at a less intrusive location. The local
Governor announced endorsement of the recommendations and a
committee was formed to implement the agreed plan. The
mediation had achieved a consensus, though In fact the smaller
dam was never built. A number of the recommendations were
implemented but, more importantly, the mediation showed that
ADR methods could work in environmental controversies.'^^

By 1986 the use of ADR methods in environmental controversies
had a sufficient "cumulative track record' for the US
Conservation Foundation to commission a study as to this
effectiveness.'^® The study was only concemed with those
controversies where the ADR method used involved a mediator.
The findings of this study were summarised in a paper by
Bingham and Haywood, both directors of the Foundation. The
abstract to the paper encapsulates the findings:

"Between 1974 and 1984 mediation was used to resolve more
than 160 environmental disputes. Agreements were reached in

W Cormick, op cit, note 16 above, 220.
47c Stukenborg, "The Proper Role of ADR in Environmental Conflict"(1994)
19 Dayton Law Review 1305 at 1312.
48 G Bingham, Resolving Environmental Disputes: a decade of experience
(1986) Conservation Foundation, Washington.

78 percent of the 133 cases where that was the parties'
objective.
On the face of it this seems an astonishing record of success.

The report said that up to the mid-1970s "the number of
mediated disputes...could be counted on the fingers of one
hand.'^^^ By the end of 1979, 36 disputes had been mediated and
by mid-1984 a further 126 from a total 162 cases; impressive
but proportionally speaking, not a dramatic increase.^^ It is
useful to place these figures in the wider context of
environmental controversies in the United States.52

Further, in 30 of the 162 cases documented by Bingham, the
parties' objective was only to 'improve communications' rather
than to 'reach an agreement'. Taking this qualification into
account, resolution of approximately 130 controversies in a 10
year period does not equate to a substantial share of the
controversies over environmental issues in the United States.

Bingham and Haywood's study does however give some insight
into the types of controversies which were subject to mediation
as the ADR movement gained momentum. Each category of
dispute was divided into two types: 'site-specific or policy

^^G Bingham & L V Haywood, "Environmental Dispute Resolution: The first ten
year'(1986) 41 Arbitration Journal 3 at 3.
^ ^ Rellly, in the Forward to G Bingham, op cit, note 48 above, ix.
S^G Bingham & L V Haywood, op cit, note 49 above, 6.
In the period from the 1984 amendments to the Resource, Conservation and
Recovery Act (US) (providing for citizen suits) to 1988, 1200 citizen actions
alone were commenced in environmental matters in US Federal and State courts,
see L Jorgenson & J J Kimmel, Environmental Citizen Suits: Confronting the
Corporation (1988) Bureau of National Affairs, Washington, 19.

level disputes'. Site-specific disputes Involved a dispute over a
particular project or plan while policy-level disputes involved
questions of local, state or national environmental policy. Six
broad categories were identified:

Land Use:: 70 site-specific & 16 policy-level disputes,
Natural
Water

Resource Management

29 site-specific & 4 policy-level,

Resources:: 16 site-specific & 1 policy-level.

Energy: 10 site-specific & 4 policy-level.
Air Quality:: 6 site-specific & 7 policy-level.
Toxics:: 5 site-specific & 11 policy-level.

The findings indicated there was little difference in the
settlement rate between site-specific and policy-level
disputes. The parties were successful in reaching agreement in
79% of site-specific cases and in 76% of policy dialogues. There
were significant differences in the implementation rate of the
two types of disputes. In site-specific disputes the agreements
reached were fully implemented in 80% of the cases, while in
policy-level disputes agreements were fully implemented in
only 41% of cases.^s The reason for this difference appears to be
that while with site-specific disputes the organisations
(usually public agencies) with authority to implement decisions
were directly involved, in the case of policy-level disputes,
when those with the authority to implement the
recommendations were not at the table (for whatever reason)
the terms of the agreement were either modified or rejected.^^
^^G Bingham & L V Haywood, op cit., note 49 above, 9.

54|d.. 12.

There is a clear message from these results that In the case of
environmental conflicts all parties involved, in particular the
relevant organ of government, should be party to the
negotiations from the outset. There is no benefit in 'resolving' a
dispute when the resolution is subsequently rejected by
government.

Subsequent reviews of the use of ADR methods in the United
States for environmental controversies show an increasing and
established pattern. A 1989 study found 458 ADR programs
operating in 45 States dealing with environmental matters. The
trend has been for environmental mediation to become
Instututionalised. A National Institute for Dispute Resolution
was formed in 1989 to create state-level and state-sponsored
mediation offices to address environmental controversies, with
four offices opening in that and following years.^^

Stage Two: Consolidation
At the consolidation stage the use of ADR methods in
environmental controversies was firmly established and the
discussion turned to what the proper use of these methods
should be. By this stage the view that the surge in the use of
ADR methods was due to the Inefficiency of the court system
had been largely dispelled in the literature and critics now saw

Adier, "Mediating Public Disputes" in R J Fowler (ed.) Proceedings of the
International Conference on Environmental Law, 14-18 June 1989, Sydney,
University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 103-112 at 105.

it more as a question of the courts' ineffectiveness in
addressing tlie real issues in dispute in environmental
controversies. Many litigated controversies dealt only with
procedural compliance rather than substantative issues as to
whether the development should

proceed.^e

ADR was now presented as a more effective mechanism for
environmental dispute resolution rather than the only one. The
view that ADR methods were the best mechanism had not been
unanimously embraced and the implementation of these methods
was not widespread. Though there was growing acceptance of
their use to resolve planning disputes, there was significantly
less support for using ADR methods to resolve environmental
conflicts. The view continued to be strongly held that while
adjudication was inappropriate for environmental conflicts, so
too were negotiation-based approaches. The use of the
administrative mechanisms inherent in the political process
were still seen as the preferred method for resolving valueladen conflicts. As the use of ADR methods moved out of its
initial experimental stage deeper issues arose as to the nature
of their role. These issues are considered in detail here.

^^G W Cormick, op cit., note 16 above, 96.

Identification
for

of

environmental

controversies

suitable

mediation

The first of these issues was to determine an appropriate
method of

identifying those environmental controversies which

were suitable for resolution using ADR methods. By the early
1980s, the use of ADR methods had sufficient currency for a
number of mediators practising in the area to propose a means
for evaluating the suitability of ADR for environmental
controversies. These commentators do not make a distinction
between planning disputes and environmental conflicts, nor do
they have regard to the concept of a continuum between them.
However from the examples they examine it is apparent that
they are dealing with both halves of the continuum but with a
strong emphasis on environmental conflicts. One experienced
mediator estimated that "about 10% of environmental disputes
are good candidates for ADR.'57 Comnick, both a practising
mediator and a theorist in the area, defined four criteria
necessary for a successful mediation:

(1) a stalemate or the recognition that stalemate is
inevitable,
(2) voluntary participation,
(3) some room for flexibility, and
(4) a means of implementing agreements.^Q

57A R Talbot, Settling Things: Six Case Studies in Environmental Mediation
(1983) The Conservation Foundation, Washington, 91.
S^Quoted Id., 99.

This first criterion tends to bring us back to one of Fuller's
intrinsic limitations of mediation, that it presupposes an
intermeshing of interests in achieving an outcome.59 It is a
criterion also repeated by Wald when she lists as one of her
preconditions, a situation "where the parties' precise objectives
cannot be reached without n e g o t i a t i o n . P a t t o n identifies a
similar precondition as 'uncertainty', where no one party can
hope to dictate the outcome with any certainty.^^ It is this
recognition that the controversy has reached an impasse that is
regarded as crucial. It affects the attitudes a party brings to
the negotiations. Cormick does not expressly state this in his
list of suitability criteria but several other commentators
consider it warrants clear expression. Patton says the parties
must want to "consider settlement'®^ and Bingham says it is
necessary that all parties "desire settlement".^^ It is important
to remember that this recognition is not altruistic, it flows
from a realisation that a stalemate has been reached which
makes the parties want to negotiate. The parties recognise the
relative power of the other participants, if only in a 'spoiling'
role.64

This shared recognition that an impasse has been reached which
then makes the parties willing to collaborate should not be
S^L Fuller op cit., note 1 above, 330.
60p vv Wald, op cit., note 7 above, 7.
K Patton, "Settling Environmental Disputes: the Experience with and the
Future of Environmental Mediation"(1984) 14 Environmental Law 547 at
549.
62|d., 653.
Bingham, op cit., note 48 above, 10-11.
P Grad, "Alternative Dispute Resolution in Environmental Law"(1989) 14
Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 157 at 166.

equated with mandating the process. This is Cormick's second
criterion, the requirement for voiuntariness. His view reflects
the prevailing view that the essential character of ADR
processes is that they are not coercive but consensual. There is
one qualification to this as regards the necessary elements for
successful negotiated rulemaking. Harter says there may be a
compulsion to make a decision 'lest some other agency
undertakes to do so.'^^ He emphasises that there may be
pressure to settle but he does not equate this to compulsion.
There is also the implication that all parties can participate
free from the constraints imposed by imbalances of power and
resources which is subject to debate.®®

The third criterion is the existence of some element of
flexibility in the participants so that there is scope for
compromise. Bingham noted this as a crucial criterion in her
review of mediated settlements. She identified the need for an
ability and an authority to settle on the part of all parties in the
successful mediations reviewed.®^ This precondition may well
exclude value-laden environmental conflicts. If such conflicts
are to be negotiated there needs either to be a measure of
agreement on fundamental values or an agreement to exclude
from the negotiations, value-laden issues.®® In the absence of
these preliminary agreements it is suggested negotiation-based
solutions would not be effective in such conflicts.

®5p Harter, "Negotiating Regulations; A Cure for Malaise" (1982) 71
Georgetown Law Journal t at 51.
®®P W Wald, op cit., note 7 above, 7.
Bingham, op cit, note 48 above, 11.
®®F P Grad, op cit, note 64 above, 166.

As to the fourth criterion the need for a means of ¡mplementing
agreements reached is a recognition that the mediation process
may offer no compulsion external to the parties to enforce a
consensus outcome. This is recognised as a difficulty by Harter
who lists as one of his necessary elements "a commitment to
implement the agreement reached".®^ His comments were in the
context of negotiated rulemaking where the parties know an
external agency can impose a different solution if the parties do
not adhere to their consensus. Another way of achieving the
implementation of an agreement is to ensure that parties
representing all views on an issue are joined as participants and
that their representatives have the authority to enforce and
implement any agreement reached. ^^

There are other subsidiary issues to do with the effectiveness
of the ADR process (such as cleariy defined issues and
manageable numbers of participants) but these four simple
criteria have gained considerable currency as a means of
identifying controversies suitable for ADR methods and they are
returned to in this research.^i

Harter, op cit., note 65 above, 51.
70A R Talbot, op cit., note 57 above, 99.
71c Stukenborg, op cit, note 47 above, 1333.

Problems of

Participation

The second of the issues which arise in this consolidation stage
concern a number of recurrent problems to do with participation
which have appeared in the United States experience of
"environmental mediation." These problems are examined
separately here.

Inequality of bargaining power

The first problem identified is the need to deal with the
inequality of power in the mediation process between the
participants. Amy had perceived a tendency in mediation to
"institutionalise maldistributons of power."^2 But Adier says
this inequality of power can be managed if it is recognised that
there are other types of power than economic power and that
these other types of power can effectively be used by "citizen
groups" to balance the equation.

in this regard there is the

power of public opinion which can be marshalled against
unpopular development projects or the power of delay inherent
in protracted litigation, particularly if the citizen groups are
protected against cost orders if unsuccessful.

The first step in dealing with this problem is a recognition that
the negotiation or mediation process is by its essence a process
of power exchange, and therefore no different from the political
process involved in the administrative mechanism. The parties
72D Amy , op cit., note 32 above, 6.
73p Adier, op cit., note 55 above. 111

to the controversy must have some relative ability to exercise
sanctions over one another for the mediation process to have a
chance of success, just as they must have in the administrative
mechanism7^

Absence of decision malcing power
The second problem is also a question of power. There is a
necessity to deal with the absence of decision-making power in
the participants. This arises in two situations. The parties must
first have the authority of their constituency to accept a
solution. This presents difficulties for peak environmental
groups such as the Nature Conservation Council (NCC)
endeavouring to agree to resolutions binding upon its
constituent bodies. This extends to government parlies, so a
government agency involved in the process must have the
authority to agree to any compromise solution reached over a
controversial development.
A separate aspect of the problem is that the participants must
also have authority over the process and the outcome. Cormick
makes the point that mediation is not a planning or information
process but a decision-making process. If the consensus reached
has no certainty or likelihood of implementation then the
parties have been involved in no more than "some sterile
participation or informational e x e r c i s e . ' ^ s To achieve this will

W Cormick, op cit., note 16 above, 216.
75|d., 219.

require a commitment by decision-making authorities to
implement tlie outcome readied, otherwise the process is futile.

Inequality of resources
The third recurrent problem of participation was the need to
deal with inequality of resources between the parties. Parties
with limited resources may consider these are better used in a
forum likely to attract maximum public attention, such as
adjudicative fora or in public protest^®
The existence of unequal resources may preclude the use of
negotiation-based methods. If ADR methods are to be used,
mechanisms need to be developed to provide the means to
generate the scientific and technical information crucial to
balanced negotiation. In its absence, this 'lack of resource
power" may preclude the use of ADR methods.77

ADR Mechanisms: independent or Ancillary?
The third issue at this consolidation stage is whether ADR
methods should operate as a separate and distinct mechanism or
as a process ancillary to other mechanisms. The main focus of
this debate has been whether the mediation services should be
court-annexed or totally outside the judicial system.

Bingham, op cit, note 48 above, 159.

77|d., 160.

To have the use of ADR methods in environmental controversies
as a court referred mechanism overcomes some of the concerns
expressed by Fiss and others. They were concerned that only
adjudicative mechanisms are capable of upholding normative
values. Wald says that a sympathetic judicial overview would
allow for the refusal of settlements not 'in the public
interest'.78 Her view is that:

"the amputation of meaningful judicial review from settlements
or negotiated regulations in the environmental field would make
these ADR techniques far less attractive to some of the parties
as instruments of justice."7 9

If settlements are to embody the nearest approximation of the
ideals of justice to which Fiss refers, this would allow the
adjudicative mechanism to operate to ensure that mediated
settlements contain just outcomes.

Bingham supports this view when she says that court-related
mediation services are preferrable as they overcome the
hazards of second class justice and lack of external control.^^ In
Bingham's view there is also the likelihood that making
mediation services court-annexed would increase the range of
services offered by the courts and thereby increase
accessibility to the judicial system.

78p vv Wald, op cit., note 7 above, 25.
79|d., 33.
Bingham, op cit., note 48 above, 151

Conversely, making ADR methods court related may produce a
loss of informality and may take from the parties the resolution
of their own controversies, both positive attributes of ADR
methods. Bingham suggests that the accessibility and
independence questions could be resolved by the
institutionalisation of mediation services on a State-wide
government funded basis in the form of environmental mediation
c e n t r e s . T h e y would be institutionalised but not controlled.

The United States experience has shown however that if ADR
processes are institutionalised outside the adjudicative system,
the strength of public opposition presently prevent 'any
widespread acceptance" of their use in the resolution of
environmental controversies.®^

ADR Mechanisms: Voluntary or Mandated?
The final issue in the consolidation stage is whether mediation
should be a mandated or a voluntary option. Voluntariness is
suggested as an essential component of mediation, in the sense
of contrasting it with the mandatory or coercive character of
litigation at least as far as the decision-making is concerned.®^

®l|d., 154.
®2C Stukenborg, op cit, note 47 above, 1338.
®®P Adier, •Resolving Public Policy Conflicts through Mediation: The Water
Round Table'CIOSO) 1 Alternative Dispute Resolution Journal 69 at 78.

stage

Three: Current

Practice

The issues that arose in the consolidation stage had been more
or less addressed by the mid-1980s with an established trend to
institutionalise the use of mediation to resolve environmental
controversies. This saw the formation of the National Institute
for Dispute Resolution (NIDR), a Washington based non-profit
organisation, which sought to create State-level and Statesponsored mediation offices to address public disputes
including environmental controversies. It began with four State
offices in 1989.®9

AdIer reports that the Program for ADR

(PADR) fomned in Hawaii conducted 39 Mediated Policy
Roundtables in the period 1985-89 achieving agreement or
partial agreement in 29 of these matters.^o

The types of matters reported as being mediated are large scale
disputes, including environmental conflicts. The matters AdIer
gives as examples reflects this trend. So, for instance, he
describes disputes about toxic waste disposal (Virginia), urban
redevelopment (Minnesota), housing and historic preservation
(Ohio) and industrial redevelopment (Indiana).®^

Two specific applications of the use of mediation-based
methods show the manner in which these methods were being
used. The first relates to a long running controversy between
fishing and oil industries off the coast of California following

AdIer, op cit., note 55 above, 107.

90|d., 110.
91 Id., 106.

oil discoveries there in the 1980s. In 1983 a proposal to grant
fresh exploration and production permits to the oil interests
was vigorously opposed by the fishermen. Mediators from the
Mediation Institute, Seattle, Washington were engaged to seek
to resolve the controversy. After lengthy mediation sessions
which resolved the immediate issues in dispute the parties
agreed to establish permanent committees to address continuing
issues and potential new areas of controversy. The ageements
reached were formalised and incorporated into the exploration
permits issued by the relevant government agency.®^

The second example is the implementation of a memorandum
issued by the Environment Protection Authority (EPA) in 1987
"Guidelines of the Use of ADR Techniques in Enforcement
Actions". The intention of these guidelines was to encourage the
use of mediation to agree upon the penalty to be imposed on a
violator in the case of illegal land contamination.®^ The use of
mediation was designed to overcome the lengthy delays in the
clean up of toxic waste sites due to protracted litigation. The
intention was to use mediation to agree on consensus decrees
for pollution clean up obligations under the

Comprehensive

Environmental Response, Compensation and Liabiiity Act 1988
(referred to as CERCLA or Superfund) and thereby overcome the
lengthy delays In enforcement being experienced.®^ As Peterson
points out the use of mediation was also slow to be
implemented and in 1989 the EPA began an ADR Pilot Project to
W Cormlck & A Knaster, "Mediation and Scientific lssues'(1986) 28(10)
Environment, December 1986, 33 at 34-37.
Q^Grad, op cit., note 64 above, 175.

expedite its use. By 1992 tlie results of this pilot project
showed that ADR methods could assist in the effective
resolution of a large number and variety of Superfund cases.^^

Similar government interventions in the form of legislative
enactments have encouraged the use of ADR methods to resolve
environmental controversies. The Administrative

Dispute

Resoiution Act 1990 expressly authorised and encouraged the
use of ADR techniques by requiring federal agencies to consider
the use of ADR methods before commencing litigation.^s

There was also the encouragement given to the use of ADR
methods in the rulemaking process by the Negotiated Ruiemai<ing
Act 1990.

The Act established a framework for the conduct of

negotiated rulemaking by Federal agencies and 'encouraged the
use of such procedures when it would enhance conventional
rulemaking procedures'.^^ The purpose of the legislation was to
allow agencies to settle controversies 'by tailoring the
requirements of a regulation to a particular dispute while still
enforcing the policies behind the regulation'.But the process
was criticised as having little flexibility and for producing
regulations which often challenged adjudicatively.®®

95L Peterson, "The Promise of Mediated Settlements of Environmental
Disputes: The Experience of EPA Region V" (1992) 17 Ck)lumbia Journal of
Environmental Law 327 at 379.
96c Stukenborg, op cit., note 47, 1329.
97Quoted Id., 1330.
98|d..
99d M Prltzker & D S Dalton, Negotiated Rulemaking Handbook (1995)
US Government Printing Office, Washington, 2.

The processes were modified to address these problems. The
incentive for interest groups to agree was that the agency
retained the authority to write its own rule if the parties could
not agree on one.^oo The process had three pertinent criteria.
There were limits of 20-25 participants as stakeholders, the
rules for negotiation were selected so as to preclude any
requirement for compromise on fundamental principles and the
agency imposed a deadline to impart urgency into the
deliberations.

The use of negotiation in these contexts was

credited with overcoming some of the impediments to producing
regulations in the areas of national emission standards and
performance standards which have not been subject to
challenge.^02

The institutionalising of the use of ADR methods has ensured
their continuing refinement and development in the United
States and provided potentially valuable lessons for the
Australian context.

Conclusion

This discussion has examined a number of questions which have
come to prominence in the growth and development of ADR
methods in environmental controversies in the United States. It
is anticipated that the same questions would need to be

iooid., 5.
101 Id.. 6.
102|d., 7.

addressed in the Australian context and so this discussion may
provide assistance.
It is firstly apparent that a number of recurrent themes arise
when the suitability of ADR methods to resolve environmental
controversies is considered. Similar themes are expected to
arise in the Australian context. Most importantly for our
purposes, some critics suggest that there are a number of
factors that will always constrain the wider use of ADR
methods, particularly in the case of environmental conflicts.
The conclusion is that ADR methods will therefore always have
a limited role.
These factors are:
1. There will always need to be a requirement for voluntariness.
Any steps to mandate the use of ADR methods are a
contradiction in terms.
2. There will always be a need to consider the politics of
environmental dispute resolution, in particular the inequalities
of power and the illusion of decision making power and these
inequalities may dictate that the use of ADR is unsuitable in
many environmental controversies.
For ADR methods to be effective, it is critical to consider these
two factors. These factors will always act as a permanent
constraint on the wider use of ADR methods in environmental
controversies. Whether this prediction has proven the case in

Australia is explored in the next chapter and in the empirical
research to follow.

CHAPTER FIVE
THE AUSTRALIAN CONTEXT

Introduction
The Australian response to the high praise and promise of ADR
methods in the environmental area in the United States can be
traced to a period beginning in the late 1980s. There are a
number of reasons for this slower development stemming from
the unique character of environmental dispute resolution in
Australia.

Appraisal of the Promise of ADR IVIethods
A number of commentators have examined the potential use of
ADR methods in environmental matters in Australia. Wootten
approached the issue from the familiar perspective that the
usual means for resolving environmental controversies in
Australia were administrative and adjudicative means.^
Preston adopted much the same approach labelling these
mechanisms as "resolution by managerial direction" (a term
incorporating both executive and administrative decision-

1H Wootten,•Environmental Dispute Resolution"(1993) 75 ^de/a/de Law
Review 33 at 35.

making) and "resolution by adjudicative

decision"^

These two

mechanisms are labelled here simply as administrative and
adjudicative

resolution.

While essentially accepting that ADR methods do have a role,
there remained uncertainity in the eyes of these commentators
as to what this role should be. Should it operate as an ancilliary
part of the administrative or adjudicative systems or as a
separate and distinct consensual mechanism?

In addressing this issues a number of questions have arisen.

1. What are the precise differences in the Australian
context which affect the use of ADR methods?

A number of differences in the Australian context were
identified.

Firstly, as regards the administrative mechanisms for dispute
resolution, environmental controversies have in the past tended
to be dealt with outside any regulatory or adjudicative forum
which could be seen as equivalent to the fonnalised Rulemaking
Procedures adopted in the United States. This has meant there is
not a widely accepted form of public participation in Australia
into which ADR methods might fit. In its place Fowler identifies
"a distinctive approach to the resolution of environmental

2B J Preston, "Limits of Environmental Dispute Resolution
Mechanisms"(1995) 13 Australian Bar Review 148 at 149-151

disputes in Australia" in the fonn of "extra legal strategies".^
These strategies, which had their earliest expression in the
green bans of the 1970s, involve the use of devices such as
large scale public protests, intensive lobbying and media
coverage to attempt to influence environmental decision making
outside any formalised public participation framework. Fowler's
point is that this confrontationalist approach indicates a
dissatisfaction

with traditional

administrative

mechanisms

similar in some respects to the dissatisfaction in the United
States with judicial mechanisms.

Secondly, as regards adjudicative mechanisms. Fowler argues
that courts in Australia are far less accessible to
environmental litigants than in the United States, due largely to
constraints on standing and costs. But conversely, in Australia,
there are alternative adjudicative fora available in the form of
specialist tribunals and courts to hear merit appeals. These
differences have meant that many of the criticisms voiced in
the United States about delay and inadequate fora are not as
pertinent to the Australian context, either because limited
court access has meant fewer delays or because the specialist
fora cater more adequately and effectively for environmental
matters.-*

^R J Fowler, "Environmental Dispute Resolution-What Role In
Austrana?'(1992) Environmental and Planning Law Journal April 1992
,122 at 128.
4|d., 127.

2. What are the potential restrictions on the roie of
ADR methods in environmental matters?

The main ¡mplementatlon difficulty envisaged in adopting ADR
methods is a reluctance by government to relinquish a perceived
electoral mandate to adopt and Implement their own policies.
This would particularly constrain the use of ADR methods as an
adjunct to existing administrative mechanisms in resolving
environmental controversies. Further, the use of ADR methods
would arguably require a shift away from a confrontationalist
approach by all parties to the "reasoned argument' and 'detailed
objective appraisal' said to be characteristic of consensual
means.5

In the case of adjudicative mechanisms, the concern most often
expressed is that the development of ADR methods in existing
adjudicative fora would detract from a pressing need to reform
and modify these mechanisms themselves, particularly as
regards the limitations imposed on environmental action by
legislative and practical cost-related restrictions.®

Wootten emphasises that environmental law in Australia is
essentially a product of the parliamentary system rather than
the common law. As such it exhibits the characteristics of this
system, that is an emphasis upon 'statutorily authorised
executive decision making'.^ The effect of this is that some

5|d. 129.
6|d.
^H Wootten, op cit.,note 1 above, 34.

environmental controversies are resolved primarily in the
political system rather than in the courts. Those who seek
particular environmental outcomes are thus forced to become
involved in politics and to adopt political methods in order to
achieve their environmental objectives.®

Accordingly when we look at ADR in Australia we are not only
looking at it only as an alternative to litigation but more so as
an alternative to the current forms of administrative resolution.
Since environmental controversies are dealt with at various
tiers of government (legislative, executive, administrative or
local) the issue at stake may be resolvable not by an
interpretation of the existing law (that is, adjudicatively), nor
through the agreement of the parties (that is, consensually) but
by the creation of a new law or the alteration or reintepretation
administratively of an existing one (that is, administratively).®

This is not to dismiss the potential use of ADR methods within
either the adjudicative or administrative systems. As Wootten
points out the political practice of "making issues justiciable
that were once merely political" ensures that both the courts
and tribunals and the administrative system do have a
substantial role in the resolution of environmental
controversies in

8|d., 35.
9|d., 36.
10|d., 37.

Australia.^o

Any potential role for ADR methods thus depends upon whether
the controversy is litigation-related or politically-related.

In

the case of litigation-related controversies, the role of ADR is
favourably exemplified by the mediation service offered by the
Land and Environment Court of NSW in 'settling* controversies,
even though it deals with 'only a few percentage of matters
coming before the Court"J ^

In the case of politically-related controversies, the role of ADR
methods is not 'settlement' or 'resolution' as defined here,
because the final decision still remains an administrative or
executive one. However, there is scope for ADR to be used to
formulate options and recommendations to government and as a
vehicle to facilitate participation. Mediation in this sense
embraces "processes where parties who lack power to resolve a
dispute by their agreement, reach agreement by mediation on a
common position to put to a decision-maker'.'^^

Wootten gives a number of examples of mediation used in this
way. He examines the mediation of the Colondale Ranges
controversy in South East Queensland in July 1990. The political
context to this issue was important. The Queensland Labor
Government in the lead up to an election in 1989 promised to
extend two existing national parks in the Conondale Ranges
north-west of Brisbane, which would effect logging in the
region. After its election, the government formed the Colondale
Range Consultative Committee comprising representatives of all
Id., 47.
l^ld., 41, (emphasis supplied).

affected stakeholder groups to provide a plan for implementing
this decisionJ3 The Community Justice Program provided
mediation services to the Committee. After mediation sessions
extending over a six month period, a joint recommendation for
extending the park and limiting the areas which could be logged
was put to the Queensland Govemment. In June 1992 the
government endorsed and implemented the joint proposals.^^
Wootten offers this process as an example of the effective use
of ADR methods in an environmental controversy. When the
necessary concurrence exists, ADR methods may come to the
fore as a means of achieving a consensual recommendation to
deliver to govemment which can then be endorsed
administratively.

Preston injects a cautionary note in his appraisal of the
potential role of ADR methods in Australia. In a 1989 review he
considers that, particularly in the case of environmental
conflicts, there are three essential preconditions for the use of
mediation. These preconditions are parity of power, a real
likelihood of compromise and a conflict within manageable
p r o p o r t i o n s . I n the case of environmental conflict, a parity of
power in terms of economic or legal leverage or political
influence is not always present. In Preston's view, if this parity
is absent mediation is not suitable.

"•^T Bonyhady, Places Worth Keeping (1993) Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 23.
"•^H Wootten, op cit., note 1 above, 72.
15b J Preston, Environmental Litigation (1989) LBC, Sydney, 392.

Preston considers that compromise is rarely possible once
matters of principle which question the very development itself
intrude. This is the point made in Chapter Two in relation to
fundamental value conflicts. If value conflicts exist a
consensual resolution may not be possible. This is consistent
with the view that the political process which has "already done
the balancing act between conflicting interests' is the more
appropriate mechanism for resolution.^ 6

The precondition of a conflict within manageable proportions
essentially concerns the need to have a workable process. A
mediation involving 40 or 50 interests is likely to be too
unworkable and unweildy to "develop the give-and-take upon
which success depends." Preston emphasises that even if such a
process reaches a 'settlement' or 'resolution' there may not be
the committment amongst such a large number of participants
to carry it into effect, nor the political will of the consent
authority to approve the committment

reached.^^

But as

discussed in Chapter Two, the size of controversies in terms of
the number of parties is not necessarily indicative of the
existence of an environmental conflict.

Preston considers that these characteristics of environmental
conflicts make them unsuitable for resolution by ADR methods.
He concludes that "most of these characteristics, if present in a
particular environmental dispute, cause difficulties for

16|d., 398.
401.

consensual resolution methods".^® He considers that
adjudicative means remain more "appropriate" for resolving
environmental conflicts and that the focus should remain on
these existing mechanisms. The emphasis should be upon
reforming the Inefficiencies of the adjudicative fora Instead of
"encouraging parties to resolve environmental disputes by
ADR". 19 He reiterates the view that Inefficiencies, such as
restrictive procedural rules, the emphasis on adversarial
presentation of evidence and limitations on standing, are of
more pressing concern that the unwarranted attention given to
less effective ADR methods.

3. Can ADR methods address the inadequacies in the
existing systems of environmentai dispute

resoiution?

As well as emphasising the Inadequacies In the adjudicative
fora, concerns were also voiced about adequacies of existing
administrative fora. This was particularly so In the case of
environmental conflicts. Involving conflicting community
lnterests.2o Such conflicts were seen as common but the
existing means. Including "political system solutions" were
considered inadequate, giving as they did disproportionate
weight to pressure groups, to provide an Inadequate voice for
other views and to produce diluted compromise solutions.^^ It

18|d.. 173.
19|d., 174.
20m Klug, "Public Interest Dispute Resolution: A Role for Lawyers?"(1991)
2(3) LEADR Brief May 1991, 1.
21 Id., 2.

was considered that the use of the 'negotiated consensus
building model' might address these inadequacies by bringing
together representatives of all stakeholder groups.

This was a view adopted at the time of the establishment of the
Resource Assessment Commission (RAC) in 1989 to deal with
major resource use controversies. The RAC commissioned a
report on the use of mediation as an effective part of its inquiry
process. In the view of one of its commissioners, the report
suggested a significant role for mediation in just those

terms.22

In a similar way, ADR methods were proposed as a possible
solution to the perceived inadequacies of the adjudicative
system. While it was conceded that in excess of 90% of matters
litigated were in fact "settled" this type of settlement was
considered to be "a crude and ill defined system" which
committed environmental controversies to "the culture and
techniques of adversary litigation" resulting in the protraction
of a dispute.23 Paratz considered that the use of some form of
"managed negotiation" might also address these inadequacies.

The expectation that these methods could be effectively
implemented was given encouragement by "the significant
references to the use of ADR processes" in the Fitzgerald Report

22g McCoII. "Environmental Dispute Reso!ution"(1993) 12th NELA
Conference, Canberra, 5-6 July 1993 Conference Papers,^,
23d Paratz, "Options for Environmental Dispute Resolution"(1990) 9th NELA
Conference, Gold Coast, 26-28 August 1990, Conference Papers 273.

on the mining of Fraser Island released in 1991.2^ in this
atmosphere Paratz predicted that it was "highly likely..that we
shall shortly witness experimentation as to the use of these
processes in environmental disputes in AustraliaV^s

4. What concerns were raised about the use of ADR
methods in these systems?

In spite of this enthusiasm, concerns were raised. One strong
line of criticism concerned the use of ADR methods to resolve
environmental conflicts. These criticisms echo some of Amy's
criticism

that ADR inevitably requires compromise and such

compromise is not acceptable in those environmental
controversies involving broad moral and philosophical
differences, namely environmental conflicts.27 Rogers takes the
criticism further by asserting that ADR methods "as a process"
are also an unsuitable mechanism from the perspective of
environmental groups. She argues this in the context of
questioning the efficacy of existing administrative methods,
such as public inquiries. Such inquiries tend to 'diffuse a sense
of crisis and create false confidence in a process" but they at
least have the effect of enhancing and sustaining public
consciousness.28 However ADR processes because of their

24|d., 280 and see G W Fitzgerald, Commission of Inquiry into Conservation,
Management and Use of Fraser Island and the Great Sandy Region (1991) The
Commission, Brisbane.
25|d., 282.
26D Amy, The Politics of Environmental Mediation (1987) Columbia
University Press, New York.
Rogers, 'A Dark Green Perspective on Environmental Dispute
Resolution'O 994) 7 Commercial Dispute Resolution Journal 111 at 114.
28|d.

confidential nature may rob environmental groups of the public
forum and media coverage essential to their main long term goal
of achieving "an effective shift in public

consciousness."29

She

suggests the focus on compromise implicit in ADR methods will
in fact tend to depoliticise and diminish the conflict.
This criticism has been a major constraint on the extended use
of ADR methods, especially in environmental conflicts in
Australia. The insistence that ADR processes, especially
mediation, be confidential takes the resolution of such
controversies outside the public forum. If the process is
confidential, only the stakeholders can be apprised of the
results of the decision making process. This has two
disadvantages in the eyes of environmentalists. Firstly, there is
the concern that controversies are being resolved in the 'private
spaces' of administrative decision making. This produces a lack
of transparency which tends to arose suspicion about any
compromise solution reached. Secondly, because the process is
confidential it is not possible to bring the deliberations into the
glare of public attention. As such it is not possible to subject
the controversy to the kind of political pressure arising from
perceived public opinion. This is a considerable disadvantage,
because public opinion is often seen as a powerful weapon in the
armory of environmentalists.

For these reasons, while so ever the insistence on
confidentiality remains, it seems likely that the suspicions

29|d., 115.

environmentalists have over the use of ADR methods to resolve
environmental conflicts will remain strong.

Rogers also voices the concern that environmentalists may be at
a disadvantage in any mediation or negotiation process due to
power inequities. Since environmental controversies inevitably
involve relationships with some level of government, Rogers is
concerned that the power imbalances inherent in these
relationships can transform mediation. The effect is then to
"replicate(s) the power relationships entrenched in bureaucratic
and administrative organs of the State'^o.

Similar criticisms are made about whether ADR methods provide
a better method of resolving environmental controversies than
"direct action." Rogers equates direct action with Fowler's
'extra-legal techniques', involving public protest or
'environmental theatre'. She rejects the suggestion that ADR
methods could replace direct action with "a more dignified form
of participation". For Rogers, direct action has the potential to
generate publicity and a sense of urgency sufficient at times to
produce a political resolution of the controversy. But this
criticism does not allow for the fact that direct action may
merely exacerbate or precipitate a controversy. The view
remains in many circles that "in the long term, activism may
achieve more for the environmental movement than any other
strategy".
118, see too J A Scutt, "The Privatisation of Justice: Power
Differentials, Inequality & the Palliative of Counselling & Mediation" (1988)
11 Womens Study International Forum 503.
31 Id., 122.

Salmon speaking from the perspective of the Australian
Conservation Foundation supports this view and regards some
forms of ADR methods as conflict suppression rather than
r e s o l u t i o n . J Q

^QQ

mediation as a means of quelling 'mindless

conflicts' is in the eyes of the ACF 'nothing so much as a side
track from the main game.'^a Salmon however allows some
scope for ADR methods in making the point that the best way to
avoid conflict lies with proper policy development strategies.
She gives the example of the Canadian Green Plan developed in
1990 as an action plan to achieve environmentally sustainable
development. This Plan was the product of an extensive 'multistakeholder consultative process.'^^ She sees a potentially
positive role for mediation in a similar process of policy
development in Australia but is not convinced that the potential
is sufficient "to direct our energy from some of the (current)
processes".This

potential use of ADR methods in a public

participation role is discussed In detail in the second case
studies in this research in Chapter 9.

James Johnson, Director of the Environmental Defenders Office
(NSW), echoes this cautious tone. He is concemed with the use
of ADR methods to resolve environmental controversies over
issues that affect 'the general public', that is to say

32s Salmon, "Working Towards the Same Agenda? Processes Which Reflect
Community Concerns and Industry Needs' (1991) MR Conference
•Environmental Dispute Resolution", Sydney, 15 May 1991, Conference
Papers, 1.
33|d.. 4.
6.

35|d.. 11.

environmental conflicts as defined here.^® He concedes that the
traditional processes of litigation or political intervention
provide inadequate fora to examine the broad questions of
development as they impact upon the environment.^^ But he
remains wary of the use of ADR methods for this purpose,
repeating Preston's trio of reasons not to use ADR: 'principles,
politics and precedent'.^®

Examining these three reasons in turn, Johnson makes the point
that where 'principles' are involved compromise is seen as
inappropriate. Where philosophical beliefs or legal rights
clearly encourage parties to demand proper environmental
assessment or protection, compromise is not seen as an
appropriate response.

Similarly where 'precedent' is involved in the sense of the need
to develop and protect such principles, ADR methods may not be
appropriate because a successfully mediated environmental
controversy still does not provide an effective precedent which
may help "to redefine the boundaries of environmental
protection".39

With respect to the issue of 'politics' Johnson voices the most
concern. He is concerned with both the politics of the ADR
process itself and with the wider administrative mechanism. As

J Johnson, "Applying Mediation Techniques to Environmental Issues'
(1991) 28 Impact, September 1991, 5.
37|d., 7.
38b J Preston, op cit., note 15 above, 15.
39j Johnson, op cit, note 36 above, 7.

regards the process itself he says that participation may be
perceived as an indication of weal<ness by other parties. He
gives an example of a response received from the NSW
Government when negotiations were conducted directly between
the EDO office and a mining company over a bat habitat in
limestone caves at Kempsey, northern New South Wales. Johnson
says that on becoming aware of meaningful negotiations, the
government altered its pro-conservation position claiming "it
would seem you are no longer committed to pursuing this matter
through the courts."^o Johnson conceded there is also the risk of
environmental groups losing respect and credibility in their own
organisations through showing a preparedness to consider
compromise. In this wider political sense, environmentalists
may not wish to avoid conflict, seeing it instead as a
mechanism of change and a vehicle to effect a shift in public
values.

Nevertheless Johnson is not entirely dismissive of ADR methods.
He also sees their potential role as being in the policy setting
process. He suggests ADR in the form of a mediation policy
round table would be effective if used before any major
environmental legislation was introduced. Similarly the use of
mediation at the planning and policy stage may help to defray
potential areas of dispute rather than leaving these to be
escalated on a site by site basis^^ It is the use of ADR methods
in this context which is the focus of the second case study
discussed in Chapter 9 of this research.
40|d.
41 Id., 8.

Models for Implementation

of ADR Methods

Scholarly attention was also directed to devising appropriate
models for the implementation of ADR methods in environmental
controversies. In a series of papers in 1988-91 Sandford, also
identifying the forms of environmental dispute resolution as
administrative and adjudicative, considered that these were
essentially inadequate to address environmental issues. She
suggested a model to redesign these mechanisms to incorporate
mediation as an integral part of the existing mechanisms.'*2 Her
approach is termed the integration model.

The Integration Model

In examining the existing appeals systems in Tasmania,
Sandford looked at a number of examples. In the adjudicative
system, she considered Courts of Petty Sessions where
objections raised to the granting of acquaculture permits for
the establishment of marine farms were reviewed. In this
existing system once formal objections had been lodged the
dispute proceeded to a hearing without formal negotiation
procedures. Sandford considered there was a role for mediation
in the pre-objection stage as a dispute prevention measure, or

Sandford, 'Environmental Dispute Resolution: Alternatives for Appeals
Systems" (1990) 7 Environmental and Planning Law Journal May 1990, 19
at 24.

at the stage of objections to mediate a solution before a hearing
commenced.43

In the administrative system, she considered the Environment
Protection Appeal Board which heard objections and appeals
under the Environment

Protection Act 1973 (Tas). Sandford saw

a role for mediation in these appeals either prior to objections
being lodged or before a hearing took place. Sandford
foreshadowed the potential of ADR methods in these processes
as "an integral part of the environmental decision-making
process".

In 1990 Sandford was involved in one specific application of this
integration model involving the use of unassisted negotiation. This
was the Salamanca Agreement Process which evolved from "the
rubble of the 1988 Helsham Inquiry" into forestry management in
T a s m a n i a . T h e Process was a result of the Tasmanian
Parliamentary Accord between Labor and the Green Independents
which delivered government to Labor in 1989.^5 The Agreement
bound all stakeholders to negotiate for a period of twelve months
to develop a strategy for forest management. Round Table
negotiation took place between February and September 1990 but
broke down when all parties could not agree upon a joint
recommendation. A non-unanimous (which significantly did not
include the Combined Environment Groups) recommendation for a

43|d., 26.
Sandford, "The Merits of Negotiation and Mediation in Resource
Management Disputes" (1991) Environmental Dispute Resolution Conference
Sydney 14-15 May 1991 Conference Papers, IIR Conferences Sydney, 4.
4 5 t Bonyhady, op cit., note 13 above, 23.

final strategy was put to the Tasmanian Cabinet. But as the
Accord began to unravel, due in part to this breakdown, the
strategy was not implemented. The Salamanca Process failed to a
large measure because it was so closely tied to this
Parliamentary Accord.

Though the Salamanca Process was not successful, Sandford
drew a number of lessons from its failure which she provided
for in her "integration model." She emphasised the need to
prevent or minimise dispute escalation at the outset of any
dispute resolution process. She suggested this be done by
encouraging broad public participation in the form of regional
advisory groups to parallel the stakeholder negotiations and
provide a vehicle to constructively voice community concerns.^^
Secondly she saw a need for mediation to assist in the initial
stages of the negotiation process to develop an agreed scope and
procedure for the negotiations to follow.-^^

Sandford's model was based on the use of ADR methods as an
integral part of the whole environmental decision making
process as distinct from being used solely as an adjunct to the
dispute resolution part of the process. Used in this way she
considered ADR methods had the potential for dispute prevention
or minimisation as well as dispute resolution.

This integration model was one strongly endorsed in the report
to the RAG on the use of ADR methods in its Inquiry Process.
Sandford, op cit., note 44 above, 7.
4 7 r Sandford, op cit., note 48 above, 8.

This report looked at a wide range of approaches and models for
the use of non-adversarial methods as an effective means of
public

participation.48

The models reviewed included the Harvard MIT model

the US

Environment Protection Authority's Regulatory Negotiation
Project, the Canadian Round Tables, the Salamanca Agreement
Process itself and the Pitjantjatjara model used for negotiating
clearances over Aboriginal sacred sites in the Northern
Territory and South Australia prior to mine exploration.so
Following this review the report suggested implementation of
ADR methods into the inquiry process. The consultants saw a
role at the commencement of each new inquiry for the use of
mediation to determine the scope of the main issues, the
required research and the likely participants. Additionally they
saw clear benefits in integrating mediation into the inquiry
process itself as part of a public participation strategy.^i

Boer et al saw a role for ADR methods but not as a dispute
resolution strategy since this was beyond the RAC's
jurisdiction. Instead they saw their use as a means of dealing
with process issues, such as the scope and procedure of
inquiries. To this extent they endorsed Sandford's model since
they gave ADR methods a role integral to the whole
48b Boer et a!., The Use of Mediation in the Resource Assessment Commission
Process (1991) AGPS, Canberra, ix.
49See R Fisher & W Ury, Getting to Yes (1981) London, Hutchinson.
50B Boer et al, op cit., note 48 above, 24-42.
51 Id., 6 0 - 6 4 .

environmental decision making process. Much of the perceived
effectiveness of ADR methods in this context was considered to
be that the usual strict confidentiality was not required. This
aspect warrants further exploration and is examined in detail in
the second case study carried out for this research.

The emphasis in Sandford's model on ADR methods as an early
intervention tool is considered the best strategy for
controversies concerned with Environmentally Sustainable
Development (ESD) questions.52 Christie emphasises that
implementation of ESD principles may not be achieved through
one resource management option only, but that a range of
options along a continuum may each achieve the goal to differing
degrees. So, for example the Fitzgerald Report on logging on
Fraser Island provided four options, all consistent with ESD
principles.53

Christie said that adjudicative processes consider

whether a particular proposed usage is "environmentally
acceptable' and will not seek alternative uses which may prove
more suitable. ADR processes on the other hand can fully
evaluate each option on the continuum and reach an informed
view as to which is preferrable in ESD terms.^^ The use of ADR
methods can thus be an essential first step in the decision
making process where questions of ESD are in focus.^s

52e Christie, "ESD and Environmental Dispute Resolution" (1993) 4(4)
Alternative Dispute Resolution Journal, November 1993, 257.
53|d.

54|d., 268.
55|d., 270.

The Adjunct Model

The other model of the use of ADR methods in environmental
dispute resolution emphasises their use as a distinct part of the
dispute resolution mechanism, rather than as an integral
component of the broad environmental decision making process.
Weir in considering the recommendations of Fitzgerald's Report
suggested that the use of ADR methods in administrative and
adjudicative mechanisms should be as an essentially adjunctive
o n e . H e supports a single adjudicative forum to decide all
development and environmental matters with the use of ADR at
pre-hearing conferences being "firmly established within the
court system".Additionally, if a controversy is to be dealt
with administratively by way of an inquiry then ADR should be
involved to "encourage public participation (and) to allow a
broad range of views to be considered".58

This adjunct role for ADR methods was one implemented in the
Environment Resource and Development Court, South Australia
established in January 1994 by the Environment Resources and
Development Court Act 1993 (SA). This role was supported by
one of its founding judges who considered that the most
appropriate environmental dispute resolution mechanism was
adjudicative with ADR methods operating in a supportive role.^^
56m J Weir, "Alternative Dispute Resolution in Queensland Environmental
Law"(1991) Alternative Dispute Resolution Journal, November 1991, 224 at
235.
57|d, 236.
58|d.
59c L Trenorden, "Judging the Jurisdictions: Where Should Environmental
Disputes be Resolved?" (1994) 4 Australian Environmnetal Law News
December 1994, 46 at 52.

This is also the role of mediation in the Land and Environment
Court of NSWs Mediation Scheme.

Choice of Model

The model for ADR methods as an adjunct to other dispute
resolution mechanisms is a more limited role than that
expounded by Sandford. Her model gives ADR methods essentially
a 'beginning-to-end' role in the environmental decision making
process. In this sense ADR has a dispute prevention role or as
Roberts describes it "a dispute management role."®® The breadth
of this role extends to conflict anticipation, equivalent in some
respects to the role performed by "regulation negotation" in the
United States and also to the scoping of issues requiring
resolution prior to administrative processes. The model allows
the development of a role in other stages of "the regulatory
lifecycle".®^ It is this integration model that may "convince
environmentalists that mediation does have a role" in
environmental dispute resolution.®2 This research examines the
extent to which either roles has been implemented.

60j Roberts, "Environmental Mediation: dispute Resolution or Dispute
Management?" (1993) Alternative Dispute Resolution Journal May 1993,
150.
61 Id., 156.
62|d., 158.

Review

of

Practice

In looking for evidence of the use of ADR methods in
environmental controversies in Australia the difficulty which
confronts the researcher is on the one hand the sparcity of
empirical infomnation, and on the other anecdotal evidence
which suggests significant implementation. Clark points out
this area remains "under-theorised, under-researched and little
evaluated.Nevertheless

he can say "the reality is that there

has been a significant growth in Australia in the use of various
ADR techniques.'®^

The evidence of such growth is less than persuasive. While
recognising that environmental controversies are most often
encountered at the local government level, Clark is only able to
say that Sandford's model of integration is being re-emphasised
and that local government will "increasingly be conflict
managers" to prevent controversies before they begin.®® But
there is little cogent evidence of this promise coming to
fruition.

Clark refers to the court-annexed Mediation Service offered by
the Land and Environment Court of NSW. But he says "more often,

®3E Clark, "The Role of Non-litigious Dispute Resolution Methods in
Environmental Disputes' (1995) 2(2) Australasian Journal of Natural
Resources Law 1 at 42.
43.
®5see R Sandford, "The Politics of Agreement Local Governments as Innovators
in Environmental Management Conflicts"(1995) Published Proceedings of 'On
Common Ground: National Symposium and Skills Workshop' National Local
Government Environmental Resource Network, 30-31 March 1995, 3.
66E Clark, op cit., note 63 above, 6.

mediation is entered into privately without supervision by a
c o u r t . B u t there is no evidence provided for this assertion.

With respect to institutionalised mediation there are examples
of the Community Justice Programs both in New South Wales and
Queensland and the Conflict Resolution Service in the ACT. But
there is no clear evidence that these institutions are properly
equipped to facilitate environmental mediations due to the
technical and specialised nature of these controversies.®®

Clark notes that one of the contextual differences in the
Australian situation affecting implementation of ADR methods
is the lack of legislation expressly authorising ADR, such as the
Negotiated Rulemaking Act 1990 (USC) in the United States. The
only example Clark provides of administrative agency use of
ADR is the Department of Urban Services including conditions of
mandatory negotiation in new building industry standard forms
of contract.®^ Similarly there are no legislative initatives in the
environmental area similar to the Farm Debt Mediation Act 1994
(NSW;and the Native Title Act 1996 (Cth) mandating mediation
before enforcement action. There are only examples of
legislation where its use is encouraged, for example the Land
and Environment Court Act 1979 (NSW) and the Planning,
Environment and Development Assessment Act 1995 (Qld).

®7|d., 12.
®8See J O'Dea "Mediation and Local Government" (1994) 11(3)
Environmental and Planning Law Journal June 1994 ,211, note 27.
®9E Clark, op cit., note 63 above, 20.

O'Dea looks at planning disputes and suggests that mediation at
local government level is being used to some degreejo The
potential for such usage exists both at what O'Dea terms Stage
One, essentially equivalent to Sandford's integration model, and
at Stage Two, the adjunct dispute resolution role, when the
matter is before the Court for review. He sees Stage One as a
pre-emptive action by local councils instigating mediation
before the approval process begins. But the potential at Stage
One is currently not being realised, and its development in many
councils is largely an ad hoc affair.^i

O'Dea's Stage Two mediations are a reality in the fomi of the
Mediation Service offered by the Land and Environment Court of
NSW. But its usage among local councils, which are parties to
virtually all such merit appeals is not overwhelming. In 1992
figures obtained by O'Dea show only 25% of local councils
involved in matters before the court chose to use mediation,
which related to about

8%

of all merit

appeals.72

O'Dea

considers mediation is used in only a few cases either because
of a fear of it as an unfamilar concept or a mistrust or bias
against mediation in councillors or council solicitors.73

O'Dea suggests that early intervention usage would be
encouraged by the establishment of an independent
environmental service. This idea was considered in a pilot
project co-ordinated by the Australian Dispute Resolution
70j O'Dea, op cit., note 68 above, 217.
71 Id..
72|d., 216.
73|d., 216-217.

Centre (ACDC) and funded by the Commonwealth Government in
1996.74 In this pilot project six large multi-party controversies
were subject to attempted resolution by mediation or
facilitation. The controversies involved diverse developments,
such as the relocation of an iron foundary to a rural residential
area, a subdivision, a concrete crushing plant, a retail
development, the extension of working hours on a development
site and the proposed construction of a school haWJ^
Following the pilot mediations ACDC developed a model dispute
resolution program which it provided to all councils in NSW.^e
This model essentially duplicated Sandford's integration model.
The expectation was that "the dissemination of outcomes will
encourage councils to adopt consensual rather than adversarial
approaches to development issues" and implementation of these
procedures is continuing.77

Spiegel also considered the scope for the use of ADR methods in
an integration role.^s She saw they had a use at the stage of
early intervention to ensure that the application was ready for
submission in a form both economically and environmentally
feasible.79 Secondly, she saw ADR methods as useful for the
74Australian Commercial Dispute Centre, Dispute Resolution in Local
Government Planning-Strengthing Local Economic Capacity (1996) ACDC Ltd.,
Sydney.
75|d., 18. See Chapter Seven following for a detailed review of these
controversies.
76id., 4 3 - 5 7 .
77Australian Commercial Dispute Resolution Centre, Press Release (undated,
c.1995),1.
78E Spiegel, "Mediation in the Court" (1992) Paper delivered to NELA (NSW)
Conference, Sydney, 2.

79|d.

creation of policies and programs in the controversial areas of
pollution control and resource management, for instance in the
setting of urban consolidation policy. She was however unaware
of any implementation in these areas.®o

The example and success of the Mediation Scheme in the Land
and Environment Court of NSW which is examined in detail in
Chapter Eight has encouraged similar developments in using
mediation in an adjunct role in other States, in particular in
Victoria. An investigation into the use of mediation in the
Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Victoria) for planning
disputes recommended a trial of the mediation conference
concept.®^ This institutionalisation was motivated in part by
the cost savings based upon the NSW example.®^ Concerns were
raised at the time as to whether AAT members would conduct
such mediations themselves and the effect this might have on
their independence and the safeguards which could be
implemented to ensure the public interest was addressed.®®

This Victorian review considered whether mediation would be
more conducive to resolving minor controversies between
neighbours "on a fairly even footing" but where there were "few
cost savings" or controversies over multiple issues which
involved the prospect of extended hearing time saved.®^ While
®0E Spelgel, Personal comments, 17 April 1996.
Management Committee for the Mediation in Planning Project, Mediation in
Planning Disputes, Final Report (1994) Department of Planning &
Development (Victoria), Melbourne.
®2v Davies, "Mediation and Planning Appeals: Jumping on the Bandwagon?"
(1994) 2 Australian Environmental Law News 1995 65 at 68.
®3|d., 72-73.
®4|d., 80.

the pilot project itself concentrated upon essentially smaller
disputes

the arguments for extending mediations to larger

more complex controversies were cogent. It was argued that
these controversies could benefit from scoping to refine the
issues and independent expert appraisal to advise on
particularly contentious technical issues, such as traffic flow
or effluent disposal even if full resolution could not be
achieved. Following a review of the report the President of the
AAT advised in June 1995 that mediations would be offered once
a planning appeal had been lodged.^^

Other examples have also come from Victoria. In 1991 Fisher
successfully mediated a controversy involving the expansion of
the facilities for a tourist resort which included both amenity
questions and environmental questions dealing with threats to
local wildlife habitats. This appears to be an example of the
successful resolution of a controversy in the environmental
conflict half of the continuum.s^

Another example was the resolution of an environmental
controversy concerning an application to amend a planning
scheme to allow for larger rural subdivision in the Shire of
Hastings, south of Melbourne. This controversy in the view of
the two mediators was "at heart a value conflict" involving a
large number of parties but was instead successfully mediated

^^Management Committee, op cit., note 82 above, 5-9.
86|d., 82.
87T Fisher, "Mediating a Planning Permit Dispute" (1992) 71(1056)
Australian Municipal Journal, January/February 1992, 4 at 5.

by not directly confronting this conflict and concentrating upon
the negotiable amenity issues.®®

There is also evidence of the use of ADR methods in the
resolution of other environmental conflicts. In addition to the
use of mediation to resolve the controversy over the Conondale
Ranges in south-east Queensland

discussed by Wootten and

others earlier®^, Boulle cites other successful examples of the
use of "policy making mediation" to negotiate environmental
standards practice.^o

Other examples of the use of mediation to resolve environmental
conflicts include the management of a waste disposal site ^^
and conflicts over tourism in World Heritage sites.92 in addition
there are suggestions that ADR methods may have provided
resolution of some conflicts that were dealt with
adjudicatively. Naughton provides two examples where
adjudicative decisions to refuse proposals for new quarry sites
might have been more effectively dealt with by negotiated
solutions which allowed for some compromise.^^

®®B Turner & R Saunders, "Mediating a Planning Scheme Amendment: A Case
Study in the Co-mediation of a Multi-party Planning Dispute" (1995) 6(4)
Alternative Dispute Resolution Journal, November 1995, 284 at 295.
®9H Wootten, op cit.note 1 above, 72 & T Bonyhady, op cit., note 13 above, 23.
Boulle, Mediation: Principle, Process, Practice (1996) Butterworths,
Sydney, 217.
91K Train & M Klug, "Managing a Waste Disposal Conflict" (1992) 3(2)
LEADR Brief February 1992, 9.
& T Atherton, "Mediating Disputes over Tourism in Sensitive Areas, Part
11" (1994) Alternative Dispute Resolution Journal, May 1994, 134.
93T Naughton, "Court Related Alternative Dispute Resolution in NSW " (1995)
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The use of ADR methods have also been suggested as a more
effective mechanism for community participation in
environmental decision making. Much was made of the promise
of community participation in the formulation and
implementation of public policy in the 1980s. This was
particularly so in the case of environmental policy. But the
promise often failed to materialise when the consultation
tended to be little more than community education.^^ It was
considered that ADR methods might provide a more meaningful
vehicle for participation given that "a participatory style Is
more likely to build awareness, perhaps consensus'-^® This use
of ADR methods in this role is examined more closely in the
second case study.

Conclusion
This review has demonstrated that there is some support for
the promise of ADR methods as a useful environmental
dispute resolution mechanism. Two models have been
suggested for the implementation of ADR methods in this
area. The first is the integration model where ADR methods
are used as an integral part of the whole environmental
decision making process. This model assigns to ADR methods
a dispute management or conflict resolution role. The second
model gives ADR methods a reduced role as an adjunct to
Alviano, 'Environmental Conflict and the Failure of Connmunity
Participation" (1995) Alternative Dispute Resolution Journal 33 at 34.
Robinson, "Public Participation In Environmental Decision-Making"
(1993) Environmental and Planning Law Journal October 1993, 320 at 329.

existing administrative or adjudicative dispute resolution
mechanisms. Tiiis model places ADR methods in a dispute
settlement role.
This discussion of the Australian experience confirms a
number of the concerns voiced in the United States literature
as to the suitability of ADR methods in the resolution of
environmental controversies. In particular the critics
reiterate the concern over the political nature of
environmental dispute resolution. These critics contend that
the use of ADR methods fails to take adequate regard of the
political nature of the process itself or the absence of
decision making power in the stakeholders.
In addition the Australian experience has shown the
importance of two further issues placing constraints on the
wider use of ADR methods. The first issue discussed is the
negative effects of the insistence upon the confidentiality of
the process.
The issue of confidentiality is a recurrent theme in ADR
practice in environmental matters. A persistent view is that
the need for confidentiality conflicts with other important
issues, such as the need for transparency of decision making.
Whilesoever confidentiality remains a crucial requirement of
ADR it will continue to act as a significant constraint on the
expanded use of these methods in environmental
controversies, especially in environmental conflicts.

The second issue is the perceived need to protect the public
interest. This is seen as a crucial factor in the resolution of
environmental controversies. Since the public interest is
potentially present in all environmental controversies (either
dormant or activated), this poses another significant
constraint on the use of these methods. The literature to date
suggests that controversies involving an activated public
interest will always tend to be unsuitable for consensual
resolution.

Given this review, the next step is to devise a research
method to examine the implementation of ADR methods and
the effect of these concerns.

CHAPTER SIX
RESEARCH METHOD

Introduction
The aim of this research is to investigate the use made in
Australia of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) methods for
the resolution of environmental controversies. The scope of such
investigation needs to be confined in some manageable way. It is
neither feasible nor possible to investigate all jurisdictions and
contexts.

Chapter Two provided a method of classifying environmental
controversies by the extent to which they exhibited a number of
characteristics. Three of these characteristics were highlighted
as being key determinants of the nature of the environmental
controversy: value conflicts, questions of scientific
uncertainity and public interest concerns. Those controversies
which exhibited these three key characteristics were
considered more ikely to sit towards the environmental conflict
half of the continuum. Conversely, controversies which did not
exhibit these three key characteristics were more likely to fall
in the environmental dispute half of the continuum. The
classification method was not presented as being a definitive
method of categorisation. Rather environmental controversies
were said to be graduated along a continuum between the two
extremes depending upon the full or partial exhibition or non-

exhibition of all the characteristics considered. This
investigation aims to examine the use of ADR methods in
resolving environmental controversies towards opposite ends of
the continuum.

In addition, the discussion in Chapter Five provided one other
ancilliary matter which warranted investigation. This review
identifies two models of the use of ADR methods:
-an integration model, and
-an adjunctive model

As a secondary objective, the research will consider the
prominent of each of these models in the introduction of ADR
methods in the solution of environmental controversies in
Australia.

Using these preliminary bases a series of hypotheses or
research questions can be set. It is then necessary to select
appropriate and manageable methods to test the questions
raised.

The first function of this chapter is to clearly identify the
research questions set. The second function is to detail the
methods selected to test these questions and to justify the
selection. The chapter also describes in outline the design of the
research instruments used to carry out specific parts of the
research.

Research

Questions

Drawing from the literature review a number of expectations
arise about tine effectiveness of ADR methods in resolving
environmental controversies. These expectations arise in
particular from the nature of the response in Australia to the
United States experience with ADR methods. In the United
States there appears (in spite of some strongly voiced
misgivings) to be an expectation that ADR methods can be
effective in resolving controversies towards the environmental
conflict end of the continuum. Indeed a great deal of the United
States literature seems to equate "environmental disputes' (as
they are referred to there) with environmental conflicts as
described in this research, with little regard to the
environmental dispute half of the continuum.

But this expectation is not reflected in the Australian
experience. In Australia, the expectation appears to be that ADR
methods can work well for environmental disputes but will
rarely be effective in environmental conflicts. This expectation
is said to be because of the differences in the nature of the
environmental protection regime between the two countries. The
assumption is made that because environmental conflicts in
Australia are in the main dealt with administratively, ADR
methods will prove to be unsuitable.

The hypothesis that arises as a result of these assumptions is:
*ADR methods will be effective in solving controversies
towards the dispute end of the continuum but not controversies
towards the conflict end.

Research Method
In order to test this hypothesis it is first necessary to review
the fora in which environmental controversies are resolved in
Australia to gauge the extent to which ADR methods are
employed. This results in a very broad area of inquiry from
which emerge three questions:
(1) Where are environmental controversies resolved in
Australia?
(2) Do ADR methods play a significant part in the resolution of
environmental disputes in Australia?
(3) Do ADR methods play a significant part in the resolution of
environmental conflicts in Australia?
The focus of these broad questions needs to be refined to a more
manageable scope for the purposes of this study. To make the
research project manageable the focus has been reduce to the
following

questions:

(1) In what fora are environmental controversies
resolved In New South Wales?

(2) How successful are ADR methods In the solution of
controversies towards the dispute end of the
continuum?

(3) How successful are ADR methods In the solution of
controversies towards the conflict end of the
continuum?

Selection of Method
It has proven extremely difficult to select suitable methods to
test the second and third of these research questions. ADR
methods by their nature are altemative to traditional means. As
a result there is no institutionalised recording system for the
number and nature of controversies dealt with nor the results
obtained, as there is for instance In the case of matters dealt
with by adjudication.

In addition, an essential characteristic of most ADR methods is
confidentiality. This feature has added to the difficulties of the
research in obtaining examples of controversies dealt with and
results obtained. These access problems were compounded when
controversies dealt with in a non-court annexed system were
examined.

A further difficulty arose from the lack of transparency evident
in controversies resolved by administrative means. These
restrictions made it difficult to determine the extent of the use
of ADR methods in this context.

The methods selected attempt to address these problems. Two
specific case studies were conducted. The case studies selected
are not necessarily typical of the use of ADR methods and indeed
may be atypical. The case studies are not presented as
representative of such use but merely illustrative.

Allowing for these restrictions the following methods were
selected to address the research questions set:

Question 1
In what fora are environmental

controversies

resolved

in NSW?

A review was undertaken of all known public and private fora
dealing with environmental controversies in NSW. This review is
reported in Chapter Seven and provides a context from which the
case studies were selected. The case studies were specifically
chosen to illustrate the use of ADR methods in dealing with
what are hypothesised to be environmental disputes on the one
hand, and what are hypothesised to be environmental conflicts,
on the other. In addition, the case studies are chosen to
illustrate the use of these methods as part of what are
hypothesised to be adjunct and integration models.

Question 2
How successful are ADR methods in the solution of
controversies towards the dispute end of the
continuum?

Empirical research was undertaken in the form of a case study
of the Mediation Scheme in the Land and Environment Court of
NSW. All matters mediated in the period May 1991-December
1995 were examined. For the period May 1991-December 1994
the results of previous research was reviewed. The records of
court files of all matters mediated in the period January to
December 1995 were personally examined and substantially
more data was extracted from such files than had been the case
with the earlier research.

The first stage of the case study was to examine the
characteristics of the cases mediated in the Land and
Environment Court to seek to confirm the hypothesis that they
could be classified as environmental disputes. The second stage
of the case study was to assess the effectiveness of mediation
as used in the Scheme.

This case study was chosen in the expectation that it would
provide an example of ADR methods used in the forni of an
adjunct model.

Question 3
How successful are ADR methods in the solution of
controversies towards the conflict end of the
continuum?

Empirical research was undertaken In the form of a case study
of the Interim Assessment Process (lAP) negotiations conducted
by the NSW Resource and Conservation Assessment Council
(RACAC) in its preparation of an interim assessment strategy
for forests in NSW in 1996. In particular all Non-Govemment
Organisation (NGO) participants in the process were
interviewed.

The first stage of the case study was to examine the
characteristics of the forestry controversy to test the
hypothesis that it could be classified as an environmental
conflict. The second stage of the case study was to assess the
effectiveness of negotiation in the Interim Assessment Process.

This case study would chosen in the expectation that it would
provide an example of ADR methods used in the form of an
integration model.

Design of Research Instruments
In addition to selecting appropriate methods to test each of the
research questions posed, it was necessary to design suitable

research instruments to carry out this testing using illustrative
case studies. The following designs were developed.

Case Study review of the Mediation Scheme in the Land
and Environment Court of NSW.

The Mediation Scheme offered by the Court has been in operation
since May 1991. Access to quantitative data previously compiled
by other researchers was available for a substantial part of this
period. Additionally direct access was obtained to the Court's
files for mediated matters for a further 12 month period of the
Scheme's operation to update the information available to
December 1995. This direct access allowed the collection of
much more comprehensive information than previously obtained.

In summary, the Scheme was examined using the following data:

(a) Data from the Young Lawyers' survey^ conducted by
questionaires administered to participants in the 42 mediations
conducted in the period May-December 1991.

(b) Data from Tow & Stubbs' court file analysis^ for the 140
mediations conducted in the two year period 1992-94.

1J Muller, "Report on Young Lawyers' Survey- 'Mediation in the Land and
Environment Court'" (1992) 3/3 A 4 LEADR Brief 8.
^D Tow & M Stubbs, "The effectiveness of ADR Techniques in the Resolution of
Planning Disputes" (1995) forthcoming, University of Western Sydney.

(c) Data from a review of court files for the 73 mediations
conducted in the period January-December 1995.
The data reviewed was examined to test the hypothesis that the
environmental controversies mediated could be classified as
environmental disputes and to detennine the effectiveness of
such mediations.

Case Study review of the Interim Assessment

Process

conducted by the Resource and Assessment Council of
NSW.

The use made of negotiation in the Interim Assessment Process
(lAP) conducted by the Resource and Conservation Assessment
Council (RACAC) during April 1996 was examined in detail.
RACAC was formed with the overall function of assisting the
relevant Minister in the exercise of his administrative dispute
resolution function to resolve issues concerned with the
formulation and implementation of a comprehensive forestry
policy in New South Wales.
The stated aim of the lAP was to identify those forests which
would be set aside for inclusion in a resen/e system on an
interim basis. The aim of the negotiations was to allow
stakeholders to participate in the selection of those parts of
State Forests which would be deferred from logging to fully or

partially meet the reservation targets derived from the
Commonwealth-State agreed conservation criteria.^

The objective of the negotiation process was to produce options
providing varying levels of satisfaction of conservation and
resource targets.^ In the course of negotiations these were
reduced to four conservation / wood supply scenarios for each
of ten regions in eastern NSW.

The lAP negotiations were a series of face-to-face negotiations
conducted between the major stakeholders in the forest
controversy. Representatives of the following stakeholders
were included:

Commonwealth Government
State Forests of NSW
National Parks and Wildlife Service
*NSW Forest Products Association
*Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union
Aboriginal

Communities

^Conservation Groups represented by the Nature Conservation
Council®

The review was conducted by way of a series of interviews with
the three NGO participants (mari<ed * above) conducted in 199697. These interviews focussed upon the parties' perception of
3RACAC, Draft Interim Forestry Assessment Report {^99e) RACAC, Sydney,
3.

4|d., 18.
^RACAC News, Issue No.3 May 1996, 1.

whether the negotiation process constituted an effective
method to resolve or manage environmental conflict over the
forestry

issue.

The Process was reviewed to test the hypothesis whether the
forestry controversy could be classified as an environmental
conflict and to determine the effectiveness of the negotiation
process.

Conclusion
The methods selected are intended to provide a means of testing
the hypotheses. It was anticipated that the two case studies
would examine fora dealing with controversies located towards
the opposite ends of the continuum. The first hypothesis was
that the ADR methods used in the Land and Environment Court
would be effective. The second hypothesis was that the ADR
methods used in the Interim Assessment Process would not be
effective. The extent to which these hypotheses were confirmed
is the subject of Chapter 10.

CHAPTER SEVEN
REVIEW OF FORA FOR RESOLVING
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROVERSIES IN
NEW SOUTH WALES

Introduction
This chapter examines the fora used to resolve
environmental controversies in New South Wales to
determine whether ADR methods are used and whether this
use is on an integration or adjunct basis. The fora
reviewed seek to cover bodies resolving environmental
controversies both adjudicatively and administratively.

In the case of administrative fora, the decision-maker is
vested with authority, usually by statute, to apply the
relevant criteria and to exercise the authority in
accordance with administrative law principles.^ If such
decision is subject to review on its merits to a court or
tribunal the review is nonetheless an exercise of
administrative function. So a merit appeal remains a reexercise of an administrative or executive power and in
this way is fundamentally different from the judicial

1M A Eisenberg, "Participation, Responsiveness and the Consultative
Process: An Essay for Lon Fuller"(1978) 92 Harvard Law Review 410 at
425.

function of a court in reviewing a decision.2 The
administrative fora to be examined would thus include
administrative or executive bodies, quasi-independent
advisory bodies and courts or tribunals when dealing with
merit appeals.

Adjudicative mechanisms usually involve a judicial or
quasi-judicial body making a judgement in relation to a
controversy or issue before that b o d y T h e decision made
is binding upon the parties to it and in the case of judicial
decisions establishes a precedent which may be binding
upon others. An example of a controversy resolved by way
of an adjudicative mechanism is the judicial review of the
decisions of government ministers or officals.^ The
grounds of such a review must involve alleged errors of
law in the manner in which the minister or official has
exercised his or her powers.

Within these two broad categories the fora to be reviewed
can be listed as follows:

(1) Administrative or Executive Bodies
(2) The Land and Environment Court of NSW
(3) Commissioners of Inquiry for Environment & Planning
(4) The Australian Commercial Dispute Centre (ACDC).

^B J Preston, 'Limits of Environmental Dispute Resolution
Mechanisms''(1995) 13 Australian Bar Reviewl48 at 149.
3|d.. 150.
^See for example Friends of Hinchinbrook Society Inc. v Minister for
Environment & Ors. (1997) 142 ALR 632.

Fora

Reviewed

Administrative

or Executive

Bodies:

Locai Councils, State Government l\/linisters and
Officiais

These individuals or bodies have executive or
administrative authority to resolve environmental
controversies. The decision made by ministers or
government officals or other consent authorities such as
local councils may be to grant or refuse various consents
or approvals Additionally they issue or withhold licences
or permissions to carry out various activities which have
an environmental impact.

Clearly the principal dispute resolution mechanism used
by these bodies is administrative. In addition, there is
some evidence of the use of consensual mechanisms. In the
case of local councils, for instance, this may purely be on
an ad hoc basis. North Sydney Council, for example, had
formulated a specific policy to recommend mediation of
environmental controversies by way of an integration
model.5 Similarly, the pilot project conducted by the ACDC
included as one of its recommendations the establishment
of a mediation based process for resolving environmental

O'Dea, "Mediation and Local Government"(1994) 11(3) Environmental
and Planning Law Journal June 1994, 211 at 218

controversies at an early stage as a standard part of the
Councils' approval processes.®
At state government level, consensual mechanisms have
been considered and adopted as an adjunct to the
administrative mechanism. A notable example is the use
made of negotiation in the Interim Assessment Process
conducted by the NSW Resource and Conservation
Assessment Council previously referred to. The Council
was established to assist the NSW Government in its
decision making process to resolve the environmental
controversy over the use of State Forests for logging. As
outlined in Chapter 6, this is the focus of a case study
reported in Chapter 9.
The decisions made by these bodies are subject to judicial
review by a court or tribunal such as the Land and
Environment Court of NSW. In addition some decisions are
subject to a re-exercise of the administrative or
executive power by way of an appeal on the merits, for
instance by the Court exercising its administrative power.
Such reviews have been the subject of considerable
controversy.^

^Australian Commercial Disputes Centre, Dispute Resolution in Local
Government Planning-Strenging Local Economic Capacity" (1996) AC DC,
Sydney, 3.
7 Appeals are available undeer s.20 for the court to exercise judicial
review power; under s.17 for merit appeals by applicants and under s.87 &
98 for third party appeals with respect to designated development.

Land and Environment Court of NSW

The Land and Environment Court of NSW (the Court) has
power to resolve environmental controversies within its
jurisdiction; in doing so it exercises judicial and
administrative power and thus acts as both an
adjudicative and administrative mechanism.

The Court was established under the provisions of the Land
and Environment Court Act 1979 (NSW) and commenced
operations on 1 September 1980. The Court was described
at the time of its enactment as a "somewhat Innovative
experiment in dispute resolution mechanisms" combining
as it does both the exercise of judicial and administrative
power".8

The Court was an innovative fomm in the manner in which
it had jurisdiction to exercise both these powers.
Importantly, the tribunal was not subject to the doctrine
(applicable to federal tribunals) separating the exercise of
these powers. It could exercise administrative functions,
as it does in merit appeals under
classes 1, 2 and 3 of its jurisdiction (ss17-19), heard by
judges or assessors. In addition, its judges could hear and
determine class 4 civil enforcement proceedings, class 5
summary criminal prosecutions and judicial reviews

8D P Landa, NSW Parliament, Legislative Assembly Debates (1979), 21
November 1979, 3350.

generally. This combination was viewed positively in the
eariy years of the Court:

"the new court exercises a more comprehensive
jurisdiction in relation to planning and environmental
matters than has hitherto been vested in any one appellate
body.'Q

Class 1 generally relates to development appeals. Such
appeals include applications against a consent authority's
refusal of a development application or against the
conditions imposed on a consent. This Class also includes
appeals under the Environmental Planning and

Assessment

Act 1979 (NSW) by third parties in relation to "designated
developments". These are matters which, by the nature of
their operations, are likely to have a significant impact on
the environment.

Class 2 relates to building applications and orders issued
by Councils for demolition and the like. Class 3 is the
miscellaneous jurisdiction including cases relating to
compensation, valuation and land tenure matters including
claims under the Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (NSW).

^Cripps J, "The Jurisdiction of the Land and Environment Court under the
EPA Act 1979 & LGA 1919"(1982) as quoted in T F M Naughton, Land and
Environment Court Practice (1997) LBC, Sydney, para. 1310.
10M Connell, "Mediation in the Land and Environment Court of NSW", paper
presented at University of Technology, Sydney 31 March 1995, 2.

Class 4 relates to the civil enforcement of environmental
laws. Such proceedings may be brought by consent
authorities to restrain environmentally harmful acts or to
enforce compliance with conditions of consent. This Class
also allows a third party to seek judicial review of a
decision by a relevant authority, such as a council or
government Minister, to grant consent to a particular
development. Such right is available primarily pursuant to
s123 of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act
1979 (NSW) but also under ancilliary Acts. However the
majority of such third party appeals are made by
commercial competitors rather than environmental
objectors.

Class 5 is the summary criminal enforcement of
environmental laws and Class 6 is appeals against
Magistrate's decisions in Local Courts in relation to
environmental offences.

As well as these adjudicative and administrative
mechanisms, the Court has introduced the use of consensual
mechanisms in the form of mediation and conciliation in an
adjunctive role. The Court commenced a Mediation Scheme
initially as a pilot project in May 1991. As a result of the
success of this pilot project, mediation was confirmed as
part of the Court's procedure in December 1991. As outlined

Land & Environment Court of NSW, "Third Party Appeals in Class 4,
Primarily Secton 123 Environmental Planning & Assessment Act", LEC
Research Paper, December 1995.

in Chapter 6 the Mediation Scheme is the focus of the case
study reported in Chapter 8.

Commissioners of inquiry for Environment and
Pianning

The Commissioners of Inquiry as constituted under section
119 of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act
1979 (NSW) have power to inquire, inter alia, into
environmental aspects of any proposed development the
subject of a development application. The matters
referred to the Commissioners are in the main matters "of
State or regional significance, and generate considerable
public debate"J 2 The Commissioners deal with both
"designated developments" (principally different forms of
heavy industry specified in Schedule 3 of the
Regulations^^)

and other forms of significant development.

This has the effect of widening the scope for public
participation in the inquiry process. But at the same time
it removes the appeal rights available to "any person"
under s87 and s98 of the Act with respect to designated
developments.

The Commissioners' Inquiry does not lead to the resolution
of the controversy as the final decision remains with the
l^Office of the Commissioners of inquiry for Environment and Pianning,
Annual Report 1993-94, Sydney, 3.
The category has now been broadened beyond this to include certain nonindustrial activities.
l^See section 101(9) as to the manner in which the Minister can exercise
'call-in' powers.

government. The function it provides is clearly an
administrative one.

The fact that the inquiry process is non-determining has
led to criticism of the process as "an expensive charade so
as to give the appearance of fulfilling the public
involvement objectives of the Act" and "an expensive
means of enabling participants to 'let off steam".^ s

There is evidence of the Commissioners adopting ADR
methods "alongside the traditional inquiry procedures".
The particular methods said to have been used or
encouraged are round table specialist conferences,
directed negotiation and informal discussion between the
parties.

The use of these methods remain at present

limited. As Wootten points out:

"They (inquiry processes generally) must be recognised as
an important part of the context in which environmental
mediation would operate in Australia, and may to some
extent be seen as reducing the need for ¡t."^®

The established nature of the Inquiry process, particularly
in respect of public interest matters, shapes the way in

Taylor, "Public Scrutiny of Planning Decisions tiirough the Legal
System" (1989) 6 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 156 at 158.
^Office of the Connmissioners of Inquiry for Environment and Planning,
Annual Report 1994-95, Sydney, 4.
17|d., 5.
18h Wootten, "Environmental Dispute Resolution" (1993) 15 Adelaide Law
Review 33 at 40.

which environmental conflict, in particular, is resolved in
New South Wales. The process has operated since 1980 and
in that time conducted approximately 300 Inquiries, often
dealing with contentious matters. Recent notable
contentious examples are the Bengalla Coal Mine and the
Lake Cowal Gold projects discussed and compared in
Chapter 2.

Australian Commercial Disputes Centre (ACDC)

The ACDC was established with the support of the New
South Wales Supreme Court and Government in 1986. Its
purpose is "to assist all commercial disputants to resolve
their disputes outside the court system".^ 9 This purpose
has been expanded from strictly commercial disputes to a
wider range of disputes, including public interest and
environmental controversies. The ACDC has been involved
in a number of environmental controversies.2o

The ACDC cannot be strictly seen as a forum for resolving
environmental controversies because that is not its main
function, environmental controversies only coming before
it on an ad hoc basis. Nonetheless its charter encourages
the use of consensual mechanisms to resolve
environmental

controversies.

l^M Ahrens & G Witcombe, Australian Dispute Resolution Handbook
(1992) ACDC Limited, Sydney, 9.
20wootlen, op cit., note 18 above, 72-3.

To extend its role in this area the ACDC undertook ¡n 1995
a pilot project under the Federal Government's
"Strengthening Local Economic Capacity" (SLEC) funding
scheme. The aim of the pilot project was to select a
number of environmental controversies, subject these to
facilitation or mediation and utilise the results as case
studies to promote the benefit of ADR methods.21
A draft report was released in October 1996 detailing the
five mediations conducted. The four controversies
resolved are as follows:
1. Great Lakes Council, December 1995.
The controversy involved a Development Control Plan (DCP)
for a 29 lot subdivision at Forster. 21 objections had been
received and 3 public exhibitions held over 15 years.
A facilitation was held after the application for
subdivision was lodged. Mediation occupied approximately
8 hours with prior separate meetings of opposing parties.
The 100 people who attended the public meeting were
reduced to 6 representatives and 6 observers.
There were issues of privacy, traffic and noise.
The facilitation addressed the meaning and scope of the
DCP and the implications of this were examined by the
stakeholders. It was accepted the subdivision could
proceed under existing planning law. An agreement as to

Australian Commercial Disputes Centre, Press Release, 1995, 1

acceptable conditions was reached and the controversy
settled.
The subdivision was subsequently approved by the council
subject to conditions which addressed the issues raised.
2. Leichhardt Municipal Council, May 1996.
The controversy involved an application by a developer for
the development of a landmark site for use as a
supermarket, shops and restaurants. There were 20
objectors.
The issues were traffic, parking, the scale of the
development and heritage issues.
A facilitation was held and opposing viewpoints were
heard. Smaller meetings were held between the developer
and particular objectors before a mediation session was
conducted. Following the mediation agreement was
reached to allow the development to proceed. Settlement
was reached as all parties accepted the alternative to be
protracted litigation and expense for the council and local
community.
The development was approved at the next council
meeting.
3. City of Sydney Council, May 1996.
The controversy involved an application to extend
construction hours to 24 hours, 7 days per week on a large
construction site at East Circular Quay. The application

attracted an objectors' letter campaign and involved a
conflict between the council's 'Living city' concept and the
need for developers to meet deadlines. A large number of
residents and resident action groups were involved.
A facilitation was held and the objectors indicated they
were prepared to negotiate and that they accepted that the
project had to proceed. At issue were questions of noise
and the risk of setting a precedent of lengthy construction
hours. An agreement was reached on extended working
hours subject to a number of agreed conditions.
A recommendation put to a meeting of the Central Sydney
Planning Committee was approved.
4. Ashfield Municipal Council, July 1996.
The controversy involved a government department plan to
build a school hall on an existing school site to
accommodate 600 primary school children
The local community was suspicious of the hall's potential
functions and the effect it may have in terms of loss of
green space, traffic and noise.
A facilitation was held and a list of suggested conditions
for development were distributed. This narrowed the
issues but it was considered too late in the process to
substantially amend the plans and the development was
modified only marginally and subsequently approved.

Following the success of the pilot project, a
recommendation was made that Councils proceed to
implement a dispute resolution program using ADR
methods as part of the standard Development
Application/Building Application process. It was
suggested that the use of ADR methods at this early stage
would work to prevent further escalation of the
controversy often engendered by methods such as public
meetings.22

The extent of Use of ADR methods in the
Fora

Reviewed

It was reported in a recent seminar into the use of ADR
methods that to date these methods had 'not embraced
wholeheartedly'.23 The focus of the seminar was
essentially on the mediation of those controversies which
would be classified as environmental disputes in this
study. A number of explanations were proffered.

Justice Lloyd of the Land and Environment Court of NSW on
reviewing the high success rate of the Court's Mediation
Scheme, asked rhetorically in relation to mediations, "Why
are there so few of them?'. He said he suspected one of
the reasons was a reluctance on the part of Local Councils
22|d.. 3.
23NSW Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee, Proceedings of the
Interactive Seminar on 'Dispute Management in Local Government' (1998)
PAC Report No. 24/51, Sydney, April 1998, 7.

to authorise their legal representatives or General
Manager or Mayor to settle or compromise proceedings.^^
The limiting effect of this lack of authority was raised by
a number of speakers who saw it as a major constraint to
the fuller use of ADR methods. Others saw the reasons
more in procedural terms, citing either the introduction of
ADR methods too late in the dispute resolution process or
a lack of knowledge in govemment circles about the
availability and effectiveness of these methods.^s

It was reported to the seminar that a recent survey of
Councils in the Sydney/Newcastle area showed "60% were
starting to use mediation", though more than half of these
had only been involved in 1-3 mediations to date.26
Additionally, about 40% of these Councils were using their
own staff trained in mediation, rather than using the
preferred method of independent accredited mediators.

Other reasons offered touch upon some of the issues
raised already in this study. Some Councils were reported
as being concemed that the confidentiality aspects of
mediation were inimical to the proper processes of
dispute resolution for an elected body. This same concern
was expressed in different terms by delegates of other
Councils who said that mediation, with its required
delegation of authority to compromise, involved an
24|d., 14.
25|d., 40-44.
26|d., 60. The survey was carried out by Carieen Devine, Sydney City
Council.

abrogation of their political responsibility.27 These
concerns centred upon whether "the public good or the
public interest" is being adequately taken into account by
the negotiating parties when any compromise solution is
reached.

Suggestions made to enhance the use of ADR methods,
particularly the use of the Court's Mediation Scheme,
included the viability of making participation mandatory.
Favourable comparisons were made in this regard with the
mediations conducted under the Farm Debt Mediation Act
1994 (NSW) which "has been a very successful mandatory
mediation offer".28

Selection

of Fora for Further Study

From this review, fora were selected as the source for
case study analysis of the use of ADR methods to resolve
controversies. The case studies were selected in
anticipation that they would be towards the ends of the
continuum between environmental disputes and
environmental

conflicts.

The fora selected were:

(a) For environmental dispute issues- the use of mediation
in the Land and Environment Court of NSW
27|d., 66.
28|d., 83.

(b) For environmental conflict issues- the use of
negotiation in the Resource and Conservation Assessment
Council's Interim Assessment Process.

Conclusion
This review has canvassed the fora in which
environmental controversies are resolved in New South
Wales. The review has provided an oven^iew of the use of
ADR methods in such fora. It is now intended to examine
the case studies selected from these fora in order to
determine how effectively ADR methods are used in their
dispute resolution procedures.

CHAPTER EIGHT
MEDIATION IN THE LAND AND ENVIRONMENT
COURT OF NSW - A CASE STUDY

Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to examine the use of ADR methods in
the resolution of environmental disputes. This aim is addressed
by examining the use of mediation in the Land and Environment
Court of New South Wales (The Court). The types of
controversies dealt with will be examined to determine if they
fall in the dispute half of the continuum of environmental
controversies. Having made a determination as to the nature of
the matters mediated, an investigation will be made as to the
effectiveness of such use.

Land and Environment Court of NSW
Mediation Scheme
An Adjunct Model

As outlined in Chapter 7, the Court has specific jurisdiction
which is divided into Classes. Controversies coming before the
Court are dealt with in various ways depending upon the Class
into which they fall. The role of mediation is as an option at
defined stages in this process and so it operates in an
adjunctive mode rather than in an integrative one

The Court In exercising its jurisdiction to detenmine merit
appeals pursuant to section 20(1 )(e) and section 71 of the Land
and Environment Court Act 1979 NSW ( LEG Act) is exercising an
administrative or executive power as distinct from a judicial
power. Thus an appeal on the merits in Class 1-3 proceedings
under the Act involves resolution by an administrative rather
than by an adjudicative mechanism. In such proceedings, ADR
methods are operating as an adjunct to administrative dispute
resolution. In this form mediation is being used to resolve the
controversy to finality, subject only to a supervisory overview
by the administrative or executive body.

In comparison, when the Court conducts civil enforcement
proceedings or judicial reviews in Class 4 matters pursuant to
section 20 of the LEC Act it is exercising an adjudicative
function. The first aspect of this jurisdiction is the dvil
enforcement of rights, obligations or duties imposed by a
planning or environmental law as defined in section 20(3) of the
Act. Additionally, the Court has jurisdiction *to review, or
command, the exercise of a function conferred or imposed by a
planning or environmental law' under section 20(2) of the Act.
When mediation is used in Class 4 matters this involves the use
of consensual methods as an adjunct to the exercise of an
adjudicative

function.

Mediation has had only a very small role to play in Class 4
matters. Mediation was conducted in only a small number
of Class 4 matters ( approximately 20 matters) up to

March 1995J In the revised Land and Environment Court
Rules 1996, mediation was specifically extended to all
Class 4 matters.

Mediation in the form of an adjunct to an adjudicative
function is more akin to the classic role proposed for
mediation in the United States literature. However, in this
light it is well to recall the comments of the then Chief
Judge about the rationale behind a large proportion of
Class 4 matters:

"Many people who object to developments on merit grounds
have recourse to actions under s123 to change proposals
on legal grounds. Such challenges sometimes have about
them an air of unreality, with ail parties pretending that
they are concerned with legal niceties rather than the
merits."2

With these comments in mind it may well be that a number
of Class 4 mediations are merit reviews "in disguise" and
are really no different in kind to the Class 1-3 mediations.
If this is so, then for all practical purposes the use of
mediation in the Court is as an adjunct to its purely
administrative dispute resolution function.

1M Connell, "Mediation in the Land and Environment Court of NSW"(!995)
Paper presented at the University of Technology, Sydney, 31 March 1995,
2.
2McClelland J's comments of 20 September 1983, quoted in A Fogg, "Third
Party Objections and Appeals in Development Control Decisions under Town
Planning Legislation"(1983) 2 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 4
at 11.

Development of the Mediation Scheme

On 1 May 1991 the Court first introduced a mediation
scheme in Class 1 and 2 proceedings. The history of the
introduction of a mediation scheme into the Court is
instructive.

One catalyst for the scheme's introduction was the report
by the Public Accounts Committee of the Parliament of
New South Wales following its "Inquiry into Legal Services
Provided to Local Govemment in New South Wales'.^ This
inquiry commenced in September 1990 and the Smiles
Report (as it became known) was issued in May 1991. One
finding of the Report, anticipated from the outset, was to
suggest that Councils were deliberately refraining from
determining politically contentious development
applications. The failure to determine such applications
within a specified period then triggered appeal
mechanisms to the Court under section 96 and section 97
of the EPAA Act as "deemed refusals" and Councils were
spared the need to make a politically unpopular decision on
the original substantive merit application.^ The Report
noted the consequences of this approach in terms of the
costs of legal services:

^Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee, Report on Legal Services
Provided to Local Govemment in NSW (The Smiles Report) NSW
Parliament, Sydney , May 1991.
^T F M Naughton, "Court-Related Altemative Dispute Resolution in New
South Wales'(1995) Environmental and Planning Law Journal, December
1995,377.

"The Land and Environment Court is clogged with cases
that are appeals from council decisions that may well
have been settled in a more speedy fashion and without the
tens of thousands of dollars of legal costs incurred if only
an alternative dispute resolution process was available."^
As the then Registrar of the Court said, "the inquiry
consolidated the debate"®, and in April 1991, shortly
before the release of The Smiles Report, the Court issued
a Mediation Practice Direction to commence on 1 May
1991. In its report, the Committee acknowledged this
development:
"The committee notes with enthusiasm the Court's
initiatives put into place during the course of this
inquiry".^
It is interesting to note that in the initial phase it was
envisaged that outside mediators from the Australian
Commercial Disputes Centre would be appointed by the
parties to conduct the mediations.^. But this proposal was
not followed and the scheme became, and remains, a
court-annexed one.

^The Smiles Report, note 3 above, ix.
Connell, "Mediation in the Land and Environment Court''(1994)
unpublished paper, 10 May 1994, 1.
^The Smiles Report, note 3 above, 95, par 5.102.
8M Connell, op cit., note 6 above, 1.

The Practice Direction commenced on 1 May 1991 and
provided for voluntary court-annexed mediation using the
Registrar or Deputy-Registrar of the Court as mediators in
Class 1-3 matters. This Practice Direction further
provided that if objectors were involved it was
anticipated they should attend "so that the views of all
interested parties may be taken into account in any
mediated settlement.'^

The Rules provided that "at callover the Registrar will
where appropriate refer proceedings to mediation or
conciliation in accordance with the Practice Notes.

It was under these joint provisions that court-annexed
mediations were commenced in the Court, initally as a
pilot program (from May-December 1991) and thereafter
as a routine option offered between callover and hearing
of a matter. The 1991 Practice Direction was replaced by
Clause 12 of Practice Direction 1993 which came into
force on 1 November 1993. Clause 12 headed 'Mediation'
differed from the 1991 Practice Direction in that it more
strongly emphasised the voluntary nature of the mediation.
It said in part:

^Land and Environment Court of NSW, Practice Direction, April 1991
lOpivision 6A Rule 2.

•It is a fundamental tenet of mediation that it is
voluntary, therefore each party will be required to
indicate that it wishes a dispute to be mediated.'^i

The Practice Direction 1993 made the following further
provisions:

(i) The option of a mediation session with the Registrar or
Deputy-Registrar was available in Class 1-3 proceedings,
(ii) It was expected that mediation could be requested any
time up to the first callover,
(iii) Mediation would usually be conducted at the Court,
(iv) Objectors could attend,
(v) It was anticipated that persons appointed to act on
behalf of any party would have the ability to resolve the
dispute,
(vi) Legal representation was not seen as necessary but
would be allowed by leave,
(vii) At least one week before the mediation, the parties
were required to serve on the other a statement of
position and issues no more than 2-3 pages long,
(viii) On filing an Initiating application in the Court a
statement setting out the option of mediation could be
handed to the lodging party who was required to serve a
copy of the statement on the other side
(ix) In Class 3 (compensation matters) it was anticipated
that parties would seek mediation after the exchange of
Inland and Environment Court of NSW, Practice Direction, October 1991,
cl. 12.

expert reports and that parties' valuers and other experts
would be present at the mediation.
(x) Where agreement had been reached at mediation, effect
to the agreement would involve one of the parties giving
consent or both agreeing to be bound by the temns of
settlement, necessary consent orders being placed before
the Court for consideration.

A year later the Court was one a number of tribunals
effected by the Courts Legislation (Mediation and
Evaluation) Amendment Act 1994 (NSW) which came into
force on 14 November 1994. This Act inserted new
provisions headed 'Mediation and Neutral Evaluation' into,
inter alia, the LEG Act being Part 5A, sections 61A-61L.
This amending legislation indicated that its purpose was
to:
"enable the Court to refer matters for mediation or neutral
evaluation if the parties to the proceedings concerned
have agreed to that course of action."i2.

These provision were seen as "effectively formalising the
court-annexed mediation conducted in this Court since
1991."13

The definition of mediation provided for in the amending
legislation does not mention the essential element of
voluntariness, but section 61D(1)(b) makes the consent of
12section 61A(1)
Inland and Environment Court of NSW, Annual Review 1994, 8.

the parties a condition precedent of the Court referring a
matter to mediation. Section 61E reiterates the essential
element of voluntariness by providing that attendance at
and participation in mediation or neutral evaluation
sessions are voluntary and that a party may withdraw
from the sessions at any time.

The amending legislation extended the scope of the ADR
methods available to the Court by adding that of Neutral
Evaluation, defining it as:

"a process of evaluation of a dispute in which the
evaluator seeks to identify and reduce the issues of fact
and law in dispute.'i'^

The other conditions precedent to the Court referring
proceedings for mediation or neutral evaluation are that
the Court considers the circumstances appropriate and
there is agreement by the parties as to who is to be the
mediator or neutral evaluator. ^^ This person may or may
not be a person whose name appears on a list compiled by
the Chief Judge of the Court under section 61H. In line
with the pre-existing mediation scheme in the Court the
first two names on the list are the Court's Registrar and
Deputy-Registrar. In order to be entered upon the list
persons were required to satisify the following
qualifications:
^^Section 61B(2)
ISsection

61D(1)(a)&(c).

(1) completion of a recognised mediation training course
including the satisfaction of any evaluation component of
that course; and
(2) completion of a minimum of 10 mediations as either
sole or co-mediator, with ongoing mediation experience
preferably in local government, planning, building,
community and environmental matters J®
Section 61G gives to the Court a supervisory role by
providing that the Court may make orders to give effect to
"any agreement or arrangement arising out of a mediation
session." The range of outcomes from a mediation session
include: non-resolution, agreement to discontinue the
dispute by withdrawing the application and agreement to
resolve the dispute in terms of consent orders. It is
through the ratification of such consent orders that the
Court can exercise its supervisory role. It is possible that
an agreement reached by the parties to the mediation
while acceptable to them may not be in the broader public
interest, for instance because it is environmentally
unacceptable. The ratification requirement ensures that
the Court's primary role in the exercise of its
administrative function is not constrained and that it can
exercise an oversight in the public Interest.

"•^Letter from President of the Environmental & Planning Law Association
(NSW) Inc. 33 NSW Law Society Journal 6 (July 1995) at 14.

Implementation of the Scheme
In the early days of the mediation scheme a number of
"designated development" matters were identified as being
successfully mediated and approved by the Court.^^ These
were principally different forms of heavy industry
specified in Schedule 3 of the Regulations to the EPAAct
involving controversies which might well be classified as
environmental conflicts in this research. Examples of
mediation of substantial designated development matters
were evident in the Court's Pilot Mediation Program. The
Chief Judge indicated:

"Mediation has been successful in reducing time and costs.
This is particularly evident in some very large multi-party
designated development cases. For example, successful
mediations have included a goldmine at Parkes, a mine at
Tumut and an extractive industry at Cecil Park."i8

The goldmine referred to was the Adovale Mine dispute
over the impact of mining on grazing and farmland,
mediated in mid 1991. It was referred to in the NSW State
Parliament as "probably the most successful mediation to
date".i9

I^E Spiegel, "i\/Iediation in the Courr(1992) Paper delivered to the NELA
(NSW Division) Biennial Conference, June 1992, 4.
Pearlman CJ, Letter to A U Forum (1993) 67 Australian Law Journal
at 941.
l^NSW Parliament, Legislative Assembly Debates (1991) 11 December
1991, 6480-1.

It was anticipated that controversies such as these,
involving as they do a number of parties and a number of
issues such as noise, vibration, dust, traffic, water
quality, site rehabilitation and visual amenity would be
particularly amenable to mediation.20 Such controversies
might also exhibit the key characteristics of value
conflicts, scientific uncertainity questions and public
interest concerns. But this expectation was not borne out
by the subsequent history of the Scheme.

Further minor modifications to the practice of mediation
in the Court occurred with the repeal of the Practice
Direction 1993 and Division 6A Rule 2 of the Land and
Environment Court Rules 1980. These provisions were
repealed with the introduction of the new Land and
Environment Court Rules 1996 (Part 18-Mediation). These
rules were effective from 29 January 1996 and
essentially repeat the provisions of Practice Direction
1993, providing that mediation is available in Class 1-4 of
the Court's jurisdiction and that "parties may apply to the
Court for referral to mediation of a matter arising in
proceedings."21 This is subject, however, to the provisos
in the legislation as to voluntariness (section 61G) and the
Court's supervisory role (section 61G).

20tFM Naughton, op cit., note 4 above, 386.
21 Part 18 Rule 2.

Review of the Effectiveness
iVIediation

of the

Scheme

From the summary of the legal framework and practice of
the Mediation Scheme, it can be seen that the Court has
had a system of mediation in Class 1, 2 and 3 proceedings
(and to a lesser extent Class 4 proceedings) operating
since May 1991. As at June 1996, the mediation scheme at
the Court had been in operation for a period of five years.
In that time, 311 mediations have been conducted.22 Data
is available from the Court for the first four and a half
years of that period, during which time 285 mediations
were conducted.

Two prior studies of this data are available:

(1) Survey by the Young Lawyers' Section of the Law
Society of NSW of mediations conducted in the period 1
May to 31 December 1991.23

(2) Review of matters referred to mediation in the period
January 1992 to December 1994.24

In addition a review of the Court files for matters
referred to mediation in the period 1 January to 31
22D Rolllnson, Deputy-Registrar, personal communication, 20 June 1996.
23j Muller, "Report on Young Lawyers' Survey-'Mediation in the Land and
Environment Court'"(1992) 3/3 & 4 LEADR Briefs.
24D TOW & M Stubbs, "The Effectiveness of ADR Techniques in the
Resolution of Planning Disputes" (1995) forthcoming. University of
Western Sydney.

December 1995 was undertaken for the purposes of this
study. From a review of this data it is anticipated that the
operation of the scheme will be found to be an example of
the use of ADR methods to resolve environmental disputes.
Environmental disputes are concerned with environmental
issues dealing with competing amenities between human
beings. An environmental dispute has been defined as:
"An environmental controversy dealing with competing
interests, needs and goals over environmental issues, but
which issues deal with competing amenities questions."
A method is needed to determine whether the
controversies referred to the Court's mediation scheme
can properly be classified as environmental disputes. For
this purpose, it was proposed to use the review of the
characteristics of the the 73 mediations conducted in the
period 1 January-31 December 1995. This period was
chosen because the Court files for these matters were
examined by the author and all information available as to
the nature of the controversies was extracted. In the
earlier research this issue had not been looked at in any
detail. However, it is important to note that the data
available on the files was for most purposes insufficient
and inadequate.
The results for the three period reviewed will firstly be
presented.

Review of Mediations
Mediations conducted 1 May -31 December
1991
The Young Lawyers' study was conducted as a review of
the first seven months of the scheme's operation, during
which time the scheme operated as a pilot project. The
purpose of the survey was to monitor the effectiveness of
mediation in the Court.25 The survey method was by way of
distribution of written surveys to parties to mediations in
the period IVIay-December 1991. The response rate was
said to be approximately 50%.26

The survey did not reach all parties. "About 50 surveys
were distributed by the Court to parties to a mediation"
and 26 responses were

returned,27

whereas a total of 42

mediations were actually conducted in this

period.^s

The surveys were distributed by sending them to the
parties' legal representatives for completion or, if the
parties were unrepresented by sending them direct to the
parties. The survey results do not disclose the proportion
of responses received from parties or legal
representatives, although it is possible from the
25j Muller, op cit., note 23 above, 8
26|d.
27Young Lawyers' - Environmental Law Group, Report on Survey
"Mediation in the Land & Environment Court' paper presented 30-31 May
1992, 2.
28d Roilinson, note 22 above.

responses to deduce that approximately 75% of the
responses were from lawyers.

The survey consisted of 12 questions, some with several
parts. Responses were by way of simple Yes/No answers
with an opportunity for additional open-ended comments.
The report drew a number of conclusions from particular
responses which have gained wide currency in the
literature concerning the effectiveness of the Court's
scheme. The most important of the conclusions the report
drew were that:

(1) A substantial majority of the participants considered
the mediation successful, and
(2) A high level of 'user satisfaction' was evident.

For the purpose of examining the validity of these
conclusions only a select number of questions and answers
are considered pertinent.29 These are examined in detail as
follows.

Responses upon which a conclusion of 'success'
were based.

In response to a question which asked: "Do you consider the
outcome of your mediation as successful? (Whether or not

^^For a full list of the questions and responses see Appendix A.

it proceeded to a hearing)", 19 out of 26 respondents or
73% said Yes.

In response to a question which asked: "Which of the
following factors do you consider added to the success?",
9 of the 19 or 47% indicated "total resolution/settlement
of the dispute" and 3 of the 19 or 16% indicated "partial
resolution of the dispute".

The report drew a number of conclusions from these
particular responses. It said "of greatest interest is that
73% of all responses considered the outcome of their
mediation to be s u c c e s s f u l . T h i s was in turn compared
favourably with success rates achieved overseas.^! But
the survey had provided respondents with no objective
measure of what 'success' was, leaving it to the
subjective judgement of the respondent. There are a
number of problems with this method and this conclusion.

Firstly, the 'success' was not equivalent to resolution or
settlement of the dispute, in the sense of a closure to the
legal proceedings. There was no basis on which to say that
73% of matters referred to mediation were resolved or
settled. This is clear from the responses to the second
question referred to which suggest that a "total
resolution/settlement of the dispute" occurred in less

^^Muller, op cit., note 23 above, 8.
Young Lawyers', op dt., note 27 above, 14.

than a majority (47%) and a "partial resolution" in a
further 16%.

The nature of these responses provide an insufficient
basis on which it is valid to compare the "73% successful"
rate with other studies which are measuring 'success
rates', in terms of resolution or settlement of disputes.
This has, however, been the use routinely made of the
survey results. 32

Responses upon which a conclusion of 'user
satisfaction'

were

based.

From the responses to a question which asked in part: "If
you are a lawyer did you experience any difficulties
convincing your client to participate in the mediation?, it
was apparent that only 6/26 or 23% of respondents were
unrepresented and therefore completing the survey
themselves.

It follows that more than three-quarters of the surveys
were completed by legal representatives. As such there is
no basis on which it is valid to draw the conclusion that
the parties participating in the mediations were satisified

32see for example, E Spiegel, op cit, note 17 above, 8; H Wootten,
'Environmental Dispute Resolution"(1993) 15 Adelaide Law Review 33 at
58; P Stein, 'Mediation in the Land and Environment Court' (1992) paper
presented to Local Government and Planning Law Review, College of Law,
Sydney, 21 November 1992, at 4 and M Connell, 'Mediation in the Land and
Environment Court' (1994) paper presented to Allen, Allen & Hensley,
Solicitors, Sydney, 10 May 1994 at 8.

with the process. The results can only support a
conclusion that the legal representatives were satisified,
not the parties. However the data has consistently been
cited as a measure of 'user satisfaction'.^^

The conclusion that this review draws is that the data
does not support the two main published findings, namely
that the scheme was achieving a 73% 'success rate' and
that it was displaying a high level of 'user satisfaction'.
The 'successful outcome' expressed as "73% of
respondents" does not equate to the settlement of the
controversy but to some lesser outcome short of
resolution. Similarly, since less than a quarter of the
respondents to the survey were direct parties the claim
that the results of the survey provide evidence of "a high
level of acceptance of the process" is not reliable.^^

Mediations conducted January 1992 December

1994

The second survey reviewed consisted of an examination
of "all Court files for matters that were the subject of
mediation in the period January 1992 to December
1994".35

One hundred and seventy files were examined in

that study. Its purpose was to review the success of the

33Pearlman J, Letter to the Editor 67 Australian Law Journal 941..
34|d..
35D TOW & M Stubbs, op cit., note 24 above, 1; note however D Rollinson,
note 22 above, records 178 mediations conducted in this period.

court-based facility as a guide to the wider application of
ADR methods in planning disputes.
The research method consisted of transcribing details
from the front of Court files of matters referred to
mediation, and analysing the information obtained

The

following details were recorded:
(1) the nature of the parties involved, local government,
State authority, development/real estate company,
planning consultant, third-parties (ie objectors),
environmental group and private individual (as applicant).
(2) the location of the dispute, either the Sydney
metropolitan area, coastal or regional.
(3) the Class of the dispute.
(4) the nature of the dispute, such as the detemnination of
a development application, building applications,
injunctions or compensation determination.
(5) the outcome of the mediation, in terms of
"successfully mediated", "partially resolved" or
"unresolved".
For the purpose of this study the raw data entries made by
these researchers were re-examined to obtain information
to answer the following questions:
(1) What was the Class of the dispute mediated?
(2) Who were the parties to the dispute?
(3) What was the nature of the dispute?

(4) What was the outcome of the mediation?^®

Findings
The following results were tabulated to answer these four
questions.
CLASS OF DISPUTE
Table 1
Class of dispute
Class

1
2
3
4
Total

Mediations
1992 - 4

Numbe
102
37
23
8
170

Total Matters
before the Court
1992 -4

Number
60
2236
22
1015
13
1267
5
687
1 00 5 2 0 5

'%

%
43
20
24
13
100

Mediation
Total
Matters
%
4.5
3.6
1.8
1.1
3.3

It can be seen that Class 1 disputes dominated the work
of the Court in temns of mediations (60%), and less so in
terms of hearings (43%) However the proportion of Class
1 disputes going to mediation is small, at only 4.5%.
Similarly the proportion of disputes in all Classes being
mediated (successfully or otherwise) is small, at 3.3%.37

36Data examined courtesy of D Tow, personal communication, 30 May
1996.
37D TOW & M Stubbs, op cit., note 24 above, 3 (NB. the 'total matters'
figure is that registrations in the Court in the relevant period).

PARTIES
Table 2
Parties Involved
Number Percentage
(%)
local government authority
(as respondent)
state authority
(as respondent)
development/real estate co.
(as applicant)
planning consultant (as
applicant)
third party
(as either)
environmental group
(as either)
private individual
(as applicant)
other (as either)

141

83

25

15

21

12

21

12

0

0

1

1

120

71

20

12

It can be seen that the great majority of disputes going to
mediation involved a local government body as respondent
(83%) and a private individual as applicant (71%).38 In
virtually all the remaining disputes the respondent was a
state authority such as the Environment Protection
Authority (15%). In only one matter was an environmental
group or other objector a party.

38|d., 2.

NATURE
Table 3
Nature of the Dispute
Number
DA involving dual
occupancy
DA involving medium
density
DA involving other
residential
DA Involving
commercial
DA Involving
industrial
DA involving other
unspecified
Appeals over conditions
of consent (DA)
Matters pertaining
to BA
Injunction/restraining
orders
Compensation

Percentage

(%)
19)

11)
total

11)
residential
7)
37
11

total
6)
residential
4)
21
6

7

4

33

19

21

12

31

18

4

2

17

10

Others

16

9

TOTAL

17739

100

It can be deduced from this data that approximately half
of the disputes were concerned with the determination of
Development Applications, either for residential use
(21%), commercial use (6%) or industrial development

3^Some mediations involved more than one issue.

(4%). The data recorded did not permit an allocation of the
remaining 19%.

The emphasis on residential disputes was reflected in the
proportion of mediations concerned with matters
pertaining to residential Building Applications for
construction or modification of dwellings

It is possible to deduce from the data that a significant
proportion of the matters mediated involved disputes over
residential, commercial or industrial land use. But to
conclude that such disputes are consistent with disputes
over competing amenities and are therefore environmental
disputes must be only very tentative.
RESULT
Table 4
Outcome

of

Resolved
Not Resolved
Total

mediations
Number
124
46
170

Percentage
73
27
100

(%)

These results show that a total of 73% of disputes
mediated were "successfully resolved". A successful
resolution was defined as a matter in which agreement
was reached on a mutually acceptable approval (usually by
way of consent orders) or where the proceedings were
withdrawn. Matters which subsequently proceeded to a
^OD TOW & M Stubbs, op cit., note 24 above, 4.

hearing were classified as unsuccessful and 27% of
disputes were in this category. It was noted that the data
on the court file did not allow a determination as to
whether there had been some partial agreement in the
sense of lessening the areas of dispute,

This study was subject to a number of limitations
recognised by the authors which arose because of the
confidential nature of the mediation proceedings. Neither
the Court nor the mediator kept written records of the
mediation process or outcome. The only record of the
proceedings was a notation on the front of the file that it
had been referred to mediation. The outcome of the
mediation was not recorded and could only be detemiined
from the course of the proceedings following the
mediation conference, for instance, whether consent
orders were subsequently filed, the matter was
discontinued or a hearing date was obtained. This
presented a number of limitations:

(a) there was no evidence of any partial agreement
(b) there was no evidence of participants other than those
on the record.
(c) there was no evidence as to whether any agreement
reached was implemented.

41 Id., 5.

These restrictions hampered the methodology of Tow &
Stubbs study. More adequate records of the mediations
conducted would have assisted more comprehensive
analysis of the effectiveness of the Mediation Scheme.
Steps to address this inadequacy will be addressed later
in this study. To overcome these restrictions, the Tow &
Stubbs methodology was modified when examining
mediations in the Court in the 12 month period to
December 1995.

Mediations conducted January 1995December

1995

A review of the Court files of matters which were the
subject of mediation conducted in the period 1 January to
31 December 1995 was carried out for this

research.42

The files were examined to elicit as much information as
possible about the nature of the disputes mediated.

The aim of this study was to provide data on the
effectiveness of the mediation scheme and to compare the
results with those obtained in the two eariier studies.

With the co-operation of the Court registry, the files of
all matters the subject of mediation in this 12 month
period were examined. Notations recorded on the front of
the file were read and the body of the file was examined
4273 files were examined; D Roilinson note 22 above, records 74
mediations conducted in this period.

to peruse pleadings, affidavit material and expert reports
filed. Details were then transcribed and recorded in the
categories, using a data entry sheet adapted from Tow and
Stubbs, to provide data on the following matters:
Class:
Whether the dispute was in Class 1-4 in terms of the
Court's division of jurisdiction.

Parties:
Whether the parties consisted of only an applicant and a
respondent or whether objectors or third parties were
involved; whether the respondent was a local or state
government authority.

Nature:
Where the dispute involved a development application
whether it involved a residential or commercial /
industrial development and the type of developments
involved; what kinds of building application disputes were
mediated; what type of compensation disputes were
mediated.

Outcome:
Whether the dispute was solved by mediation. Solution
was taken to have occurred in two situations:

(a) where consent orders were agreed to by the parties to
provide for the approval of an amended or substituted
application; or

(b) where the appeal was discontinued on the basis that
agreenfient as to a course of action had been reached
between the parties.

Unsolved mediations were taken to be those which
subsequently proceeded to a hearing in the Court.

By using this methodology significantly more information
was available for analysis than was available in the Tow &
Stubbs study. The data collection went further than that of
Tow & Stubbs in two important respects.

Firstly, more details were collected as to the nature of
the dispute. The extent of Tow & Stubbs' data collection in
this area went to listing the matters as development
application, building application, injunction or
compensation. Data collection in the present study
extended this to include whether the development
application related to residential, commercial or
industrial development and the type of development
involved in terms of single dwelling, dual occupancy,
medium density, subdivision (for residential) and business
premises, factories and plants (for commercial/
industrial). Similar data was collected as to the type of
building applications made. It was anticipated that from
this additional data some tentative conclusions could to
be reached as to the nature of the matters mediated.

Secondly, further data was collected as to the nature of
the outcome reached. Tow & Stubbs collected data to
determine whether the dispute was "successfully
resolved, partially resolved or unresolved". They conceded
there was no data on which matters could be classified as
"partially resolved". Data collection in the present study
attempted to extend this to determine whether the nature
of the settlement reached equated to a 'solution'. From
this additional data, it was anticipated that it may be
possible to draw some conclusions as to the extent to
which the outcomes reached equated with some objective
measure of success.
Findings

The following results were tabulated in relation to these
matters.

CLASS OF DISPUTE
Table 5
Ciass of Dispute
Class
Mediations
1995
1
2
3
4
Total

Number
40
20
12
1
73

%
55
27.5
16.5
1
100

Total Matters'^ 3 Mediation/
before the
total
Court 1995
matters
Number %
%
1038
60
3.9
225
13
8.9
208
12
5.8
256
15
.4
1727
100
4.2

4377je Land and Environment Court Annual Review, Year Ended 31
December 1995, Annexure A "Caseflow in the Court, Registrations'

The vast majority of matters were in Classes 1 or 2
(82.5%).44 Class 3 matters relating to compensation and
valuation accounted for a further 16.5%. Of the matters
mediated there was one Class 4 matter, which was an
objection to a development consent for a restaurant
extension. The 73 mediations conducted in 1995
represented only a small proportion, 4.2%, of all matters
registered in the Court in that year.
PARTIES
Table 6
Parties Involved

local government authority
(as respondent)
state authority
(as respondent)
individual
(as applicant)
developer
(as applicant)
objector/third party
(as either)

Number

Percentage
(%)

61

83.5

12

16.5

54

74

19

26

3

4

There was no formal notation on the file as to parties
attending. In only 3 of the 73 matters (4%) was there any
evidence of objectors or third parties attending the
mediation as a party. One case involved a third party
appeal where the applicant opposing a development
44The proportion of overall matters in Class 1 as compared with Class 2
had changed significantly over the period 1992-95, essentially reflecting a
trend in the Court for a predominance of matters to be filed as Class 1
proceedings.

consent and the developer was present at the mediation,
not yet having been added as a party. In the second case,
the objector was an adjoining owner supporting a
demolition order against his neighbour. In the third case, a
group of community objectors were noted as attending to
oppose a development application for a concrete batching
plant on the North Coast of New South Wales.

In all other cases (96%), the file notation did not disclose
any participants other than the applicant, respondent and
mediator, who was either the Registrar or DeputyRegistrar of the Court.

In all cases, the respondent was a government
instrumentality, either in the form of a local government
planning authority (83.5%) or State government body, such
as the Roads and Traffic authority (16.5%).
NATURE
Table 7
Nature of the

Dispute

DA -dual occupancy
DA -medium density
DA -subdivision
DA -single dwelling
DA - commercial
DA -industrial
BA -residential
BA - commercial or industrial
Compensation - residential
Other - demolition/remedial

Number

Percentage
(%)

10)
9)
total
4)resident'l
9) 32
7
2
13
0
12
7

14)
12) total
5)resident'l
12) 44
10
3
18
0
16
10

TOTAL

173

1100

"

Of the 73 files examined, 41 of these, or 56%, related to
Development Applications, either in terms of appeals
against the planning authority's refusal to approve the
application or against the conditions of approval. As a
proportion of all the files examined, 32 of these matters
(44%) were concerned with development applications for
residential use (dual occupancy, medium density,
subdivision, single dwellings); 7 mediations involved
commercial developments (10%) and 2 mediations
concerned industrial developments involving a factory and
the concrete plant referred to above (3%).

All of the 13 Building Applications, which accounted for
18% of all mediations, related to residential land use.
"Other matters", relating to demolition or removal orders,
constituted 10% (7) of mediations. The balance of 12
matters (16%) dealt with claims for compensation due to
highway construction. All of the demolition orders and all
the compensation disputes related to residential
properties.

The total number of matters which could be classifies as
"residential" was 64, or 87.5% of all disputes referred to
mediation.
RESULT

Table 8
Outcome of mediations
Number
Solved
53
Not Solved 20
Total
73

Percentage (%)
73
27
100

A total of 73% of the mediations were successful in the
sense of being solved in accordance with the definition
adopted. Files which indicated the matter was not solved
at the mediation conference itself or subsequently and
therefore proceeded to a hearing were categorised as
unsuccessful and constituted 27% of the mediation in that
year.

Can the controversies

mediated in the

period January to December 1995 be
ciassified

as environmental

disputes?

The method suggested for classifying an environmental
controversy as a dispute is to use the characteristics
detailed in Chapter 3. For simplicity sake, the comparison
is confined to the three key characteristics which are said
to capture the essense of the irreconcilable conflict over
values or goals.

The three key characteristics are:

*value

conflicts

*scientific

uncertainity

questions

^public interest concerns.

A controversy which does not display these three
characteristics is classified instead as an environmental
dispute.

A review of the characteristics of the 73 mediations
conducted in the period January-December 1995 is used to
determinine whether these controversies exhibit the three
key characteristics.45 it ¡s to be emphasised that the data
obtained from the files does not allow this classification
to be made in any conclusive fashion. Allowing for
limitations as to the extent and nature of the infomiation
available a tentative conclusion is offered.

Do the mediated matters exhibit vaiue conflicts?

Any distinction in value conflicts is really one of degree.
To the participants the values in dispute may be perceived
as fundamental, though objectively they might not be of
the fundamental nature necessary to equate to an
environmental

conflict.

Nothing in the information available supports a conclusion
about whether the controversies mediated involve such
fundamental value conflicts. There is no data available as
to the subjective considerations of the parties involved in

^^For full details of the characteristics disclosed see Appendix B.

the matter. But the nature of the subject matter of the
controversies certainly does not suggest matters
involving conflicting fundamental values.

Each of the controversies could be said to involve a value
conflict in the simple sense of a difference of opinion
about what is a valuable or beneficial development in a
residential context. Such a controversy may involve a
disagreement about what is valuable to the proponent of a
residential development and what on the other hand is
deemed valuable in terms of the consent authority's
planning instmment or in terms of what objectors value in
their neighbourhood.

But to call this a value conflict is substantially removed
from the fundamential divergence in values that mark
environmental conflicts, described by Tillett as "values
about the relative rights of human beings and other
species, or the merits of exploiting natural resources or
conserving them, or what constitutes an acceptable
quality of life for people in a particular community.'^e
Hence the subject matter of the controversies mediated is
not considered to involve value conflicts of
this order.

Do the mediated matters involve questions of
scientific

uncertainity?

46g Tillett, Resolving Conflict: A Practical Approach (1991) Sydney
University Press, Sydney, 138.

There is nothing in the nature of the controversies to
suggest the ecoiogical complexity or uncertainty that
mark out environmental conflicts. Certainly there are
issues affecting one or more parties' amenity through the
approval of a new dwelling or through a building
alteration. But this is vastly different in degree to
questions of scientific uncertainity producing ecological
damage.

The assumption that issues of scientific uncertainity do
not arise is supported in some measure by the fact that
the only expert reports on the files relate to planning or
valuation questions which can be resolved with a
considerable degree of certainity. In only one matter,
involving a concrete batching plant, were any issues
requiring scientific evaluation such as, dust control,
noise, soil contamination and the like raised and the likely
effects of these could be determined with some degree of
certainity.

Do the mediated matters display pubiic interest
concerns?
It will be recalled from our discussions in Chapter Two
that all environmental controversies involve the public
interest. The distinction was made however between those
in which the public interest was dormant (environmental
disputes) and those in which the public interest was

aroused (environmental conflicts). All of the respondents
in the matters mediated were government bodies,
implicitly representative of, and responsive to, public
interest. But there was nothing in the subject matter of
the controversies, nor in the information gleaned from the
court files, to suggest that the public interest had been
aroused. In only one case, namely the concrete batching
plant referred to, did the file indicate public interest
concern. This was apparent from the fact that resident
groups were noted as being involved and expert reports
were only on the Court file in this one matter.

In the case of residential developments the public interest
may be domriant. In larger designated development
matters, involving for example extractive industries, the
public interest may well be aroused. But such subject
matter was not evident in any of the 73 files of mediated
matters examined.

The conclusion reached following this review is that the
controversies subject to mediation in the Court's
mediation scheme do not exhibit the key characteristics of
environmental conflicts. The matters mediated were
therefore classified as disputes. This conclusion can at
best be tentative in view of the sparcity of information
available on the files. The controversies are analysed as
examples of the effectiveness of ADR methods in the
resolution of environmental disputes.

Conclusion
From the data obtained for the 12 month period to
December 1995, the results can be summarised as follows:

1. In a small number of the matters coming before
the Court the parties agree to mediation.

Of the 1727^7 matters registered in the Court in Class 1-4
in 1995, 4.2% were subject to mediation.

Mediation is 'offered' by the Court in all Class 1-4 matters
but it is difficult to determine how rigourously the policy
is policed. Parties are issued with a document when they
first lodge proceedings in the Court setting out details of
the mediation service. This document must be served on
the other parly when serving the initiating process to
draw that party's attention to the availability of the
alternative.48 The parties are reminded at the first callover that mediation is available and they are asked to
indicate if they wish to mediate. As the Court's emphasis
is on strict voluntariness, if both parties do not indicate

The Land and Environment Court Annual Review, Year Ended 31
December 1995, Annexure A "Caseflow in the Court: Registrations'.
48ln this regard see the comments of Lynn Taylor, Solicitor, who said that
in addition to sending the prescribed form her firm also sends a letter
making overtures as to using ADR methods, 'To date, we have never had an
answer- ever -from the council' in Parliamentary Accounts Committee,
Proceedings of the Interactive Seminar on "Dispute Management in Local
Government' (1998) PAC Report No. 24/51, NSW Parliament, 1998, 30.

consent at this time the alternative of mediation seems to
be pursued no further.

2. Mediation is being effectiveiy used to resoive
environmentai disputes, the subject of
administrative proceedings in the Court.

Using agreement rates as a tangible measure of
effectiveness, the data for the 1995 year disclosed a
'success rate' of 73% which was identical to the earlier
study. Without overstating the empirical findings, on the
limited data available it has been asserted that the
matters mediated in the Court satisfy the definition of
environmental disputes. The data does not allow a
conclusion as to whether the solutions reached equate to a
'settlement' or a "resolution' of the matters in dispute in
the sense of satisfying all or some of the needs of the
parties.

3. i\/lediation is used primariiy for residential
disputes

The data only allows this conclusion to be made
tentatively. It discloses that 87.5% of matters mediated
could be classified as disputes relating to residential
matters. The 'success rate' for such disputes at 61% was
lower than the average of 73%. One tentative explanation
for this discrepancy is that the option of mediation may be

taken up in more 'difficult' residential disputes than is the
case with 'difficult commercial/ industrial disputes.

Drawing together the results of the review of the two
eariier studies and the study carried out for this research
some further tentative conclusions can be made. The
results show that an effective mediation scheme has been
developed in the Court since its introduction in May 1991.
The scheme resolves about 75% of the matters referred
with the consent of the parties to mediation. These
matters represent a small proportion of the controversies
which are dealt with by the Court, either administratively
or adjudicatively. In the vast majority of the
controversies dealt with mediation is operating as an
adjunct to an administrative dispute resolution function.

The controversies mediated do not exhibit the key
distinguishing characteristics of conflicts and have been
classified as environmental disputes. It was anticipated
that disputes by their nature had the potential to be
negotiated, even though the perception of incompatibliity
of interests existed. The hypothesis advanced was that
such disputes would be amenable to mediated settlement.
This was confirmed by the empirical results obtained,
subject to the caveat that the matters mediated

could

only tentatively be classified as environmental disputes.

Yet mediation has not become the preferred method of
resolving such disputes. Disputants still prefer the

dispute to be resolved by the Court exercising its
administrative function as distinct from a settlement the
parties reach themselves. The reason for this continued
reluctance and whether it is the reluctance of applicants,
government respondents or the court itself has been
considered in Chapter Seven and warrants further
attention. The Court sees the scheme as a "customer
service" but it remains at present a largely under-utilised
one. The suggestion that "given sufficient resources the
Court could potentially introduce a range of ADR methods
to supplement" the formal system may indicate that the
basis of the limited use is funding.^Q it may be that the
Court's own agenda is suited by minimising the use of
mediation in the absence of increased funding.

49j H Keogh, "Dispute Resolution Systems in the NSW Land and
Environment"(1996) 7(3) Alternative Dispute Resolution Journal 169 at

180.

CHAPTER NINE
NEGOTIATING THE FORESTRY CONFLICT
- A CASE STUDY

Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to examine the use made of ADR
methods in the resolution of environmental conflicts.
Environmental conflicts are defined as:

"Environmental controversies dealing with competing interests,
needs and goals over environmental issues, in particular the
apparently non-negotiable issues of value conflicts, questions
of scientific uncertainity and public interest concerns."

Environmental conflicts include major conflicts over uranium
mining and land use. The main ADR method adopted in this area
has been direct negotiation rather than assisted negotiation
methods, such as mediation.

This aim is addressed by an examination of the use of
negotiation in the resolution of an environmental conflict. The
controversy over forest use was chosen on the intuitive
expectation that it represented an environmental conflict. This
expectation is tested by an examination of the characteristics
of the forest controversy.

Two examples of the use of negotiation in forestry
controversies are examined. The first is a review of the use of
negotiation in the Salamanca Process conducted in Tasmania in
1989-1990 which produced a negotiated outcome. A more
detailed case study approach is used to examine a series of
stakeholder negotiations in the Interim Assessment Process
(lAP) conducted in New South Wales in 1995-96 to resolve
conflict over the implementation of forest policy.

It is intended to examine the use of negotiation in each process.
In the case of the Salamanca Process, this is confined to an
oven^iew of the negotiation process. In the case of the lAP, the
assessment draws upon responses obtained in a series of
interviews with the participating parties at the time these
negotiations were conducted in April 1996.

The resolution of environmental controversies is usually by an
administrative mechanism, either by ministerial or bureaucratic
action. Accordingly, the examples reviewed consider the use of
negotiation as an adjunct to the administrative mechanism of
dispute resolution.

The Forestry

Debate: an environmental

conflict?

The forestry debate is a long standing controversy over the use
of environmentally significant native forests, centred
particularly on the forests of the North East and South East
coasts of New South Wales and in Tasmania. The controversy
centred on logging for timber and woodchips and the

environmental consequences of this practice. Tlie significant
issues in dispute include the effect on habitats considered
crucial for endangered species, the benefits of preserving old
growth forests and the need to balance long term security of
wood supply to the timber industry with the requirements of
ecologically sustainable forest management.
In order to determine whether the forest controversy can be
classified as an environmental conflict, it is necessary to see if
it displays the characteristics of environmental controversy. In
particular, does it display the three key characteristics isolated
as indicative of the irreconcilable disagreement which marks an
environmental conflict namely: value conflicts, questions of
scientific uncertainity and public interest concerns?
A value conflict cleariy exists between conservationists and the
forestry union and the timber industry. Conservationists, on the
one hand, value forests in terms of their biodiversity, the
irreplacability of old growth forests and the ecological, social
and cultural benefits of the remaining wilderness areas and
endangered species habitats. The timber industry and the
forestry union, on the other hand, value forests in terms of
protecting the collective worth of forest industry employment,
the social and economic well being of communities reliant on
the timber industry and the benefits of maintaining a
sustainable timber industry supplying a renewable resource.
Both sides profess to value the forests in environmental terms
but the aspects they value are diametrically opposed.

Questions of scientific uncertainity centre upon the
interpretation of what ecologically sustainable forest
management entails. There is a wide divergence of views as to
what constitutes old growth forest and wilderness areas and
the extent to which they exist in native forests and their
importance in preserving biodiversity. Both sides accept that
old growth forests should no longer be logged and that such
forests are an irreplaceable resource, but the debate rages over
the nature of the timber resources which satisfy this
classification. There are also questions of scientific
uncertainity in terms of the effects of disturbance of
endangered species habitats and the destruction of forest
biodiversity. Hence questions of scientific uncertainity clearly
arise in forestry controversies.

Both sides of the debate vehemently assert that they represent
the public interest. The effects of any long term resolution of
the forest controversy is widely reported in the media. Thus
forestry controversies generate and activate public interest
concerns.

On the basis of this brief examination, it is assumed that this
conflict satisfies the three key characteristics of
environmental conflicts. This conclusion can be reached with
more certainty than was possible in the case of the
controversies mediated in the Land and Environment Court.
Accordingly, for the purposes of this study, the forest debate is
classified as an environmental conflict.

The Salamanca Process
The Salamanca Agreement Process (so called after the venue of
the original negotiations) is a negotiation process which
"evolved from the rubble of the 1988 Helsham lnquiry".i The
process began with some informal discussions held before the
1989 Tasmanlan State election between members of the
Tasmanian Fanners and Graziers Association and
conservationists over the long running forest conflict.^

A Parliamentary Accord between Labor and the Green
Independents put the Field Labor government into power in May
1989. Part of this Accord was an agreement to attempt a nontraditional approach to resolving forest conflict. The formal
Salamanca Agreement to conduct such negotiations was entered
into on 31 August 1989. The parties to the agreement to
negotiate were representatives of the Forest Industries
Association of Tasmania (FIAT), the Tasmanian Trades and Labor
Council (TTLC), the Tasmanian Fanners and Graziers Association
(TFGA), the Tasmanian Forestry Commission (TFC), the
Wilderness Society and the Australian Conservation Foundation
[the latter two to later combine as the Combined Environment
Groups (CEG)] and the Tasmanian Govemment. The Agreement
bound the parties to work together for 12 months to develop a
draft strategy for forest management.

"•R Sandford, "The Merits of Negotiation and Mediation in Resource Management
Disputes" (1991) paper delivered to IIR Environmental Dispute Resolution
Conference, Sydney, May 1991, 4.
2H Wootten, "Environmental Dispute Resolution" (1993) 15 Adelaide Law
Review 33 at 74.

The Agreement was institutionalised by tlie establisliment of
tlie

Forests and Forest Industries Council of Tasmania (FFIC) in

February 1990.3 It was the task of the FFIC to develop a final
Forests and Forest Industries Strategy (FFIS) by 1 September
1990. Essentially the FFIS was intended to provide a strategy
which would guarantee security of resource supply, security of
employment and security and protection of conservation
values.The wide ranging scope of the FFIS saw the membership
of the Council expanded to include further representatives from
the Commonwealth Government, the Municipal Association of
Tasmania, the Woodcraft Guild and the Tasmanian Guild of
Furniture Manufacturers. Subsequent additions were made to
include representatives of the Tasmanian Logging Association,
Tasmanian Beekeepers Association and the Tasmanian
Traditional and Recreational Land Users Federation."^
The Council formed the following subgroups:
1. "Technical/Scientific Working Groups" within the FFIC to
focus on specific issues and areas of dispute,
2. "A Balanced Panel of Experts" to advise on the consen^ation
values of contentious areas,
3. "A Forest Planners Group" to advise on resource options.

^Sandford, op cit., note 1 above, 4.
4|d., 5.

At the ssimG time broader public participation was encouraged
througli an extensive consultation process involving the
formation of 14 "Regional Advisory Groups".

On 1 June 1990 the draft "Key Issues and Principles Likely to
Shape a Forests and Forest Industry Strategy for Tasmania", was
agreed to and adopted by all parties. A period of two months of
public consultation then followed. On 14 September 1990, the
recommendations for the final FFIS was released in the form of
a final strategy "Secure Futures for Forests and People".
However the CEG did not agree to the final strategy as they
considered it would have allowed export woodchipping to
increase by up to 50%. The Environmental Groups then withdrew
from the process.®

The Tasmanian Labor Cabinet endorsed 'in principle' the
recommendations in the final strategy on 1 October 1990. The
Green Independents considered this a breach of the
Pariiamentary Accord and for this and other political reasons
the Labor/Greens Accord was broken. The Salamanca Agreement
Process effectively ceased from that time.

The exercise was not successful in the sense that it did not
reach a consensus agreement which was subsequently
implemented. However Sandford pointed out in 1991 that:

5 t Bonyhady, Places Worth Keeping (1993) Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 23.

'the Salamanca process is not about failure. A lot of common
ground has been identified and there are many issues of
economic, social and environmental importance that have been
or are still being, worked on by the parties."®

Similar sentiments are expressed by Wootten^ and BonyhadyS,
namely that the use of negotiation to resolve environmental
conflict was an ambitious endeavour which warranted
revisiting.

The use of negotiation was revisited in the successful 1991
Conondale Ranges Agreement over the management of native
forests in South East Queensland^ and in the 1996 Interim
Assessment Process designed to implement revised forest
policy in New South Wales. It is the latter which is examined in
detail here.

The Forestry Conflict and the Interim
Assessment

Process

The origins of the Interim Assessment Process lie in the
framework set by the joint Commonwealth and State
Governments' National Forest Policy released in 1992. This
policy set a number of benchmari<s and its adoption was agreed
to by the Commonwealth, State and Territory Governments in a
^Sandford, op cit., note 1 above, 5.
^Wootlen, op cit., note 2 above, 75.
^Bonyhady, op cit, note 5 atx>ve, 23.
^Id., and see earlier discussions in Chapter 5.

joint National Forest Policy Statement (NFPS) later that year. In
particular, the NFPS provided for the establishment of "a
comprehensive, adequate and representative (CAR)"io forest
reserve system on public land by the end of 1995, supplemented
by relevant private forests by 1998.

The CAR forest reserve system as implemented in New South
Wales was interpreted to mean:

(1) "Comprehensive": a network of forest parks protecting the
full range of native forest communities found in NSW
(2) "Adequate": a reserve system large enough to protect the
vast range of forest dwelling plants.
(3) "Representative": a reserve system including all natural
varieties within each forest type or species.^ ^

The political will to ensure the implementation of this policy
was laid through a series of pre-election commitments made by
the then Labor Opposition prior to its election to government in
March 1995. Post-election pressure to meet these
committments was substantial and on 13 June 1995 the NSW
Government announced the NSW Forestry Policy which included
adoption inter alia of the CAR reserve system.

^^National Forest Policy Statement (1995) AGP, Canberra.
11ntergovernmental Technical Working Group, Report: Broad Criteria for the
Establishment of a Comprehensive, Adequate and Representative Forest Reserve
System (July 1995) JANIS, Canberra and see also The Joint CommonwealthNSW Government Report, Deferred Forest Areas (December 1995) AGP,
Canberra.

Following this, In July 1995 specific criteria for achieving the
CAR forest resen/e system were proposed by the Commonwealth
Government. The Commonwealth's criteria were developed by an
advisory panel of scientists chaired by Australia's Chief
Scientist. These criteria included:

* a broad benchmark of 15 per cent of the pre-1750 distribution
of each forest community to be protected within conservation
reserves;
* the retention in reserves of at least 60 per cent of existing
old growth, increasing up to 100 per cent for rare old growth;
* the protection of 90 per cent or more, wherever practicable,
of high quality wilderness; and
* endangered species

protection.

These criteria were endorsed as a "broad benchmark" by the NSW
government in the Scoping Agreement signed with the
Commonwealth on 25 January 1996. However given the longstanding dispute between stakeholders in the forestry debate
particularly in New South Wales, implementation of these
benchmarks on a regional basis were considered likely to
produce further conflict. Accordingly, it was necessary to find
an acceptable implementation mechanism to achieve these
criteria.

Progressing to a full CAR reserve system in one step was not
considered feasible and so a short-term, interim protection for
National Forest Conservation Reserves, Comniionwealth Proposed Criteria, A
Position Paper, July 1995, AGP.

areas which might be required for the CAR reserve system was
required. The NSW Government policy allowed for an initial
Interim Assessment Process (lAP) to provide this temporary
solution to the implementation problem. This was an interim
arrangement to ensure that any areas which might be needed for
the reserve system were not logged before the CRAstage took
place.
Implementation methods were to be addressed through the
formation of a

Resource and Consen^ation Assessment Council

(RACAC). Following its creation RACAC was to adopt a three
stage process for identifying those forest areas which would be
reserved from logging and those which would be released.

The first phase consisted of the formation of a Steering
Committee and a number of Working Groups. The Conservation
Working Group (CWG) was fomned to develop methodologies and
guidelines for applying the resen^e criteria. In so doing the
group was to establish forest type and fauna databases for all
public land tenure areas in NSW. The CWG was supported by
specialist "Flora and Fauna Panels'. The panels comprised
representatives of the National Parks and Wildlife Services, the
State Forests and two independent experts.^^ In addition, a
Social-Economic Working Group (SEWG) was formed to provide
information and advice on the social and economic implications
of the adoption of a CAR resen/e system.^^

AC AC, Draft Interim Forestry Assessment Report{June 1996) RACAC,
Sydney, 1.
15.

The second stage of the process was the lAP negotiation stage,
anticipated to be completed by mid-1996. In the negotiation
stage representatives of all stakeholders were to negotiate the
specific implementation of the conservation targets set in the
Scoping Agreement on a regional basis utilising the data bases
established by the Working Groups.

The third phase was termed the Comprehensive Regional
Assessment process (CRA), an extended series of data collection
exercises and further negotiations and public consultations
expected to be concluded by the end of 1998 which would
finalise the reserve system.

It is the second of these phases, the negotiation process itself,
upon which this study focuses.

The lAP Negotiation

Process

The lAP negotiations were a series of face-to-face negotiations
conducted between the major stakeholders in the conflict over
forest use in New South Wales. Representatives of the following
stakeholders were included:

The Commonwealth Govemment
State Forests of NSW
National Parks and Wildlife Service
NSW Forest Products Association
Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union

Aboriginal Communities
Conservation Groups represented by the Nature Conservation
Councips

The aim of the lAP was to identify those forest areas which
would be set aside for interim protection while they were being
considered for inclusion in a CAR reserve system. The
negotiations would allow stakeholders to participate in the
selection of those parts of State Forests which would be
deferred from logging to fully or partially meet the reservation
targets derived from the Commonwealth-State agreed
conservation criteria.^ ®
Before the negotiations, the targets required under the
consen/ation criteria had been set In terms of hectare areas of
forest types, biodiversity targets, old growth reservation
targets and habitat area reservations for endangered species (so
for example a reservation of 200 ha was set for each breeding
area of the sooty owl species). Forest areas reserved were also
to consider the need for adequate allowance for wood supply
targets to meet existing mill quotas. The stakeholders were
thus set the task of negotiating both conservation and resource
outcomes but within defined parameters.

In order to be able to take account of all these factors RACAC
developed a computer modelling system capable of predicting
the likelihood that a particular forest compartment would need
^^RACAC News, Issue No.3 May 1996.
ISRACAC, Draft Interim Forestry Assessmer)t Report, note 13 above, 3..

to be conserved to meet the reservation targets. This was
quantified in terms of an 'Irrepiaceability Index". Conversely the
importance of a particular forest compartment for a sustainable
wood supply was measured in tenns of a "Wood Sustainability
Index'.i7.
A refinement of this system allowed the data produced to be
used "interactively", in the sense that the satisfaction of the
two indexes could be recalculated each time a decision on a
compartment of forest was made. The system also allowed a
continuous review of the extent to which a conservation or a
resource criteria had been met at any stage in the process.^^
Prior to the negotiations the conservation representatives
consulted with local environmental groups as to forest
compartments they considered should be subject to reservation.
Additionally representatives of the relevant regional
consen/ation groups attended the negotiations when that region
was being examined.^^ This was an important preliminary stage
because the Nature Consen^ation Council (NCC) operated as a
peak body representing some 100 regional organisations and
affiliates. Similarly the NSW Forest Products Association (FPA),
representing small to medium timber industries consulted with
their members on a regional basis 20^ as did the employee

17|d., 12-15.
18|d., 13.
idpersonal comments of Dalian Pugh, Conservation Representative, 3 October
1996.
20personal comments of Col Dorber, FPA, 25 February 1997.

representative the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy
Union (CFMEU).2i

The objective of the negotiation process was to produce
outcomes providing varying levels of satisfaction of
conservation and resource targets.22 This allowed the
government adequate flexibility when it considered adopting the
recommendations made. In the course of negotiations, these
levels were reduced to four conservation/wood supply scenarios
for each of ten regions in eastern NSW. It is crucial to recognise
that these four scenarios were imposed upon the negotiators by
the NSW Government from the outset. The effect of this was to
dictate the whole scope of the negotiations. The negotiators
were never free and unfettered but were always confined to
reach a decision within the parameters set by the government.
The first scenario was based essentially upon achieving as far
as possible the criteria set for the CAR reserve system. This
was the 'preferred conservation option' for the conservation
groups.23 This option was achieved by progressively building up
a deferred forest area using the databases in order to satisfy all
consen^ation targets as far as possible, and minimising where
possible the effect on timber volumes but primarily seeking to
satisify the CAR reserve system.24

The three other scenarios were based upon a 'rollback' or scaling
back of the first scenario to allow for continued logging at
21 Personal comments of Mark Greenhill, CFMEU, 9 April 1997.
22RACAC, op cit., note 13 above, 18.
23Nature Conservation Council, Environment NSW, Autumn 1996, 1.
24RACAC, op cit., note 13 above, 2.

three different levels relative to quota allocations as at July
1995, but calculated with wood supply from identified
wilderness areas excluded.

In summary the four scenarios provided for the following
outcomes:

1. Conservation Criteria Outcome: Meeting the conservation
criteria as fully as practicable.

2. 30% Wood Supply Outcome: Meeting the consen^ation criteria
as fully as possible while preserving wood supply at
approximately 30% of current (July 1995) quota log allocation.

3. 50% Wood Supply Outcome: Meeting the consen^ation criteria
as fully as possible while preserving wood supply at
approximately 50% of current quota log allocation.

4. 70% Wood Supply Outcome: Meeting the conservation criteria
while preserving wood supply at approximately 70% of current
quota log allocation (this corresponded to the Government's
stated policy for a reduction to this level for quotas in
1995/6).25

In some instances the full range of outcomes were not developed
for each region. This was either because the starting point as
disclosed by the database was less than one or more of the yield
25RACAC, Draft Interim Forestry Assessment Report: Summary (1996)
RACAC, Sydney, 1.

outcomes (usually In the case of substantially cleared areas) or
because one or more of the yield outcomes fully satisfied the
full conservation outcome (usually in the case of relatively
uncleared areas).26

The exception to this process was the Eden Management Area
which was subject to separate later negotiations conducted in
November 1997. These negotiation were subject to resolution of
two specific outcome requirements, namely the proposing of
additional national park reserves to produce a maximum 90,000
hectare reserve and the ensuring of the supply of a minimum
sawlog quota of 26,000 cubic metres per year^^. The first
requirement was In order to satisify the Government's electoral
promise and the second to facilitate a proposal for a new
sawmill at Eden.28

Negotiators in the lAP were provided with computer models
showing the location of reserved areas and colour coding of
State Forest compartments according to their Irreplaceability
Index (for instance areas considered totally irreplaceable were
coloured 'dark red'). As the negotiations proceeded,
compartments selected for deferral or deselected to be made
available for logging were identified by a colour change on the
screen to indicate partial fulfillment of a conservation or
resource criterion.29

26|d.. 18.
27|d.
28Nature Conservation Council et al, Forest Parks Couritdown (July/August
1996) NCC, Sydney. 1.
29RACAC. op cit., note 13 aboye, 19.

The negotiation process itself involved tlie following sequence
of events:
1. The negotiations were conducted over a four week period from
23 April 1996.
2. The Eastern Forests of NSW were divided into 11 regions and
approximately two days of negotiations were conducted on each
region.
3. A position statement was made by each of the stakeholders at
the start of negotiations for each new region indicating the
stakeholder's preferred conservation or resource outcomes in
that region.
4. The first step in negotiations on each region involved the use
of the databases' interactive system to make an agreed number
of automatic selection steps to select or deselect forest
compartments based upon consen/ation criteria or resource
outcomes.
5. For the conservation criteria outcomes, these steps were
based upon a combination of features described as:
a. high overall irreplaceability
b. high summed irreplaceability of individual features
c. significant contribution to forest type targets

d. significant contribution of percentage area of old growtli
forest.30

6. For the resource outcomes, these steps were based upon a
combination of features described as:
a

moderate to high timber values

b. low summed irreplaceability of individual timber types
c. low contribution to forest type targets
d. low percentage contribution to old growth forest.

7. The second stage of the negotiations involved the use of the
computer model to make manual selections for the three
rollback scenarios. These scenarios set at timber supply of
approximately 30%, 50% and 70% of 1995 quota allocations and
equated to a decreasing achievement of the conservation
criteria targets. These reductions were achieved by agreed
deselection of forest compartments know to be important for
factors such as continuity of operations, the occurrence of
plantation areas, the extent of regrowth or the existence of
over-reserved forest types,

8. The adapted data was then examined by RACAC to detemriine
whether the selections made were in accordance with the
Commonwealth Proposed Criteria for Reserve design. These
criteria provided for a number of factors to be considered in
formulating reserve options including size, ecological integrity

30|d., 19.
31 Id.

and refugia location but subject to the overriding consideration
tliat,
"where information is limiting, the precautionary principle
should be applied in the form of conservation land use
decisions".32

Ancillary to this negotiation process, social and economic
impact studies were undertaken by the SEWG. However the
results of these studies were not factored into the negotiation
process as "the data obtained was not of a nature that could be
formally considered in determining outcomes."33 j h e studies
conducted were said to be primarily intended to be considered
subsequently by the government when reaching its decision on
RACAC's recommendations for the implementation of the CAR
reserve system.

Two specific studies were undertaken. Firstly a pilot social
impact assessment was undertaken to determine the effect of
the reorganisation of the timber industry on dependent
communities and the mitigative measures necessary to
minimise these effects.^^

Secondly an economic impact analysis to determine the
economic effect of adopting forest reform policy was carried
out. Its preliminary results suggested:

32Quoted Id., 20.
33|d., 18.
34|d.. 33-36.

1. If the reduction in log supply was 30%, most mills would
make Intemal adjustments; there would be limited structural
change and the overall reduction In activity and employment
would be less than 30%.

2. If the reduction in log supply was 50% or higher, substantial
structural change would occur, including mill rationalisations
producing significant loss in employment.^^

It was in anticipation of such economic effects on the
implementation of the CAR reserve system that part of the
Government's Forestry Policy announced in July 1995 was the
Forestry Structural Adjustment Package which provided for $60
million (matched in a similar sum by the Commonwealth
Government) for timber industry restructuring and worker
relocation.

At the end of the negotiation period the outcomes were
considered by RACAC and a draft Interim Assessment Report
was released for public comment in June 1996. The
recommendations within the report are described under the
heading "Consultation" as :

'the result of input from key stakeholders representing a range
of viewpoints and providing a basis for rigorous and transparent
decision-making processes.

35RACAC, Questions and Answers (1996) RAC, Sydney, 3.
3®RACAC, op cit., note 13 above, 38.
37|d.. 8.

Following the release of the report a consultation period was
allowed during which the RACAC visited communities in the
affected areas and sought submissions. This period closed on 11
July 1996 and the final report in essentially the same terms
was then issued to the NSW Govemment for decision.

It is apparent from this summary that while the parties to the
negotiations were able to negotiate over how policy was to be
implemented on a regional basis, the scope of the negotiations
did not extend to the policy contents itself. The parties were
asked to devise four options, not to choose the options, this was
left to an administrative determination.

Implementation of the lAP negotiated outcome

One of the criteria used to measure the effectiveness of any
negotiation process is whether the outcome reached meets with
the approval of all stakeholders. For this reason it is important
to follow the events that occurred after the lAP negotiations to
assess whether the outcome produced met with stakeholder
approval.

Strenuous political lobbying occurred between the submission of
RACAC's report to the NSW government in July 1996 and the NSW
Cabinet decision which provided the final outcome on the issue
on 23 September 1996. In this period the major NGO
stakeholders took up more entrenched positions that was the
case in the negotiation process.

The environmental lobby in the fomn of 12 environmental groups
made a joint submission as the "Forest Parks Countdown" to the
government in the form of a 'Forest Reserve Plan'. The
environmental lobby were now advocating their preferred option
in seeking:

1. A logging moratorium over the areas covered in Scenario One
of the lAP Report (ie rejecting the other 3 options as
inadequate)

2. Immediate declaration of a number of new national paries and
wilderness areas (ie permanently embargoing some of the areas
in scenario one rather than on an interim basis)

3. Rejection of the timber industry's call for 'resource security'
(the Industry had sought guaranteed 5 year wood supply
contracts).

The NCC has estimated that some 22,000 submissions
principally in the form of a letter of support for the 'Forest
Reserve Plan' were lodged with RACAC.^^ In addition, in July
1996 a letter seeking support for the 'Forest Reserve Policy'
was sent to all Members of the NSW Pariiament by this
environmental alliance.^o

^^Nature Conservation Council et al, op cit. note 28 above, 3.
^^Nature Conservation Council, Environment NSW, Winter 1996, 1

40|d.

The industry lobby through its peak body, the Forest Product
Association, made a submission to the government in the form
of "A Sustainable Management Option" seeking:

1. Wood supply quotas set at 70% of 1995 allocations (ie,
scenario 4)

2. Term agreements for renewable 5 year contracts set at a
minimum of 60% of 1995 allocations

3. No wilderness declarations being made without independent
analysis to identify genuine undisturbed old growth forests,
with shortfalls in resource allocations being met from
compartments established as being 'extensively disturbed'.^^

The industry groups engaged political lobbyist and former
politican Peter Anderson to lobby on their behalf.^z The industry
position emphasised the need for immediate 'resource security'
rather than leaving it to be determined in the Comprehensive
Regional Assessment (CRA) to be completed in 1998. The
industry lobby sought eariy provision of the guarantee of
renewable 5 year contracts to mills for wood supplies from
mid-1996. 43

The union lobby through the CFMEU lobbied the NSW Labor
Council to also support scenario four, ie wood supply at 70% of
NSW Forest Products Association, unpublished Briefing Note No.3, 30 July
1996, 3-5.
^^The Australian, 15 May 1996, 29.
43see C Dorber, in Sydney Morning Herald, 21 June 1996, 12.

1995 quota levels. To strengthen their position the union was
claimed to have released to the media the consultant's report
prepared for the SEWG detailing prospective job losses which
made headline news ("Thousands of timber jobs at risk")^^ In
addition, threats to march on Parliament House by unionists
heightened the political pressure.

It can be seen at this lobbying stage that the two major
stakeholder groups were expressing diametrically opposed
views. The conservation lobby sought implementation of the
scenario which equated to full CAR reserve system
implementation. The resource lobby sought implementation of a
reduction of the full CAR reserve system equal to the existing
forest policy position announced in June 1995, that is the 30%
reduction provide for in the Govemment's Forest Policy as a
trade off for the Forestry Structural Adjustment Package. The
CFMEU essentially endorsed the industry position.

The positions of each of the major stakeholders were markedly
different from the breadth of options in the Report. Each had
plainly taken a much more entrenched position. The negotiations
had given the govemment a number of options from which to
choose. The need to choose between different options remained a
matter of political judgement, with such choice influenced by
all the aspects of the political process. This in particular
involved traditional political lobbying, in which the

^^Sydney Morning Herald , 20 July 1996,

stakeholders from the negotiation process now pressed for their
preferred option.
The political process involved the preparation of a
recommendation for Cabinet by its Forestry Subcommittee
comprising the Environment, Planning and Forests Ministers. The
lobbying by all stakeholders was intense before this
recommendation was formed:
'Just a week ago, the Government was set to lock up nearly 70%
of the State's forests in what was regarded as a significant
environmental victory.
Furious lobbying from the timber industry and key Labor unions
have forced the Govemment to retreat, particulariy as it became
clear that many ministers were being persuaded to the industry
cause.
Senior Government sources said the turning point came when a
consensus position was reached by the members of the Cabinet's
forestry subcommittee...'After that, all the lobbying became
irrelevant' one source said."^®
The Govemment's decision was released on 23 September 1996.
It provided for moratorium levels essentially in terms of
scenario two, that is at 30% of 1995 allocations but at the same
time providing for the possibly contradictory provision of term
agreements for renewable 5 year contracts set at 50% of 1995
allocations . This involved setting aside for conservation
45|d., 19 September 1996, 4.

approximately 670,000 hectares of State Forest on an interim
basis with an additional 320,000 hectares permanently reserved
by way of national park or wilderness area creation

The attempt to satisfy both criteria, however, left serious
doubts as to whether the allocations allowed could be filled
from forest compartments outside the moratorium areas. There
was a fundamental contradiction in the decision. It allowed
logging to continue at levels which could not realistically be
met from the reduced wood supplies provided. The policy
decision also provided for community based Harvesting Advisory
Panels to be set up in each of the 11 regions to monitor logging
compliance pending the completion of the Comprehensive
Regional Assessment (CRA) process in 1998.

Following the Government's decision, the major stakeholders
affirmed their committment to the negotiation process but were
highly critical of the outcome announced. The NSW Forest
Products Association, decried the decision in their press
release ("Another win for the Greens"), but concluded:

"The RACAC Interim Forest Assessment Process has been a
valuable lesson for this industry and we have today recommitted
ourselves to working within the Process"^^

Similar qualified support was expressed by the Nature
Conservation Council on behalf of conservation stakeholders:
46|d., 24 September 1996, 4.
47Forest Products Association, Press Release, 23 September 1996.

"the IAP...has been the best process ever applied in Australia for
determining the areas of public forest most likely to be needed
for CAR reserves'.^®

Assessment

of the Effectiveness

in the Impiemetation

of

of Environmental

Negotiation
Poiicy

in the lAP
It should be remembered that it was not the case that
stakeholders to the lAP had agreed upon a settlement in relation
to logging or conserving State Forests and that the government
had then adopted this resolution. The form and scope of the
decision remained at all times with the Government. The
decision making process could be crystalised into the following
sequence:

1. The intergovemmental agreement set the broad parameters of
Forest Policy;
2. A negotiating process was created with the stakeholders
presented with a number of options detailing the
implementation of these broad parameters (ie the lAP);
3. The negotiators were required to select particular areas to be
logged or conserved to satisfy such parameters;
4. A report issued from this process detailing how the criteria
could be met in four possible scenarios;

48Nature Conservation Council, Environment NSW, Winter 1996, 6.

5. A period of political lobbying followed; and
6. A Cabinet decision choosing one of the options and including
qualifications was released by the Government in apparent
resolution of the environmental conflict.

Case Study
The balance of this chapter is concerned with gauging the
effectiveness of the use of negotiation in resolving the
environmental conflict over forest use. The review of
effectiveness is based upon a survey of the main participants
through a series of interviews conducted at the conclusion of
the negotiations.

Case Study Methodology

The purpose of the evaluation project was to assess the success
of the use of negotiation as a dispute resolution method in this
process.

The methodology used in the evaluation project was to
interview the representatives of the three Non Government
Organisations (NGOs) who attended the negotiation sessions
(industry, union and environmental groups) and obtain responses
to a series of evaluation questions.

Rationale for Method

The number of stakeholders in the lAP was small, consisting of
twelve participants plus a chairman. Eight of the twelve were
government representatives, one was a scientific representative
and the remaining three were NGO representatives. The
evaluation was limited to these three NGO representatives. The
small size of this sample was compensated for by the fact that
these representatives were not part of the normal
administrative dispute resolution process and thus could be
expected to show a fresh perspective. Secondly, they had had
first hand experience of the use of negotiation in the lAP in that
they were all the key negotiator for their constitutency.
Additionally, the use of an interview technique allowed for
substantial depth and detail of response. However, because of the
small sample, the analysis of the data is limited to descriptive
comments and a liberal use of quotes to substantiate
observations made.

Format

A semi-structured interview schedule (See Annexure D) was
used to elicit comments on broad issues dealing with the
research questions:
1. Whether the lAP represented an interest-based or positionbased negotiation process
2. Whether the real issues in dispute were subject to
negotiation
3. Whether the process was effective

4. Whether the subsequent government decision reflected the
agreed outcome.

Focus of Inquiry

The focus of the evaluation project was to determine whether
negotiation was used effectively.

There are substantial difficulties involved in defining and
measuring effectiveness and success.

One useful definition of

effectiveness is "the achievement of a certain group's goals'.-^®
Another commonly used yardstick for measuring the
effectiveness of mediation has been agreement rates. This is
not considered an appropriate measurement for negotiation
because the purpose of negotiation may not always be final
agreement.50

Bardow and Gibson provide a number of other

indicators of success. They list five "indices of effectiveness",
agreements rate, client satisfaction, level of compromise,
stability of the mediated agreement and cost savings.si

Choosing and adapting from these to allow for the nature of the
lAP process, this evaluation project focuses on an assessment
of the effectiveness of negotiation as measured by the indices
of:

Y. Wadsworth, Do it Yourself Social Research (1984) Victorian Council of
Social Services, Melbourne, 15.
50 s. Bardow and J. Gibson, Evaluation of the Family Court Mediation Service
(1994) Family Court of Australia Research and Evaluation Unit, Canberra, 76.
51 Id., 76..

* Participant satisfaction
* Level of compromise
* Level of implementation of the negotiated agreement.

Participants
Three stakeholders from the lAP negotiations participated in
the interview process. Each of the participants had been the
stakeholder representative conducting negotiations on behalf of
their constituency and as such had first hand experience of the
negotiation process. Each interview followed the format of the
semi-structured interview schedule with the interviewer
elicting comments on the four issues selected.

The representatives were:

Col Dorber, Executive Director of the NSW Forest Products
Association who was interviewed as the industry
representative.

Dailan Pugh who was interviewed as the non-Government
conservation representative on behalf of the Nature
Conservation Council.

Gavin Millier, NSW Branch Secretary. Construction, Forestry,
Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU) was the union representative on
RACAC but the lAP negotiations were conducted by Mark
Greenhill, a union organiser. He was interviewed as the main
union representative.

Responses
Question 1.
Whether The lAP Represented An Interest-Based
or A Position-Based Negotiation Process
(a) Nature of

Negotiations

For the purposes of this evaluation, the broad concept of
negotiation is understood to be:

"an attempt by parties to reach agreement concerning some
matter in dispute between them.'^a

The Iiterature53 suggests there are essentially two major
strategic approaches to negotiation: position-based and
interest-based.

Position-based negotiation involves positional bargaining in
which each party begins by advocating a single and usually
extreme solution. Agreement can therefore only be reached by
the parties successively conceding to new positions. It is
suggested that in the process of maintaining successive
positions, parties may lose sight of their real objective and any
52 E Clark, The Role of Non-litigious Dispute Resolution Methods in
Environmental Disputes'(1995) 2 The Australasian Journal of Natural Law
and Policy 2 aX S.
Fisher & W Ury, Getting to Yes (1981) Business Books Ltd., London.

agreement reached may not be reflective of the interests of the
parties, this may in turn lead to implementation difficulties.^^

Interest-based negotiation, on the other hand, involves a focus
not on positions but on the underlying interests or needs of the
parties in order to understand why they have adopted a
particular position.ss The rationale for focussing on interests is
said to be that for every stated interest, there may exist
several possible solutions. Therefore it may be feasible to find
one that meets the interests of all parties.^e

Fisher and Ury's model of interest-based negotiation relies upon
four principles:
1. Separate the people from the problem
2. Focus on interests, not positions
3. Generate a variety of options for mutual gain
4. Insist that the results be based upon some objective
criteria.57

Applying these principles, RACAC's framewori< for the
negotiations suggests a negotiation process modelled upon the
principles of interest-based negotiation.

Using data obtained in the interviews, the four principles appear
to be addressed as follows:
54 B Wolski. "The Rde and Umitations of Fisher and Ury's Model of InterestBased Negotiation in Mediations" (1994) Alternative Dispute Resolution
Journal, August 1994, 210 at 211.
55 R Fisher & W Ury, op cit, note 53 above, 11.
56b Wolski, op cit, note 54 above, 211.
57R Fisher & W Ury. op cit, note 53 above. 11-12.

1. Separate the people from the problem.

NGO stakeholders were provided with 'guidelines for behaviour*
prior to the commencement of the negotiation process
emphasising the need to avoid personalising the debate.
Negotiators were told to satisfy other's interests as well as
their own.5®

2. Focus on interests, not positions.

The process provided for each of the stakeholders to make
statements prior to the negotiation sessions on each separate
Forest Area. In this statement they set out their constituency's
needs and interests with respect to that particular area.

3. Generate a variety of options for mutual gain.

Implicit in the negotiation process (and acting as a constraint
upon the negotiations) was the imposition of a range of
scenarios by the New South Wales Govemment, involving
differing levels of satisfaction of each stakeholder's interests.

4. Insist that the results be based upon some objective criteria.

There were comprehensive attempts in terms of the CWG and the
SEWG to provide objective forest and fauna databases, and also
^^RACAC, Guidelines for Negotiations in the Interim Assessment Process,
1996.

data on the social and economic implications of each option
considered. The level of data available was considerable, though
there were doubts expressed by the stakeholders about its
reliability.

In view of the way RACAC sought to address the four principles
of Fisher and Ury's model, it is considered that the use of
interest-based negotiation was encouraged by the process. It is
necessary to review the stakeholders' responses given in the
interviews to determine whether they ,as participants,
considered the process represented interest-based negotiations.

(b) Stakeholders Responses^^

The perception of the industry representative was that the FPA
had entered into the lAP with a "complete sense of cooperation".
At the start of the process, he considered that 'nothing was on
the table". His organisation considered the process was to deal
with the satisfaction of broad forest policy outcomes only. More
specific options based on certain levels of reduction of Wood
Supply Quotas were then provided and the parameters of the
negotiations and subsequent negotiations remained constrained
within these parameters.

Given these constraints, this representative considered that
five weeks of "extremely effective negotiations" involving
59D Pugh, 'Major Findings of 'An Appraisal of the Reliability of State Forests'
Wood Resources Study"(1996) unpublished paper, September 1996, 1.
6^hese summaries are based upon file notes of the interviewees' responses to
the questions in the Interview Schedule, see Appendix D.

"massive horsetrading sessions' then ensued. These sessions
involved 'hard bargaining' which produced an agreed range of
outcomes within the specified parameters for each forest area.
He considered this 'a consensus process', where 'we both had to
give a lot of ground'. He considered the negotiation process
centered upon the problem not the personalities and that the
focus was upon interests. He was not satisfied that the ability
to generate options was given sufficient scope given the
constraints of the four scenarios. These scenarios were
presented to the parties as a fait accompli, forcing them to
work within them. He was satisfied the results were based upon
objective criteria provided by the CWG and the SEWG groups.

The conservation representative from the NCC indicated that
their involvement was influenced by 'a political imperative' set
by the New South Wales Govemment. The Government wished to
implement its Forest Policy which had in part delivered it to
government in 1995.

The conservation representative

considered that the stakeholders could 'either agree on a method
of implementation' or 'have one imposed on them'. They
considered the need to produce an outcome was crucial to their
and the other stakeholders active participation in negotiations.

He considered genuine negotiation took place, "quite tense, quite
hard, quite heated at times". However, he considered that both
industry/union and conservation representatives "thought we
would win in the sense that we would get the outcome we
wanted politically, that is outside the lAP", later on. He
considered this made both sides "more flexible than we might

otherwise have been prepared to be". If this belief had not
existed "the negotiations would have been a lot tougher".
Nevertheless he was of the opinion that if one scenario rather
than four had been negotiated to provide "one outcome over
State Forests" to the government, the Government would have
accepted it without substantial amendment but "it was not
possible to ever get a single agreed criteria".
He also agreed the focus was upon the problem and not
personalities and upon interests and not positions. He agreed to
allow options to develop even though they departed from full
compliance with the conservation criteria. He was not satisified
that the results were always based upon objective criteria. For
instance, he considered one of the objective criteria used (the
Wood Resource Study prepared by State Forests) "grossly overestimated resources".® 1
The union representative from the CFMEU came new to this form
of negotiation. He had had previous good relations with industry,
less experience dealing with Government Departments and a
"very cool" relationship with the conservation movement. He
considered that the negotiation process was marked by " a lot of
theatrics eariy on" and "lots of stunts". He was of the opinion
that what happened "at the time looked like real negotiation but
in fact it wasn't". The representative always expected the
RACAC report issued following the negotiations would not be

Pugh, op cit., note 58 above, 1.

accepted as the basis for a final decision.

He was of the view

that negotiations would continue 'on a political level". In fact he
reported that there were a series of concurrent lobbying
sessions which paralleled the negotiation process. He said this
was well known to the other participants. When stalemates
arose, the union representative reported that he would routinely
say 'all this will be sorted out politically later on".

The tenor of his comments did not suggest that he considered
true interest-based negotiation was taking place in the lAP.

Question 2.
Whether the Real Issues in Dispute were Subject
to

Negotiation

(a) Real Matters at Issue
The stakeholders were asked to evaluate the extent to which the
real issues as perceived by them were addressed in the
negotiation process. For the industry and union representatives,
the real matters at issue were the need to maintain the
viability of the forest industry. Their aims were closely allied,
being to minimise as far as possible the effect on the industry
and forest workers of any reduction in supply quotas. The
conservationist considered the real matters at issue were the
need to preserve, initially temporarily but in the long term
pemnanently, as many high consen/ation value forest areas as
possible.

(b) Stakeholder

Responses

The real Issue for the industry representative was the likely
impact on forestry industries' quotas due to reduction of wood
supply.

Industry sources wished to negate or minimise any

reduction in wood supply quotas. But the representative
considered a proper airing of this issue was constrained by the
negotiation parameters set:
"We wanted to see economic and social impact assessment at
10% increments of reduction of 1995/96 wood supply quotas.
(We were) told (this) couldn't be done by the consultants, so
then (the options were) reduced to 30-50-70% levels."
These reduction options then became the only options discussed.
The effect of this was that discussion of the real issues
("maintenance of a viable timber industry") as far as the
industry representative was concerned, was subject to an
imposed constraint.
The conservation representative considered that the New South
Wales government had indicated there was a need to produce "an
outcome over State Forests" and by his involvement the
representative sought to produce an outcome which was
acceptable to his constituency. His aim was 'to achieve the full
consen/ation outcome as far as was possible."
Realistically, he also "expected that Resource Security would be
given" but he hoped to achieve conditions in logging licenses

which could be monitored by conservationists. However, he
considered that the Imposition of the four scenarios "served
another purpose". It locked the stakeholders Into giving the
government a breadth of options through which It could produce
an outcome which departed significantly from the real issues
negotiated by the stakeholders.

There was an acceptance by the conservation representative
that the real Issues under negotiation were not the specifics of
government forestry policy since this had already been
politically determined but its "Implementation In specific
forest areas." The negotiation process gave the opportunity to
the stakeholders to "agree on a method of implementation only".
This level of consultation not been granted In other States, such
as Victoria and Western Australia, "where there was no NGO
consultation."

The real Issue so far as the union representative was concemed
was the maintenance of adequate resource security to protect
Its members' jobs. The unions had consented to a prior
government decision to reduce the resource allocation to 70% of
pre-1995 quotas. The union representative wished to prevent
any Increase on this agreed 30% reduction. Equally Important, he
wished to see a corresponding land base (le wood supply) being
guaranteed to avoid the situation of quotas being set at 70% and
yet Inadequate supply being available to fill the quotas. Like the
other stakeholders, the union representative was not content
with the four scenarios set, but considered "we had no choice on
these stages."

These 'real issues' from the union representative's perspective
were the subject of negotiation, however he shared the view of
the conservation representative that the negotiation process
would not be conclusive of the outcome: "I said, all this will be
sorted out politically later on." As indicated previously, with
this in mind the unions maintained "lots of meetings
concurrent(ly)" to lobby the NSW Labor Council and government
members.

Questions.
Whether the Process was Effective
(a) Measures of Effectiveness
The stakeholders were asked to evaluate the effectiveness of
the negotiation process. The indices of effectiveness used were
participant satisfaction, level of compromise reached and level
of implementation achieved. The participants interviewed were
asked to consider whether the negotiations were effective In
terms of each of these indices.

(b)Stakeholder
Participant

Responses

Satisfaction

On the basis of the interview data, all of the stakeholders
considered the process effective in terms of the indicia of
participant

satisfaction.

The industry representative's view was tliat the process was
successful, 'it assisted us in develop(ing) an understanding of
each other's positions', 'we learned to work together without
personalising the debate' and 'we felt that if left to our own
devices we could (have) come up with an agreed position".

Similarly, the conservation representative considered the
process successful in terms of the indicia of participant
satisfaction, considering that the "dynamics of the
negotiations' were good, "lots of good feeling, (it) has improved
communications, (we) understood where (the) other party (was)
coming from." He was less concerned with effectiveness
measured in this sense, since he considered success in terms of
outcomes a more important measure of effectiveness.

The union representative had 'never done this form of
negotiation before' and remained sceptical of the process and
less forthcoming than the other stakeholders in assessing the
process as effective in terms of participant satisfaction. He
considered it more in the context of 'groundwork for the
political lobbying later on.' He conceded:

'the other representatives- conservation and industry- were
more enamoured with the processs, but I knew that there had
been tactics, such as media leaks throughout the process, and I
knew this would escalate after the interim decision and before
the Cabinet decision.'

Level of Compromise

Using the indicia of level of compromise, the industry
representative evaluated the process as effective: 'we agreed on
a range of outcomes which took into account the resolving in
each area of the specific environmental dispute.' This
represented 'a consensus process- we both had to give a lot of
ground.'

As regards the indicia of level of compromise, the conservation
representative considered there had been a high level of
compromise but that this was essentially artificial, since each
party believed that compromises made could be abandoned or
modified in the subsequent political lobbying period. For
instance, the conservation representatives considered their
unique form of strong grass roots political lobbying ('16,000 of
the 20,000 subsequent public submissions were from
conservation groups') would win the day for them in the end.

In this sense, the level of compromise reached was not an
accurate measure of the effectiveness of the process because
the compromise reached was not truly genuine. Compromises
made were not subsequently adhered to. The conservation
representative conceded:

'In the political phase our focus changed, (we were seeking)
moratorium areas, opposing Resource Security, (seeking)
declaration of National Paries now.'

This approach to the negotiation process on the part of the
conservation representative exhibited a political pragmatism
which was not apparent in the industry representative. The
industry representative admitted in this regard that his
"constituency thought me politically naive" in the level of
compromise to which he committed them during the process.
As regards the indicia of effectiveness in terms of level of
compromise, the union representative considered the
compromise evident in the process was artifical. Though "at
times it looked like real negotiation" the outcome when finally
announced by the government did not reflect the arguments or
compromises reached. He was in no doubt that the negotiated
agreement represented by "the RACAC report wouldn't be
accepted". Again, he considered (rightly so) that the real
solution would be one "sorted out politically later on."
Level of Implementation
In terms of the indicia of level of implementation, no single
negotiated agreement was reached. A range of options for
implementing government policy was presented to the relevant
administrative authority for consideration. The industry
representative's view was that:
"RACAC was presented as a body which would take the results of
the negotiations and incorporate the(se) in one comprehensive
recommendation to government, not as four scenarios."

His view was that "RACAC had failed to present a solution to
government", so in terms of a durable agreement the negotiation
process was a failure. He concluded that "the process was a
success, the outcome was a failure."

In terms of the indicia of producing an agreed outcome, the
conservation representative considered the process effective.
Specifically, he believed that "getting an agreed data base was a
big achievement..the biggest success" and that this had been
"generally achieved, with some disagreement." Further, he
considered that the agreed outcome was effective in that the
"majority of high conservation areas (were) identified as
moratorium areas."

As to whether the process was effective in terms of the level of
implementation, his comments are again indicative of a
political

pragmatism:

"I think it was not possible to produce an outcome everyone
would be happy with, because there is just not enough resource
to satisify both interests, (there is) not enough room there for
compromise (given) the size of the resource."
Nevertheless, he expressed the global view about the
effectiveness of the process, "I think it is an ideal process."

The union representative's view was markedly different. He
considered the outcome was a product primarily of the lobbying
process and not of the negotiations in any significant sense.

Question 4.
Whether the Subsequent Government Decision
Reflected the Agreed Outcome.
(a) The Government Decision

The negotiation process did not produce an agreed compronfiise
resolution which could be then implemented. It operated only as
an advisory process to assist in an administrative dispute
resolution.

The Government decision released on 23 September 1996 did not
duplicate any of the four scenarios. Rather it reflected an
attempt to placate all interests. It provided for a moratorium
from logging, pending the CRA process, equivalent to 30% of July
1995 log quota allocations. There was thus substantially less
areas available for logging, this was seen as a 'win' for
conservationist interests. It also provided for resource security
by the grant of renewable 5 year log supply agreements to
sawmills set at 50% of 1995 allocations. As these benchmark
allocations were commonly regarded as grossly excessive this
was seen as a 'win' for industry and union interests. However,
the decision in attempting to produce a 'win-win' solution in
fact left the conflict unresolved. Since by quarantining large
areas of State Forest from logging, (ie., leaving only 30% of the
supply source previously available), the effect would be that
loggers would be either forced to virtually denude approved
areas of all timber or alternatively push for permission to enter

forests under moratorium in order to fully exploit the logging
quotas allowed (ie., 50% of previous log numbers).

(b)Stakeholder

Responses

The industry representative's view was that the Government
decision did not reflect the negotiated outcome. The Cabinet
Subcommittee produced "a political solution unrelated to our
negotiated settlement.' The Cabinet decision was "a
hotchpotch", while it allowed logging at 50% 1995/96 supply
levels (scenario three), it did not then provide the corresponding
resource required to achieve the supply permitted

He called it a 'bastardisation of a mediation process, a
deliberate act of political cunning." He considered it did not
reflect any of the agreed outcomes and did not provide the
resource base necessary for "the maintenance of a viable timber
industry."

The conservation representative was also firmly of the view
that the subsequent govemment decision did not reflect the
agreed outcome. He considered giving resource security at levels
above the wood supply permitted, ensured that "inevitably there
will be a need to log into moratorium areas to achieve the
quotas." The result of this in his view was that "the political
outcome, attempting to placate both sides, has not resolved the
conflict over the limited resource."

He expressed some confidence that the ongoing CRA process
might remedy this deficiency but considered that to date "the
political decision pre-empted the process" and thereby robbed it
of much of its effectiveness.

For the union representative, the government decision also did
not reflect the agreed outcome but this was never expected. For
him, particularly as a Labor government was in power, the real
resolution of the conflict was always going to be one brought
about by political persuasion.

He outlined a concerted political campaign after the RACAC
report was presented to the Cabinet subcommittee. There was
"lots of political pressure at State Conference to have the ALP
embrace the union post-lAP position" which was 60% of 1995
quotas with resource security. The union lobby presented a "very
strong hardline position..lots of media, lots of party lobbying,
then lobbying of parliamentary committees." This mounted in the
last two weeks prior to the Cabinet decision to a team of
unionists lobbying each member of Cabinet individually.

The union lobby used the socio-economic reports on the effects
of logging reductions to create concern, particularly amongst
politicans in marginal seats centred on timber towns
("Thousands of timber jobs at risk"®^). The Labor Council of NSW
lobbied parliamentary members on a factional basis to support
adoption of the union post-lAP position.

^^Sydney Morning Herald, 20 July 1996, note 44 above, 1

The political pressure was further escalated in the final week
before the Cabinet decision was due. "Lots of media, (an)
editorial in the Sydney Morning Heralcfi^ , press conferences,
picket lines on the Wilderness Society in three States..a big
political exercise." He said that, at the eleventh hour, the unions
were:

•contacted by a Carr staffer who said 'what do you really want?
Would 60% and Resource Security do?'
We said 'Yes, but we must have a corresponding land mass' and
that's essentially what the decision of 23 September 1996 was."

Given that he considered political lobbying won the day, it was
his view that the level of implementation of the negotiated
outcome achieved was minimal.

Conclusions
Using this analysis of the interview data, it is possible to draw
some conclusions about the effectiveness of the use of
negotiation in the lAP process.

These conclusions can be summarised as follows:

63-Division on forests" Sydney Morning Herald, 17 September 1996 which
concludes the promises now being made to the industry are modest and the
demands of the conservationists unreasonable."

Interest-based

negotiation

rather

than

position-based

negotiation toolc place

The focus of all the stakeholders was on the underlying
interests of their constituency: respectively timber industries,
conservationists and timber workers. The negotiation were
identified as non-personalised. While there was eventually a
focus on positions (resource security for industry and union and
full conservation criteria for conservationists), this was after
the negotiation process had concluded. A variety of options were
generated but these were essentially preordained by RACAC and
not of the stakeholders' choosing. However, it seems apparent
that no agreed recommendation would have been reached without
some artificial framework being imposed. It is concluded that
the negotiations exhibited the key features of interest-based
negotiation.

Negotiation was used In an Integrative form In the
administrative

mechanism of dispute

resolution

The administrative mechanism for resolving the environmental
conflict was resolution by a sub-committee of the NSW Labor
Cabinet to which RACAC reported following the negotiation
process. Negotiation was integtated into this administrative
mechanism.

The negotiation process did not produce an agreed
outcome which was implemented

The negotiated outcome was not a single recommendation. The
range of options would always be subject to selection and
modification by the administrative mechanism. The role of the
negotiation process was an thus advisory or consultative one
not a dispute resolution one.

The negotiation were perceived by the stalceholders as
artificial

There were two reasons for this. Firstly, no matter how
successful the negotiations were in reaching an agreed outcome,
it was always subject to approval by the administrative
decision maker. Secondly,the stakeholders, especially the union
representative, were always confident that traditional methods
of influencing an administrative decision maker outside the
negotiation process (lobbying, media attention etc.) would
always succeed over any carefully negotiated outcome. This
confidence was bome out by the resolution imposed.

The negotiation process was considered effective as
measured by the indicia of participant

satisfaction

The two stakeholders who had been in the most confrontationist
relationship prior to the negotiation process (industry and
conservationists) considered the process had tended to
normalise relationships and improved communications. By this
measure, it was considered a success.

The negotiation

process was considered effective as

measured by the indicia of ievei of compromise reached

Both the industry and conservationist representative considered
substantiai compromise occurred, the union representative iess
so. The compromise perceived was that the implementation of
government policy in terms of consen/ation and resource
criteria was agreed on an area by area basis. This required a
balance of the stakeholders' competing needs and interests.
iHowever, the level of compromise reached was not such as to
permit one single agreed outcome being recommended to the
administrative decision maimer.

The negotiation process was not considered
as measured by the indicia of level of
of the negotiated

effective

Implementation

outcome

No single negotiated outcome was ever attempted nor envisaged
at the start of the process. The implementation of the
negotiated agreement was never likely. Therefore in terms of
the level of implementation, the negotiations were not a
success.

The negotiated outcome was not reflected by the
subsequent

administrative

decision

The Cabinet decision reached on the recommendation of its
subcommittee was much more a product of the traditional
political system of influencing administrative decision-making,

than of the negotiation process. Knowing this, following the
negotiations, the stakeholders returned to their position based
approach and influenced the outcome much more effectively
politically. This was particularly so in the case of the union
representative, who saw the negotiation process as preparatory
only to traditional position-based negotiations.

Interest-based
subsidiary,

roie

negotiation

piayed

in the dispute

a significant,

resoiution

but

process

The negotiation process was always an advisory or consultative
vehicle for public participation. It was never guaranteed the
role of producing an agreed outcome. Its role remained a
subsidiary one throughout.
The

interest-based

the

environmental

negotiation

process

did

not

soive

confiict

The negotiation process contributed only to a solution reached
administratively. Whether the outcome can be said to represent
a solution of the environmental conflict over native forests
remains to be seen.

In summation, the hypothesis proposed was confimned in a
number of respects. The forestry debate was identified as an
environmental conflict. The ADR method of interest-based
negotiation was seen to be used in the form of an integrative
model. Surprisingly, and contrary to expectations, the use of

CHAPTER TEN
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
Introduction
This research sought to critically examine the use of ADR
methods in resolving environmental controversies. A system of
classifying environmental controversies based primarily upon
three key characteristics was developed. Controversies were
classified in this way and placed along a continuum ranging
from environmental disputes to environmental conflicts. This
method of classification made it possible to systematically
examine the use of ADR methods along the continuum. A case
study method was used and the results of both case studies have
been presented in detail.

Conclusions
The results of the two case studies show that ADR methods can
have an effective role in the resolution of environmental
controversies. Achieving the full potential of ADR methods in
the resolution of environmental controversies is hindered by a
number of constraints. Some of these constraints are based upon
misconceptions. It is argued that property addressed these
concerns can be overcome with a view to the wider adoption of
ADR methods.

The conclusions reached are summarised as follows:

The effectiveness of ADR methods in environmental
disputes
When mediation was used to resolve environmental disputes in
the Land and Environment Court of NSW it was highly effective,
but under-utilised, it may be that the system is operating at the
optimum level, with non-mediated disputes being unsuitable for
mediation and appropriately subject to due process in the Court.
Alternatively, the lack of effective measures to encourage
reluctant parties, particularly government respondents, to
participate may be more the explanation for under-utilisation.

The case study provided no data to determine which of these
two explanations is correct. It was suggested that a checklist
for gauging the suitability of environmental disputes for
mediation and a Mediation Report for reporting the results of
successful mediations be devised. These guides would be
suitable for circulation to local government bodies and other
parties with a view to encouraging participation to develop.

It is further suggested that the requirements that participation
in mediation be voluntary and the process be confidential be
reviewed. These suggestions are discussed below.

The effectiveness of ADR methods in environmentai
confiicts

Environmental conflicts are predominantly the subject of
administrative resolution. The use of ADR mechanisms as part
of the resolution of these conflicts can be accommodated
provided it does not involve the delegation of decision-making
power. The role of ADR methods in the resolution of
environmental conflicts has developed in an integrative role in
these administrative mechanisms

It is suggested that this is the proper role of ADR methods in
environmental conflicts. Within this context, the use of ADR
methods should allow the stakeholders to reach an agreement on
a resolution to be presented to govemment and endorsed.
Provided the requirements of voluntarism and confidentiality
are relaxed, it is considered there are adequate safeguards that
can be imposed to ensure effective protection of the public
interest.

There needs to be a realistic understanding of the limitations of
the role of ADR methods in administrative processes. Both the
process and the resolution are subject to political constraints
and some environmental conflicts will not be suitable for ADR
methods and should be left to existing mechanisms.

The effectiveness of ADR methods along the continuum
between

disputes and conflicts

The hypotheses set predicted that ADR methods would be
effective in resolving environmental controversies in the
environmental dispute half of the continuum but essentially
ineffective for controversies in the environmental conflict half
of the continuum.

These predictions were not fully borne out by the research. The
case study on the Land and Environment Court's Mediation
Scheme tended to confirm the expectation. The Scheme
successfully mediated what were tentatively concluded to be
environmental disputes. But the case study on the Interim
Assessment Process confounded the expectation. The forest
conflict which could be more confidently classified as an
environmental conflict was also amenable to solution using ADR
methods.

Without overstating the empirical basis for this research, these
findings suggest that ADR methods have a potential role in
environmental controversies along the whole of the continuum.

Discussion
Constraints on the use of ADR methods in environmental
controversies

From the review of the literature on the theory and practice of
ADR methods in environmental controversies in the United
States and in Australia, it appears that there are a number of
critical factors that are restricting the wider application of
ADR methods in resolving environmental controversies. The
review of the practice has shown that in Australia the approach
to ADR methods is still one of considerable caution. Wider
implementation of these methods is constrained by these
critical factors. These constraints are critically examined here.

The constraints on expanded implementation have been
identified in the literature reviews as concerns about:

*The need for confidentiality
*The requirement of voluntariness
*The politics of environmental conflict resolution
*The need to protect the public interest

The results of this research challenge whether these
constraints are real or artificial. It is suggested that they can
be accommodated to allow for wider adoption of ADR methods,
if these methods are have the opportunity to fulfil their earlier
promise.

The

need for

confidentiality

One of tiie constraints on allowing the role of ADR methods to
expand is the perception that a requirement of all ADR
processes is a need to maintain strict confidentiality.
This is viewed as an impediment to participation, particularly
in the case of environmental conflicts. Solving the conflict in
the public eye is seen by some parties as a necessary
prerequisite for gaining the support of the community.
Additionally, confidentiality is viewed as conflicting with other
important values such as the transparency of decision making
and the community's 'right to know'.

It is suggested that since in the case of traditional adjudication
and administrative dispute resolution methods, confidentiality
is not normally a requirement, ADR processes should also be
free of this constraint on the transparency of the process.
Putting aside the question as to whether adjudicative and
administrative methods are in fact transparent, we should
consider whether the requirement of confidentiality in ADR
processes, particularly with respect to mediation, is essential
in the case of environmental controversies. If it is not, there is
no reason why the requirement cannot be abandoned or at least
significantly

relaxed.

Firstly, the requirement for confidentiality as to the result and
to matters arising in the process is usually only of significance

after an abortive mediation or negotiation. If tlie process is
successful in producing an agreed outcome, confidentiality in
most cases is really no longer an issue. This being so, the
commitment to confidentiality given at the outset could be
modified to allow for publication of the result or the subject
matter of any successful outcome.

If this relaxation is conceded, it leaves only the question of the
necessity for confidentiality where the process is abortive. This
abortive result need not, and in practical terms probably cannot
be, confidential as it will be apparent from the need to take
further dispute resolution steps that ADR methods did not work.
This leaves open the question as to whether the process itself
should, in terms for instance of allowing attendance by the
general public or by interested parties, be made open. The usual
response is to deny attendance, on the presumption that in order
for the flexibility necessary for ADR methods to work the
parties must be allowed to participate in the process frankly
and freely. Critics assert the parties should be free to reveal
confidential information, to concede weaknesses in their case
and to make and receive concessions different from their
avowed positions or interests if mediation is to be allowed its
full scope. If this was done in an open or semi-open arena, it is
asserted, the necessary frankness or forthrightness would
substantially

disappear.

This concern is not borne out by the experience in the two case
studies. In the Mediation Scheme of the Land and Environment
Court, known objectors were invited to attend the mediation

process J In the RACAC negotiations, regional organisations
were free to attend, and did attend, the negotiations when
particular forest compartments were the subject of discussion.2
The reason this relaxation was possible was that not all of the
mediation or negotiation processes required confidentiality. An
essential feature of the process of mediation, for instance, is
the private caucusing that takes place between the mediator and
the respective parties. It is here that the mediator is made
privy to confidences of strengths and weaknesses and potential
degrees of compromise that do require confidentiality. It may be
sufficient for the purposes of effective mediation if the
confidentality is confined to these sessions alone. If the nonnecessity of confidentiality in other instances is conceded, a
number of advantages could arise.
Firstly, if the result of the mediation or negotiation can be
reported ( as was the case of the RACAC proceedings) a number
of positive benefits may accrue. Outcomes achieved by ADR
methods have no value as precedent, but they may have value in
terms of convincing other disputants of the effectiveness of the
process aor in enticing participation by other parties or
stakeholders in similar controversies.
In the case of the Land and Environment Court, a solved matter
is returned to the Court to deal with to finality by way of
consent orders. The fact of the mediation and its success is
1D Rollison, Deputy Registrar LEC, personal communication, 20 June 1996.
2D Pugh, NCC, personal communication, 3 October 1996.

recorded and it forms part of a published list of statistics
concerning the efficacy of the mediation scheme. But nothing
further is published. There is no reporting device through which
the success might be circulated because there is no decision
summary device on the file in which a result can be reported.
This is considered a serious deficiency. As outlined in the case
study, the scheme is effective, but seriously under-utilised. An
effective reporting system documenting the success of the
scheme might induce further participation, particularly by
reluctant government respondents.^

Secondly, if the requirement for confidentiality remained in
place for caucasing sessions and private negotiation sessions,
the concern about confidences being revealed could be allayed.
The necessary confidentiality could still be balanced with the
need for transparency and one major reason for the reluctance
to use ADR processes, particularly among environmental groups,
would be removed.

The requirement of voluntariness

A further constraint on the effective use of ADR methods is the
perception that these methods should only be used when they are
entered into voluntarily and that participation should never be
mandatory. The effect of this is that, whilesoever their use is
optional, wider implementation remains unlikely.

3With this in mind a draft of a suitable mediation summary reporting form has
been prepared, see Appendix E

The insistence upon ADR processes remaining voluntary fails to
take account of the role ADR methods perform in environmental
controversies. A common assumption is that environmental
controversies are resolved adjudicatively and that therefore the
proper role for ADR methods is court-annexed.

There are two flaws in this reasoning. Firstly, as the answer to
the first research question shows, environmental controversies
in New South Wales are resolved almost exclusively by
administrative mechanisms in various guises. They are not
primarily resolved by adjudication. Secondly, as the review of
practice generally and the case studies specifically shows,
when ADR methods are used it is in an adjunctive, not an
alternative, role. So it is not correct to assert that if
controversies are compulsorily referred to mediation, the
parties have been forced into an altemative mechanism not of
their own choosing. Their compulsory participation is still in
the administrative form of dispute resolution wherein the final
resolution will be made.

This is borne out by the comments of one of the stakeholders in
the RACAC negotiation, the subject of the second case study. It
was made clear to the parties that if they did not participate in
the process and endeavour to reach agreement, a solution ( of
which they may not have approved) would be made
administratively.-^ There was a strong element of compulsion,
but this did not affect the quality of their participation. It was

4d Pugh, personal communication, 9 April 1997.

not essential for the effectiveness of the process for their
participation to be wholly voluntary.

Based on this example, a cogent argument can be made that the
requirement of voluntariness is unnecessary and that
consideration should be given to removing it. If it was removed
or modified the use of ADR methods could be increased
substantially.

This argument is given impetus when the concept of voluntarism
itself is analysed more closely. Boulle concluded from his
analysis of the concept that "although the ideology of
voluntarism is an important element in the promotion and
marketing of mediation, it cannot be taken at face value".^
Participation is seldom strictly voluntary since there are subtle
pressures compelling involvement. The increased participation
that may flow would have the effect of removing many of the
misconceptions and suspicions now constraining the use of ADR
methods.

The Politics of Environmentai Confiict

Resolution

Wider political considerations arise when dealing with the
solution of environmental conflicts. Environmental conflicts are
by their nature political, involving as they do a struggle
between stakeholders with competing interests, needs and goals
5L Boulle, Mediation: Principles, Process, Practice (1996) Butterworths,
Sydney, 17.

attempting to influence the dispute resolution process. This is
well illustrated by the RACAC case study where the "political
mechanisms' both in the traditional forms of lobbying and nontraditional forms of direct action and media campaigns were
used by all parties in parallel with the negotiation process.

If the premise that environmental conflict resolution is a
political process is accepted, then the reluctance to participate
in ADR processes because they are also political processes
(involving the usual imbalances of power and resources) is
difficult to understand. If the ADR processes are just as
politically charged as the usual administrative mechanism of
environmental dispute resolution, then the reluctance loses
much of its validity.

It follows that if ADR processes are seen as an integral part of
an administrative dispute resolution mechanism, which itself is
political, then there needs to be an acceptance that the ADR
process will also be politicised. Participants need to be aware
of the usual features of a political environment such as power
struggles, power imbalances, distributional questions and
irreconcilible value positions. Once the participants concede
that they are involved in a political process already, much of the
basis of the concern disappears and the parties can enter into
the ADR process without any illusions.

One of the criticisms of ADR is that it gives to parties the
illusion of power. This is not strictly correct. While the process
gives the appearance of significant and widespread

participation, the administrative mechanism retains at all
times the essential policy-making power.

The RACAC case study is an example of this reality. The final
power to resolve the environmental conflict over forest use
remained at all times with the NSW Government. The parties
knew this, and knew that the solution of the conflict would have
devolved to the government if they did not participate in the
ADR process. The parties' protection was this political realism.

Is it enough though to recognise the political features of the
ADR process? The criticism of opponents of ADR methods is that
this is not enough. They say that in environmental conflicts the
political constraints make participation itself a needless waste
of scarce resources and energy. They argue that there can be no
meaningful participation in a process where one party actually
retains decisive power. The best response to this is that any
non-ADR form of stakeholder participation in the administrative
dispute resolution mechanism can be equally as illusory.

During the lobbying stage after the RACAC negotiation process,
each of the three NGO participants sought to Ilex their political
muscle.' The aim of each was the same, namely to influence the
Cabinet decision, though their methods were different. The
environmental groups sought to give the impression that public
consciousness had been raised to a level of urgency and crisis
and that the government would ignore this shift in public
opinion at its electoral peril. The union and industry groups
similarly sought by more traditional lobbying to persuade

parliamentarians that electoral risk would flow from ignoring
their constituencies' demands. Yet, even in this stage of "using
the political mechanism", it still remained a matter of
attempting to influence ultimate dispute resolution power.
There was never any realistic expectation in the stakeholders
that they were exercising that power themselves.
In this respect the political mechanism is just as much subject
to the constraints of politics as ADR processes are. If there is
an illusion of power, it exists in both processes.

The constraints of environmental politics are very real, but the
effect should not be to exclude the use of ADR methods. As the
RACAC case study has shown, ADR methods can play a useful and
significant role.

The need to protect the public interest
A further constraint on the use of ADR methods is the
perception that these processes do not provide an adequate
protection for the public interest and therefore should not be
used.
This is no such problem in the case of environmental disputes
where the public interest usually remains essentially dormant,
and if it is aroused there is a local council to represent it. In
the Mediation Scheme case study, the situation was addressed,
if it arose, by enabling interested objectors to attend the
mediation and allowing them a voice. There was also the

additional protection potentially available in the Court's
overseeing role to reject mediated solutions if these were seen
as contrary to the public interest.

But where the public interest is an activated element in a
conflict, consideration needs to be given to whether the public
interest can be satisfactorily protected in ADR processes.

This concern again raises an issue of visibility. Mediation, and
to a lesser extent negotiation, are normally private and
invisible. There is not usually the opportunity to see how the
public interest is treated. But as the RACAC case study shows
this can be addressed by imposing a requirement that specified
information about the process and the nature of any resolution
reached be publicly available and subject to public comment and
review.

This is well short of the visibility that adjudication allows, but
as noted adjudication is not the mechanism by which most
environmental controversies are resolved. Usually the resolution
is administratively reached, by Ministerial or Cabinet decision
or by bureaucrats theoretically accountable to the public
through their Minister. The proper comparison is thus between
the visibility and the protection of the public interest available
in ADR processes and in administrative decision making
processes. It is a question of comparing the adequacy of the
participation opportunities available in each mechanism to
monitor the protection of the public interest.

The concern expressed about ADR processes is that the parties
may reach an agreement which satisfies their competing private
Interests but at the expense of the wider public interest. In the
case of environmental conflicts however, this is largely an
illusory concern. Whilst it is theoretically possible for the
stakeholders to have delegated to them decision-making power,
it is extremely unlikely that the administrator would do. The
mediation or negotiation will remain part of the deliberative
process only and the decision-making function will not be
abdicated. Therefore if the public interest is neglected in this
situation, it is not the fault of ADR methods.

In fact, ADR processes may allow for a real improvement in the
quality and scope of participation in environmental conflict
resolution. The improved opportunities for input that arise may
increase the participants' ability to have a voice in protecting
the public interest. ADR processes allow for the implementation
of innovative solutions formulated by the stakeholders
themselves. They therefore have the capacity to ensure
administrators adequately address questions of public interest
in their decisions. In this sense, ADR methods may simply be a
more effective form of public participation. Nonetheless, their
role can be a significant one.
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Appendix A
MEDIATION IN THE LAND AND ENVIRONMENT COURT
The Young Lav^yer's Environmental Law Committee is monitoring the effectiveness of
mediation in the Land and Environment Court.
In an attempt to look at this issue in more detail the group requests that you give us 5 minutes of
your time to complete the questionnaire set out below.
We thank you for your assistance. (Please tick the appropriate box.)
OLTESTION I
Do you consider the outcome of your mediation successful'^
(Whether or not it proceeded to a hearing)
[

]

Yes

[

]

No

QUESTION 2 (a)
If you ansv^ered YES to Question 1 then, which of the following factors do you consider
added to the success'^' (Please tick as appropriate and as many as you wish.)
]
]
]
]
]

skill of the mediator
narrowing of the issues
total resolution/settlement of the dispute
partial resolution of the dispute
less formal procedure

]

a better understanding by you of the other parties position/ needs

QUESTION 2 (b)
Do you consider any other factors contributed to the success of your mediation"^
Please give details below.
QUESTION 2 (c)
How many mediation sessions were required to reach settlement and hovy long was the
total time spent in mediation sessions'^
Number of sessions
Total time spent
Period of time between first
and final sessions (if more than one)

=
=
=

QUESTION 3 (a)
If your answer to I was NO ie you did not think your mediation was successful:
(a)

How far towards resolution did you gef^
Nowhere at all
Partial resolution
Narrowing of the issues
A better understanding of the other parties resolution
Other (please specify )

QUESTION 3 rb)
(b)

Can you give a reason why?

QUESTION 3 (c)
Can you suggest any improvements to the present system?
QUESTION 4
Do you consider that the legal costs of your application were lower than they would have
been if the matter had gone to a full hearing?
[
[

]
]

Yes
About the same

[
[

]
]

No
Higher

[

]

No

QUESTION 5(a)
Do you consider that the other party to the mediation:
(a)
Had the authority to settle the matter?
[

]

Yes

QUESTION 6 (a)
Did you experience any difficulties with;
(i)
Arranging a suitable time for the mediation to take place?
[ ]
Yes
[ ]
No
(ii)
Having the other party agree to participate in the mediation?
[ ]
Yes
[ ]
No
(iii)
If you are a Lawyer, convincing your client to participate in the mediation?
[ ]
Yes
[ ]
No
QUESTION 6 rb)
How would you do things differently to overcome these problems?
QUESTION 6 Tc)
How long after you filed your Application with the Court did you go to the first call-over?
Days/ weeks/ months
QUESTION 6 (d)
Was your matter set down for mediation at the first call-over?
[ ]
Yes

[

]

No

QUESTION 6 (e)
Why was your matter not referred to mediation at the first call-over?
QUESTION 6 ( f )
How long was it between the date of the call-over and the date of the mediation?
^Days/weeks/months

QUESTION 6 (g)
If this matter was originally set down for hearing, how many days was it set down for'?'
^Days
QUESTION 7 fa)
Did you (and your client, if appropriate) understand that mediation remains a voluntaryprocess at all times, and that a party may pull out of the process at any stage"^
[ ]
Yes ^
[ ]'
No
QUESTION 7 (b)
Do you feel that you received adequate information from the Court about mediation before
you had to decide to take this option'^
[

]

Yes

[

]

No

QUESTION 8
In your opinion, is it likely that this matter would have settled sometime before the
hearing even without the mediation process'!'
[ ]
Yes
[ ]
No
QUESTION 9 (a)
Do you think that the current recession has influenced;
(a)
You or your clients decision to agree to mediation''
[ ]
Yes

[

]

No

QUESTION 9 (b)
The amount of pressure the parties felt to achieve a cheaper and/or quicker resolution to
their dispute than is offered by a normal hearing'^
[

]

Yes

[

]

No

[

]

No

QUESTION 9 (c)
The coming of a mediated resolution (if one was reached)'^
[ ]
Yes
QUESTION 10
Any further comments you would like to make'?'
QUESTION 11 (a)
Are you satisfied with the way your mediated agreement was put into effect
[ ]
Yes
[ ]
No
QUESTION 11 (b)
How was your agreement put into effect'?'
O U E S T I O N l l (c)
If your answer to (a) is NO, can you suggest a better method of putting the agreement into
effect''

QUESTION 12 ra)
If you did not resolve you matter at mediation, did you enter into negotiations after the
mediation which resulted in settlement of the matter?
[

]

Yes

[

]

No

QUESTION 12 (b)
If YES (ie to a) do you think that the mediation session helped with the settlement?
[

]

Yes

[

]

No

APPENDIX B

LAND AND ENVIRONMENT COURT MATTERS
REFERRED TO MEDIATION (1995)
DISPUTE

SUBJECT MATTER

PARTIES

RESOLUTION

1

Class One

GHvBSC

resolved

2

Class One

TvSSC

resolved

3

Class One

Conditions re
restaurant
Dual occupancy
conditions
Subdivision refusal

HvWCC

not resolved

4

Class Two

not resolved

5

Class One

Erection of new
FvWCC
dwelling- landscape
detriment
Alterations to dwelling FvNSC

not resolved

6

Class One

Dual Occupancy refusal HvLCC

resolved

7

Class Two

SvSSC

resolved

8

Class One

Erection of new
dwelling-building
alignment
Erection of townhouse

CvSSC

resolved

9

Class One

Erection of townhouse

FvLSC

not resolved

1 1 Class One

Retail outlet

JT

PC

resolved

12

Class One

resolved

13

Class Three

14

Class One

Concrete Batching
LvNC
Plant- contrary to
public interest
{objectors) and zoning
Compensation payable DvSRA
for land acquistion
Dual Occupancy refusal MvNSC

15

Class One

Dual Occupancy refusal HvWCC

resolved

16

Class One

resolved

16

Class Two

Erection of pontoon and RvRSC
ietty
Building Approval
PCvPC

17

Class One

Dual Occupancy refusal BvRC

resolved

18

Class Two

Refusal to obey Notice

J vSSC

not resolved

19

Class One

Erection of dwelling

MvLC

resolved

20

Class One

Conversion of office
space

BvLC

resolved

V

resolved
resolved

not resolved

DISPUTE
21

Class One

22

Class One

23

Class One

24

Class One

25

SUBJECT MATTER
Childcare Centre
Medium density
residential
New residence

PARTIES

RESOLUTION

CvPCC

not resolved

L vTC

not resolved

J vLC

resolved

GvLC

not resolved

Class One

Demolition &
reconstruction
Subdivision

CvSCC

resolved

26

Class One

Retaining wall

HvBMC

resolved

27

Class One

AvRCC

resolved

28

Class One

Construction of
verandah
Residential

MVSSC

resolved

29

Class One

Commercial

BvBMC

resolved

30

Class Two

Demolition order

GvWC

resolved

(objectors)

31

Class Two

Swimming pool

GvSSC

resolved

32

Class Two

Demolition order

BvSSC

not resolved

33

Class Three Compensation

WH V RTA

resolved

34

Class Three Compensation

CvRTA

resolved

35

Class Three Compensation

D vRTA

resolved

36

Class Three Compensation

HvRTA

resolved

37

Class Three Compensation

WvRTA

not resolved

38

Class Three Compensation

SvRTA

not resolved

39

Class One

Residential

AvNSC

resolved

40

Class One

Medium density

J vNSC

resolved

41

Class One

Rural subdivision

J vTC

resolved

42

Class One

Subdivision

BVBMC

resolved

43

Class One

Residential

BMDHvBMC

resolved

44

Class One

resolved

45

Class One

Consent to commercial DvMC
advertising
Dual occupancy
PvMC

46

Class One

Dual occupancy

resolved

SvCC

resolved

47

DISPUTE
Class One

SUBJECT MATTER
Dual occipancy

PARTIES
FvBMC

RESOLUTION
not resolved

48

Class One

Medium density

SRUvWCC

not resolved

49

Qass One

Medium density

CM V NSC

resolved

50

Class One

Medium density

TvBMC

resolved

51

Class One

Dual occupancy

CMP V NSC

resolved

52

Class One

Industrial

TPHvSSC

resolved

53

Qass One

Dual occupancy

WvCC

resolved

54

Class One

Medium density

S v AC

resolved

55

Class Two

Demolition order

PvSSC

resolved

56

Class Two

Addition/alteration

CCvDC

not resolved

57

Class Two

Garage

KvSSC

resolved

58

Class Two

Rural water connection WvCC

resolved

59

Class Two

Demolition order

CvSSC

resolved

60

Class Two

Additions

J vKC

not resolved

61

Class Two

Additions

LvPC

not resolved

62

Class Two

New dwelling

LvKC

resolved

63

Class Two

Additions

SvLC

not resolved

64

Class Two

Demolition order

NvBC

not resolved

65

Class Two

New dwelling

PvKC

resolved

66

Class Two

New dwelling

KvWC

resolved

67

Class Two

Carport

BPAvDC

resolved

68

Class Three

Compensation

M

resolved

69

Class Three

Compensation

CvRTA

resolved

70

Class Three

Compensation

GvRTA

resolved

71

Class Three Compensation

U vRTA

resolved

72
73

Class Three Compensation
Class Four
Obj. to development
consent iObiector.)

RvRTA
BHvBMC

not resolved
resolved

V

RTA

APPEr)IDIX c
- A L T E R N A T I V E DISPUTE RESOLUTION RESEARCH
B a c k g r o u n d Rescarcli - L a n d Si E n v i r o n m e n t C o u r t .

File No:

(numerical order)

1. Parties Involved at mediation confcrcncc (circle) •'

A. Local Government

B. State Autliority/Department

C. Development/Real Estate Company

D. Planning Consultant

E. Objcctor(s)

F. Environmental Group

G" Private Individual (as applicant)

H. Other

(note where tliere is legal representation with ' L ' )

2. Location of vSite in dispute (circle)

A. Sydney Metropolitan Area
(i) City/Inner City
(iii) Fringe
B. Coastal
C Other Regional

3. Class of Dispute C1 -4)

(ii) Suburban

4. Nature of Dispute fcirclc)

A. Determination of development application.
(i) dual occupancy

(ii) medium density residential

(iii) other residential

(iv) commercial

(v) industrial

(vi) other

B. Appeal over conditions of consent (DA).
C. Matters pertaining to building application.
D. Injunction/restraining orders sought.
E Compensation determination.
F. Judicial review of decision/consent.
G. Other.

5. Outcome fwherc possible)

A) Dispute successfully mediated.
B. Partial agreement achieved - areas of dispute lessened,
C. No area of agreement - matter to proceed to litigation.

APPENDIX D

RACAC PARTICIPANTS
INTERVIEWS
RESEARCH QUESTION A.
Was the lAP negotiation process an example of
the use of ADR to resolve environmental
disputes?
1. What was your organisation's involvement In the lAP
process generally & the negotiations specifically?
(PROMPT: how were you invited to participate?
Were you a willing participant?
Was it just a continuation of an ongoing consultative
process?)

2. What was being negotiated in the lAP negotiation
sessions?
(PROMPT: What was your wish list in terms of conservation or
resource outcomes?
What did you hope to achieve?
Were the 4 scenarios on the table?
A negotiated settlement that govemment would rubber
stamp?)

3. What happened at the negotiations in terms of
achieving these aims?
(PROMPT:

Real negotiations in the sense of hard bargaining,
compromises, heated exchanges?
Or essentially a consultative process?
Did what you did or said really matter?)

RESEARCH QUESTION B.
Was the negotiation process effective in
resoiving tiie conflict?
1. How do you rate the success of the negotiation
process?
(PROMPT:
What is your measure of success?
Durable agreement Implemented by government?
Reduction of conflict?
Improved communication?
Greater understanding of other party's perspective?)

2. If the negotiations did not produce a successful
outcome [= Implementing the scenarios], why not?
(PROMPT:
What Intervened- lobbying, political Intervention?
Is It a failure?
Did you want the government to adopt each of the 4
scenarios?)

3. Did the cabinet decision of 23/9/96 (essentially
scenario 3: logging @ 50% plus 5/5 contracts) resolve
the conflict over logging In State Forests?
(PROMPT:
Can It be resolved?
Are stakeholders Irreconcilably opposed?
Can negotiation resolve such disputes?)

APPENDIX E

LAND AND ENVIRONMENT

COURT

MEDIATOR REPORT
Case Number:
Class:
Number of Sessions:
Total time In Session:
Number of Parties:
Local Council / State Authority as Respondent (tick):
Number of Objectors / Third Parties:

Issues Mediated

1.
2.

3.

Full

Degree of
Resolution
None
Partial

Factors

Contributing to

Agreement:

Factors Contributing to Lacic of Agreement:

Level

of Conflict:

Factors

Contributing

High / l\Aoderate / Low
to

Conflict:

Balance of Power Held by: Applicant/ Respondent/ Third
Party / Not an issue

Type of Agreement:

Further Action:

Verbal / Written / None

Consent Orders to be filed
Application to be Withdrawn
Hearing Date to be Allocated
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